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Executive Summary
Background
This report presents the findings of a Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Survey of Kosovo, commissioned by 
SEESAC and undertaken by the Kosovo-based NGO Forum for Civic Initiatives, in partnership with Saferworld. By 
providing information that may support the work of security providers, policy makers and legislators, the SALW 
Survey is intended as a contribution to ongoing attempts at controlling SALW in Kosovo. As such, it covers four 
main areas of analysis: the distribution of SALW across Kosovo, the impact of SALW on the human environment, 
the views of the public towards SALW and security in their communities, and the capacity of institutions for 
dealing with SALW problems in Kosovo.
The research for this SALW Survey was undertaken during a five-month period from February to June 2006. A 
variety of research methods were used during the research, including a Kosovo-wide household survey (HHS) of 
1,258 respondents (standard error margin 2.8%); ten focus group discussions; interviews with more than one 
hundred key officials and opinion-formers; and a review of official data and media reports. A consultation process 
begun in April 2006 allowed officials of the Kosovo Government and United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to review and contribute to research findings. The comments received as a result of 
these processes are reflected in the relevant Sections of the Survey and in an accompanying recommendations 
document.
Having been the subject of an intense armed conflict and subsequent military intervention by NATO forces in 
1999, Kosovo remains today under international administration. While ultimate executive authority over the 
administration of the territory rests with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, an indigenous 
government called the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) was established in 2001 and 
competencies are now bring gradually transferred to it. Headed by a Prime Minister and a President, the PISG 
has recently entered into UN-brokered negotiations with counterparts from Serbia in order to agree on a new 
legal status for the province, to be implemented after the end of the UN interim administration mission.
Like many of its neighbours, Kosovo has suffered the 
consequences of internal SALW proliferation following its period 
of conflict. Illegal SALW possession has long been believed to 
be widespread, and previous estimates have put the number 
of unregistered SALW held within the territory at between 
310,000 and 440,000 weapons. Partly as a consequence of 
this, Kosovo has been affected by high levels of armed crime 
and has also seen the recurrent use of SALW during periods 
of tension. Ongoing violence in Kosovo can be attributed to 
a number of factors, including political and ethnic rivalries 
stemming from the conflict and organised crime. All of this 
occurs against a background of high unemployment, political 
uncertainty regarding the territory’s final status and a still 
developing criminal justice system. Whether in the case of 
ordinary civilians who are driven to keep firearms for their own security, or of criminal groups, the circulation of 
illicit SALW in Kosovo appears to be both a cause and effect of such problems. 
Key findings
SALW Distribution
n	 This Survey estimates that, as of June 2006, there were approximately 400,000 weapons in Kosovo. Of 
these, 33,949 firearms were in the legal possession of individual citizens; 45,217 firearms were in the hands 
  Khakee, A. and Florquin, N., Kosovo and the Gun: A baseline assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo, Small Arms Survey, 
June 2003.
Weapons seizure
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of official agencies and international private security companies; and at least 317,000 firearms were in the 
illegal possession of individual citizens and other groups.
n	 Recent decisions or plans to arm some Customs and Forestry Service personnel may represent an increasing 
trend towards arming state officials who are authorized to use coercive force.
n	 There is currently a two-tier system for arming private security companies, with international companies 
and personnel permitted to carry weapons, and local companies and personnel prohibited from carrying 
weapons.
n	 KPS evidence rooms often contain significant quantities of seized SALW, some of which have been stored for 
a number of years and are not adequately secured. Slow judicial proceedings however block the envisaged 
destruction of many stocks.
n	 According to focus group respondents, weapons possession is more prevalent in rural and border areas, and 
many Kosovans consider this to be legitimate given the level of insecurity in these locations.
n	 Efforts to establish a regulated civilian firearms registration system have been undermined to date by an 
absence of channels for the legal acquisition of SALW. The current system for the issuance of civilian weapon 
permits may have the unintended effect of legalising some illicit weapons and of fostering the development 
of the illicit market for SALW.
n	 Regulations and procedures for licensing civilians to hunt with weapons and for registering weapons used for 
hunting remain confused.
Impact of SALW
n	Medical records from the Pristina University hospital indicate that the impact of SALW misuse on public 
health, while accounting for 3.5% of all recorded deaths, has not been severe in the period from 2003 to 
2005. The level of firearm-related injuries rose sharply during the period of heightened tension and violence 
in March 2004, but was much less severe in the years before and after.
n	 Household survey responses show that Kosovo-Serbs are proportionally more likely to have been a victim of 
SALW-related crime than Kosovo-Albanians.
n	 There is a frequent perception among Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs alike that members of the other 
ethnic group are well armed and that maintaining SALW ownership is important to sustain ‘a balance of 
fear’.
n	 Perceptions of insecurity among minority communities are magnified by a belief that even if reported, crimes 
will not be promptly and properly investigated, nor perpetrators brought to justice.
n	 According to Kosovo Police Service (KPS) data and civil society groups working on the issue, firearms are 
used in violent domestic incidents, most frequently by men to intimidate women.
Attitudes and perceptions regarding SALW
n	 87% of household survey respondents believe illegal firearms pose a threat to the future prosperity of Kosovo. 
However, issues such as unemployment, poor electricity supply, bad roads, and environmental problems 
were perceived as the most pressing concerns by all social groups.
n	 Of the 23.6% of the household survey respondents who said that they would eventually acquire a weapon, 
an overwhelming majority (76.8%) stated that their main reason for doing so would be to protect themselves 
and their family.
n	 Insufficient protection from crime offered by the criminal justice system was the most often cited reason for 
personal firearm possession.
n	 Kosovo-Serb respondents are much more likely to perceive their area as unsafe than other ethnic groups 
(20% of Kosovo-Albanians versus 84% of Kosovo-Serbs fear that they may become a victim of crime in the 
future).
n	 Perceptions of security were more likely to be positive in mono-ethnic areas.
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n	 Household survey (HHS) and focus group discussions results show that the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) is 
the body most trusted to provide border security by Kosovo-Albanians, followed by the NATO-led Kosovo Force 
(KFOR). In contrast, almost two-thirds of Kosovo-Serb respondents thought that ‘other’ forces should protect 
Kosovo’s borders. In addition, evidence suggests that many Kosovo-Serb individuals perceive the Serbian 
Army as the only competent and trustworthy body to undertake this role.
n	 The majority of Kosovo-Albanians surveyed prefer that in the future the KPC becomes an army, while a large 
majority of Kosovo-Serbs believe that it should be completely disbanded. In addition, although there is no 
supporting evidence for this belief, many Kosovo-Serbs are suspicious about the number and types of SALW 
possessed by the KPC.
Capacity to control SALW
n	 The legislative framework for regulating the international transfer of arms and military equipment to and 
from Kosovo contains many loopholes.
n	 Previous voluntary SALW Collection programmes have returned few weapons, and there has been no system-
wide evaluation of previous campaigns, a fact that may hinder future attempts.
n	 Evidence from a variety of sources indicates that there would be no purpose in organising a Kosovo-wide 
voluntary SALW Collection until after Kosovo’s final status has been agreed. It also appears that the factors 
that would stimulate the surrender of SALW during a future SALW Collection programme are: 1) a decision 
on the final status of Kosovo; 2) an improvement in economic conditions; and 3) the use of individual or 
collective incentives.
n	 Kosovans consider the failure of previous SALW Collection programmes to be the result of a continuing fear 
of conflict and instability, and of minimal trust in security providers. This is more pronounced amongst the 
Kosovo-Serb population. However, a significant proportion of Kosovo-Albanians consider family tradition to 
be the primary factor preventing people from surrendering their SALW during amnesty periods.
n	 There are major gaps in the production, collection and analysis of SALW-related statistics by Kosovo health 
and law enforcement institutions. No comprehensive data on deaths and injuries due to firearms is collected, 
making it difficult to measure the direct impact of firearms on public health. The fact that different sets of 
crime statistics are seen to be kept by the KPS and UNMIK Police, makes it difficult for Kosovo institutions 
to develop public policy responses to the impact of SALW.
n	While most relevant institutions demonstrate welcome levels of transparency and share information on 
SALW, others fail to display a genuine willingness to share this knowledge to inform more effective SALW 
Control.
n	 A majority of justice sector professionals perceive security for courts to be inadequate. Many of them express 
a desire for additional protection through the right to bear arms or to hire bodyguards, citing threats against 
their person.
n	 Police and judicial capacity to implement the law regulating SALW possession is lacking, with exceptional 
problems arising in northern parts of Kosovo due to the operation of parallel structures and the significantly 
lower capacity of KPS, KFOR and UNMIK.
n	 Institutional arrangements for the development or implementation of SALW Control policy are still very 
weak.
There can be no doubt that SALW Control poses a fundamental challenge to the stability of Kosovo, and that 
this is only likely to come into sharper focus as a decision on final status moves closer. Over recent months 
there have been a number of encouraging signals that international and Kosovan power-holders are committed 
to addressing the issue of SALW proliferation and misuse. This will not always be easy: many of the problems 
identified in this report compete for priority and some are complex, particularly when considered in light of 
existing processes and plans for the territory. Further, as is the case in most other transitional post-conflict 
societies, the control of SALW is not an end in itself and cannot be achieved successfully unless it is seen as a 
component of much broader processes of reform and change. 
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SALW Control in contemporary Kosovo should therefore be integrated into existing initiatives such as the final 
status negotiations and ISSR, as well as into rule of law programmes. It is critical that leadership is provided to 
ensure that SALW becomes and remains a key element of broader reforms of the security sector. To this end, 
coordination at a senior governmental level is needed to translate the findings and recommendations from 
this and other research into effective and relevant public policy that can be implemented at all levels across 
Kosovo. To enable this, international administrators should continue to encourage the engagement of PISG at 
the organisational as well as individual levels with SALW issues in order to ensure that the future transfer of 
power promotes rather than damages the rights of Kosovans to safety and security.
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SALW Survey of Kosovo
	 Introduction
.	 Background
Having been the subject of an intense armed conflict and 
a subsequent military intervention by NATO forces in 1999, 
Kosova/Kosovo (hereafter referred to as Kosovo) remains under 
international administration. Like many of its neighbours, 
the territory has suffered the consequences of internal SALW 
proliferation following its period of conflict. Illegal SALW 
possession has long been believed to be widespread, and 
previous estimates have put the number of unregistered weapons 
held within the territory at between 310,000 and 440,000. 
Partly as a consequence of this, Kosovo has been afflicted by 
high levels of armed crime and has seen the recurrent use of 
SALW during periods of tension. Ongoing violence in Kosovo 
can be attributed to a number of factors, including political and 
ethnic rivalries stemming from the conflict, organised crime and 
revenge attacks connected with blood feuds. All of this occurs against a background of high unemployment, 
political uncertainty regarding the territory’s final status and a still developing criminal justice system. Whether 
in the case of ordinary civilians who are driven to keep firearms for their own security, or of criminal groups, the 
circulation of illicit SALW in Kosovo appears to be both a cause and effect of such problems. 
This report represents the findings of an independent SALW Survey of Kosovo commissioned by SEESAC and the 
EUSAC project of UNDP Kosovo in light of the above concerns. It was conducted by UK-based NGO Saferworld, 
in partnership with The Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) and the Gani Bobi Research Institute, both of which are 
based in Kosovo. The Survey was undertaken in accordance with the SALW Survey Protocols, and is intended as 
a contribution to ongoing attempts to control SALW in Kosovo by providing information that may inform the work 
of security providers, policy makers and legislators. As such, it covers four main areas:
n	 Small Arms Distribution Survey, which investigates the distribution of SALW across Kosovo;
n	 Small Arms Impact Survey, which examines the impact of SALW on the human environment, specifically by 
looking at armed crime and the impact on individuals, communities and government institutions;
n	 Small Arms Perception Survey, which assesses the views of the public towards SALW and security in their 
communities;
n	 Small Arms Capacity Survey, which examines the capacity of institutions to deal with SALW problems in 
Kosovo.
.	 Methodology
The research for this Survey was undertaken during a five-month period from February to June 2006. The 
research team used a wide variety of sources in order to gather the data required for a comprehensive study, 
both to ensure a high level of accuracy and allow for detailed analysis of the situation. The sources included:
 	Although a Constitutional Framework for Kosovo was implemented following elections in 2001, until very recently, the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has held full executive authority in core areas of justice and security provision, with the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) established in 2001 holding competencies in less sensitive areas such as health and 
education.
  Op cit., Khakee, A., et al.
  Specifically, the Regional Micro Disarmament Standard/Guideline (RMDS/G) 05.80 and the accompanying SALW Survey Protocols 1, 2, 3 
and 4. See: http://www.seesac.org/resources/0580e.pdf and http://www.seesac.org/index.php?content=41&section=6.
Seized small arms, grenades and rifle sights
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n	 A Kosovo-wide household survey (HHS) conducted in Albanian and Serbian by the Centre for Humanistic 
Studies 'Gani Bobi'. The Survey was carried out in March 2006, and was answered by 1,258 heads of 
households across Kosovo covering all main ethnic and social groups.  
n	 Ten focus group discussions; seven in Prishtinë/Priština (both male and female focus groups), Glloboçicë/
Globocicë, Pejë/Peć, Graçanicë/Gracanica, Leposaviq/Leposavić, and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, with a further 
three focus groups being conducted with businesspeople, war veterans and young people. These were used 
to provide a deeper understanding of their perceptions and priorities on SALW and security issues. The 
focus groups included a larger proportion of women, with two female-only groups, and a further two mixed 
discussions to compensate for their under-representation in the HHS sample.
n	 Over one hundred 'Key Informant' Interviews (KII) with government officials, technical specialists (military, 
police, psychologists, arms control implementers, investigative journalists) and community leaders.
n	 Analysis of media reports (both Kosovan and international) for the period January 2005 to July 2006, in 
order to gather additional information on the levels and type of SALW use across Kosovo.
n	 Analysis of official economic, medical and criminal data accessed either directly from relevant institutions or 
from public sources. 
n	 A desk review of relevant academic and research papers (both international and national) published on 
SALW or related issues in recent years.
A process of consultation with the PISG and UNMIK officials on the initial findings of the Survey began in April 
2006 in order to better inform responses to the SALW problem in Kosovo. A separate document containing 
the preliminary research findings and accompanying recommendations was then submitted to all relevant 
stakeholders; both those of Kosovo's PISG and the international administration. Their views were solicited through 
a series of individual meetings, and also in writing. Finally, an inter-ministerial roundtable was held in June 
2006 to discuss the findings and enable the different ministries to co-ordinate their response. The comments 
received as a result are reflected in the final recommendations document and are available on request from the 
authors.
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	 Small	Arms	Distribution	Survey
.	 Overall	distribution
This Survey estimates that, as of June 2006, there were nearly 400,000 weapons in Kosovo. Of these:
n	33,936 firearms were in the legal possession of individual citizens;
n	45,217 firearms were in the hands of official agencies and international private security companies;
n	At least 317,000 firearms were in the illegal possession of individual citizens and groups.
This Chapter provides a detailed breakdown of the distribution of SALW in each category and, where estimates 
are given, information on the method used to calculate them.
.	 Legal	SALW
..	 Civilian	SALW	holdings
As of June 2006, the Weapon Authorization Section (WAS) of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) had registered 
33,949 firearms belonging to individual civilians (both Kosovans and internationals). Of these, 99.5% (33,774) 
were hunting and recreational weapons, with the remainder being firearms registered with a Weapon Authorization 
Card (WAC), held for self-defence or close protection (see below).
TYPE	OF	WEAPONS	REGISTERED NUMBER	OF	WEAPONS	REGISTERED
Hunting and recreational weapons 33,774
WAC-registered weapons4 175
TOTAL 33,949
Table 1: Registered weapons owned by civilians4
(Source: WAS data)
As the regional breakdown in Table 2 below shows, Prishtinë/Priština has the highest number of registered 
SALW. However, Prishtinë/Priština accounts for 25% of all registered SALW, with Mitrovicë/Mitrovica accounting 
for almost 20%. The regions of Gjilan/Gnjilane, Pejë/Peć and Prizren/Prizren accounted for around 15% each, 
while the Ferizaj/Uroševac region accounted for just over ten percent of registered hunting and recreational 
weapons. 
LOCATION NUMBER %	OF	TOTAL
Prishtinë/Priština 8,653 25.6%
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 6,670 19.8%
Pejë/Peć 5,292 15.7%
Gjilan/Gnjilane 4,842 14.4%
Prizren/Prizren 4,811 14.3%
Ferizaj/Uroševac 3,506 10.4%
TOTAL 33,774 - 
Table 2: Geographical distribution of registered hunting and recreational weapons
4 This number includes 162 WAC-registered weapons held by Kosovan and non-Kosovan individuals, and 13 WAC-registered weapons held 
by international private security companies (IPSCs). With regards to local private security companies, staff who are either citizens of Kosovo 
or nationals of the ex-Yugoslav successor states or of those states neighbouring Kosovo are not permitted to carry weapons. For further 
information regarding firearms held by IPSCs, see Section 2.2.2.6 of this Chapter.
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The majority of WAC-registered firearms are handguns, though weapons with calibres of 7.62mm, 7.65mm and 
7.9mm have also been registered. According to KPS data, of Kosovo’s 162 individual civilian WAC-holders (each 
holding one firearm only): 
n	 71 were individuals who required them for their personal protection; and
n	 91 were bodyguards providing close protection to individuals deemed to be at risk.
In contrast to the fairly wide geographic distribution of registered hunting and recreational weapons, individual 
WAC-holders appear to be concentrated in Prishtinë/Priština, with 60% of all WAC-holders based there (see Table 
3 below). Further, as of June 2006, 83% of individual WAC-holders were Kosovo-Albanians, with only two Kosovo-
Serbs in possession of a WAC-licensed firearm (see Table 4 below). 
LOCATION NUMBER
Prishtinë/Priština 105
Pejë/Peć 19
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 15
Gjilan/Gnjilane 13
Prizren/Prizren 9
Ferizaj/Uroševac
14
(Including 13 registered to 
IPSCs)
TOTAL 175
Table 3: Possession of WACs by ethnicity
ETHNICITY NUMBER
Kosovo-Albanian 135
Kosovo-Serb 2
Non-Kosovan 38
TOTAL 175
Table 4: Ethnic and national distribution of WACs
Therefore, the combined total of registered hunting and recreational and WAC-authorised SALW suggests that 
there are approximately 1.7 registered firearms per 100 people in Kosovo. This rate of per capita legal firearm 
ownership is significantly below the 2004 European Union (EU) 15 average of 11 firearms per 100 people, 
and also falls below the rates identified in most other South Eastern European countries, with the exception of 
Moldova (see Figure 1 and Table 5 below). However, the situation in Kosovo with regard to firearm ownership 
is distorted by the fact that legal possession of firearms other than hunting and recreational weapons is not 
permitted, with exceptions granted only in special cases. As such, it is clear that the vast majority of Kosovo’s 
civilian-owned weapons are illegally held, and thus it is perhaps unsurprising that the rate of registered firearms 
is significantly lower than in other places (see Section 2.3.1 below).
	 Official WAS data received from Giulio Torresi, 22 June 2006.
  This is based on the population estimate of two million provided by the Statistical Office of Kosovo. Available at: http://www.ks-gov.net/
esk/index_english.htm, accessed 20 June 2006.
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Figure 1: Registered firearms per 100 people
COUNTRY CIVILIAN	WEAPONS POPULATION
CIVILIAN	WEAPONS	
/	00	PERSONS
ESTIMATED	ILLEGAL	
NUMBER	OF	CIVILIAN	
WEAPONS
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 353,000 3,800,000 9.3 148,400 - 494,300
Bulgaria 305,624 - 3.9 93,200 - 259,000
Croatia 379,000+ 4,500,000 8.4 - 
FYR Macedonia 155,996 2,022,547 7.7 100,000 - 450,000
Kosovo 33,949 2,000,000 (est.) 1.7 -
Moldova 55,613 3,386,000 1.6 -
Montenegro 86,000 650,575 13.2 40,000 - 89,000
Serbia 1,103,300 7,498,001 14.7 900,000
EU 15 Average - - 11.0 -
Table 5: Registered firearms in selected countries and the region
(Source: National SALW Surveys, 2004 - 2005)
2.2.2	 SALW	held	by	official	agencies
The following agencies and persons are currently permitted to hold SALW in Kosovo: KFOR; authorised UN security 
officers; UN Civilian Police; the KPS; the Kosovo Correctional Service; legal persons operating as international 
security providers registered and licensed by UNMIK; the KPC (maintaining ‘KFOR authorised weapons’); and 
since June 2006, the Customs Service and forest guards working for the Forestry Service.
 These estimates are taken from the most recent SALW Survey undertaken in each country. These Surveys can be found at http://www.
seesac.org/index.php?content=&page=sur&section=6. The population figures reflect the census most recent to each study. The EU 15 
average is taken from Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2003 (Oxford, 2003).
  Hereafter referred to as UNMIK Police.
 UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 ‘On the Authorization of Possession of Weapons in Kosovo’, 21 February 2001, and UNMIK Regulation 
2006/35 ‘Amending UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 on the Authorization of Possession of Weapons in Kosovo’, 06 June 2006. This most recent 
amendment will allow ‘a limited number of personally identified customs officers and forest guards on duty’ to carry semi-automatic pistols; 
correspondence with Piotr Zavgorodni, Senior Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Advisor, UNMIK, 21 June 2006.
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Transparency with regard to official SALW holdings varies between different agencies. Whilst most agencies 
approached by the Survey team openly disclosed their SALW holdings, some proved unwilling or unable to 
disclose such information. In such cases, where possible, an estimate was made on the basis of force numbers. 
Table 6 below draws together information on the numbers of weapons only possessed by official agencies in 
Kosovo, (no assessment was made of their ammunition holdings). The numbers are based on analysis presented 
in Sections 2.2.2.1 to 2.2.2.8.
AGENCY WEAPON	HOLDINGS
KPS (including the Border Police) 6,954
UNMIK Police 2,450
Kosovo Correctional Service Not available
KPC Approximately 2,200 (see Section 2.2.2.4)
KFOR Estimated 33,600 (see Section 2.2.2.5)
WAC-registered IPSCs 13
Customs Service At least 10
Forestry Service Not available
TOTAL 45,227
Table 6: Current weapon holdings of official agencies in Kosovo
...	 The	Kosovo	Police	Service
Each of the 6,846 officers serving in the KPS, including the Border Police, is armed with a Glock 9 x 19 mm 
pistol. Each weapon remains in the personal care of the officer to which it is assigned at all times. When off-
duty, weapons are stored in the home. It should be noted that the KPS does not apparently hold any weapons in 
reserve, instead purchasing additional weapons when necessary.0 In addition to the standard Glock pistols, the 
KPS holds a number of long-barrelled weapons, which are used for special policing tasks (see Table 7 below). The 
Border Police is also in the possession of 35 rifles, which are mostly of Yugoslav origin.
WEAPON	TYPE QUANTITY
Glock Pistols 9 x 19 mm 6,147
Glock Pistols 9 x 19 mm (Border Police) 699
AK-47 Assault Rifles 9
MP-5 Sub Machine Guns 64
Rifles (Border Police) 35
TOTAL 6,954
Table 7: Weapons held by KPS (May 2006)
(Source: KPS)
...	 UNMIK	Police
As of May 2006, UNMIK Civilian Police held 2,450 weapons, which are distributed throughout Kosovo. However, 
the research team did not obtain details on the specific types of these weapons or their precise geographical 
distribution. 
0  Correspondence, Major Ali Kllokoqi, KPS Department of Public Order, 18 April, 24 April and 13 July 2006.
  Interview, Lt Col Samedin Mehmeti, KPS Border Police, 18 April 2006.
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WEAPON	TYPE QUANTITY
Handguns 2,000
Long-barrelled Weapons 450
TOTAL 2,450
Table 8: Weapons held by UNMIK Police
(Source: UNMIK Police)
...	 The	Kosovo	Correctional	Service
Despite repeated requests, it was not possible to obtain information on the number of weapons held by the 
Kosovo Correctional Service or their stockpiling procedures. 
...4	 The	Kosovo	Protection	Corps	
The KPC’s active weapons holdings consist of 150 short-barrelled and around 200 long-barrelled weapons that 
are used to secure their premises. The KPC possess a further 50 deactivated weapons, which are used only for 
ceremonial purposes. Another 1,800 KPC weapons are held in trust by KFOR, handled by a single multinational 
KFOR brigade at a central storage site in Prishtinë/Priština, but serviced by the KPC. 
WEAPON		TYPE QUANTITY
ACTIvE HOLDINGS
Short-barrelled Weapons 150
Long-barrelled Weapons Approx 200
DEACTIvATED WEAPONS
SALW (Ceremonial use only) 50
WEAPONS HELD IN TRUST By KFOR
Type unspecified 1,800
TOTAL Approx 2,200
Table 9: Weapons held by the KPC
...	 NATO	Kosovo	Force	(KFOR)
Despite requests, KFOR did not provide information on its SALW holdings and therefore an estimate has been 
made based on troop numbers (minimum 16,000) and likely holdings of 2.1 weapons per soldier, yielding a 
rough estimate of 33,600 weapons in total.4 
...	 International	Private	Security	Companies	(PSC)
International staff of private security companies operating in Kosovo are permitted to carry firearms if registered 
and licensed by UNMIK. Local staff and private security companies not staffed by ‘internationals’ may not carry 
firearms. According to the WAS of the KPS, there are currently 13 WAC-registered firearms in the possession of 
IPSCs operating in Kosovo.
  Interview, Major Adem Bashota, KPC Special Equipment Officer, 09 March 2006.
  Interview, Major Costica Paraschiv, KFOR Inspectorate for KPC, 09 March 2006.
4  The multiplier of 2.1 weapons per soldier is a mean figure based on an unofficial estimate of 1.8 to 2.4 weapons per soldier for most 
armies, received from the Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG) of the UK armed forces. 
  UNMIK Regulation 2001/7.
  Official WAS data received from Giulio Torresi, 22 June 2006.
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...	 Customs	Service
Although unarmed at the time of writing, the Customs Service will have 76 weapons-trained officers by the 
autumn of 2006, as a result of a perception that staff within the Service are often subject to threats. However, 
it is expected that no more than 10 officers, working in mobile anti-smuggling units, will be armed on any given 
day. Other trained officers will only be equipped with weapons for special operations. The exact number and type 
of weapons that the Customs Service will procure has yet to be determined. 
...	 Forestry	Service
At the time of writing, the Forestry Service had plans to arm 200 of its forest guards with low-calibre weapons. 
There does however appear to be confusion as to whom exactly the authorisation to carry weapons applies. 
Whilst the UNMIK Office of the Legal Advisor stressed that the amendment concerns only a limited number of 
forest guards working for the Service and thus does not extend to Forest Service staff in general, the Forestry 
Service’s Chief Executive suggested that they also plan to provide firearms to their engineers, inspectors and 
technicians, citing the danger facing such staff as the reason for this move.0 
.	 Illicit	SALW
As well as exploring the number of illicit SALW in circulation in Kosovo, this Survey examines the different types 
of SALW owners. An understanding of the latter is arguably more valuable as the different types of SALW owners 
present different degrees of threat to safety and security in Kosovo.
2.3.1	 Number	of	unregistered	firearms	in	circulation
A feature common to most SALW Surveys undertaken in the region to date has been the difficulty in arriving at a 
reliable estimate of illicit SALW holdings. This task is arguably more difficult in Kosovo due to the absence of a 
baseline figure (such as the number of SALW looted or the size of reservist stocks) that might be used to generate 
estimates. Therefore, the estimate suggested below is based on information collected through KIIs conducted 
in 2006 together with official data on SALW Collections and seizures. These data sources suggest that the real 
level of SALW ownership amongst civilians is substantially higher, in fact many times higher, than the number of 
registered civilian SALW. 
...	 Household	survey	estimates
While the HHS contributed much to an understanding of SALW and security issues throughout Kosovo, it did 
not provide a reliable basis for estimating levels of illegal SALW possession. While under-reporting of SALW 
ownership is a common feature of such research methods, Kosovo’s recent conflict and its unresolved status 
have meant that respondents treated SALW-related questions with extreme caution, and sometimes with 
suspicion. As a result, HHS-based estimates do not correspond with informed estimates offered by KIIs and bear 
no relation to official crime figures and seizure rates. A number of reasons were provided by respondents for their 
unwillingness to answer SALW-related questions, including negative experiences of the past, an unwillingness to 
answer ‘provocative’ questions, suspicion that the questions were linked with a planned seizure operation, and 
a reluctance to ‘betray’ their neighbours.
  Correspondence, Malcolm Brown, Director of Law Enforcement, UNMIK Customs, 09 May 2006.
  Interview, Muzafer Luma, Chief Executive, Kosovo Forestry Agency, 21 April 2006.
  The wording of the legislation is unambiguous here: ‘Weapons (semi-automatic pistols) to be used by personally identified officers of the 
UNMIK Customs Service and Forest Guards of the Forest Service which shall be assigned to them by the designated management officials 
concerned under the authority of, and within the terms and conditions prescribed by, the UNMIK Police Commissioner’; op. cit., UNMIK 
Regulation 2006/35.
0  Interview, Muzafer Luma, 21 April 2006.
  See for example, op. cit., Rynn, S. et al., p. 46; and op. cit., Taylor, Z. et al., p. 12.
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...	 Key	Informant	Interview	estimates
Both Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serb KIIs regularly reported that either ‘each household in Kosovo has a 
weapon’ or that ‘there are two weapons for every household in Kosovo.’ For comparative purposes, in other 
SALW Surveys undertaken in South Eastern Europe (SEE), the response ‘every household has a weapon’ was 
usually given as the maximum assessment of SALW possession. The lower assessment of one weapon per 
household in Kosovo yields an estimate of around 357,100 weapons and if one subtracts the total number 
of registered civilian weapons and KPS handguns from this number, this produces a rough approximation of 
317,000 unregistered firearms currently in circulation throughout Kosovo. This estimate falls within the lower 
end of the 310,000 to 440,000 estimate of illicit SALW reached by the authors of the 2003 study ‘Kosovo and 
the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of SALW in Kosovo.’ 
2.3.2	 SALW	collected	by	official	agencies
Since the end of the 1999 conflict, SALW have been removed from Kosovan society by KFOR and the police 
through a combination of seizures and collections. To date, amnesty periods were held in 2001, 2002 and 2003, 
during which illicit SALW could be voluntarily surrendered to KFOR and the police. As Table 10 shows, the results 
of the amnesty and collection campaigns are poor in comparison to the estimated number of unregistered 
weapons in Kosovo. The 2003 collection campaign, organised jointly by UNDP, UNMIK and KFOR, stands out 
as a particular failure in this regard.4 However, it should also be noted that even the figure of 9,978 weapons 
collected by KFOR under the June 1999 demilitarisation agreement with the KLA is believed to represent a small 
proportion of the organisation’s arsenal.
PERIOD WEAPONS ROUNDS	OF	
AMMUNITION
21 June - 19 September 1999 9,978 5,000,000
01 May - 03 June 2001 777 Approx 31,000
15 March - 15 April 2002 496 59,200 
01 - 30 September 2003 155 -
TOTAL 11,406 5,090,200
Table 10: Results of individual SALW Collection campaigns 
2.3.3	 SALW	seized	by	official	agencies
The total yields of seizure operations by official agencies in Kosovo are much higher than the yields of the 
voluntary collection initiatives. According to official UNMIK records, the police in Kosovo seized a total of 4,026 
  The assessment ‘one weapon for each household’ does not necessarily imply that every household in Kosovo possesses a weapon. 
Rather, it is an estimate of the number of SALW in circulation in Kosovo in proportion to its population. Whilst there will be households with 
no weapon, others may own more than one, and even larger quantities will be owned by criminal or extremist groups.
  Op. cit., Khakee, A. and Florquin, N. There may be a number of reasons for this discrepancy, including: the likely net outflow of SALW 
from Kosovo since 2003 (see Sections 2.3.6 and 2.3.7); continued seizures of SALW by KFOR and the police (see Section 2.3.3); and the 
variations and error margins associated with the different techniques used by the two research teams when calculating illicit possession.
4  On 20 June 1999 the KFOR and the KLA commanders signed an ‘Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UCK’ 
committing the KLA to surrender all weapons other than pistols and hunting weapons within 90 days. In addition to 9,000 ‘small arms’, 
800 machine guns and 178 mortars, 300 anti-tank mines 27,000 hand grenades, 1,200 ‘mines’, 1,000 kg of explosives and 5m rounds of 
ammunition were reportedly surrendered. See: Ripley, T. ‘The UCK´s Arsenal’, Jane´s Intelligence Review, November 2000.
  Correspondence, Adrian Wilkinson, Head, SEESAC, 26 July 2006.
 Data reproduced in op. cit., Khakee, A. and Florquin, N., shows a total of 1,391 SALW collected during the 2002 amnesty period. Of the 
total, 895 were ‘miscellaneous items’ which include uniforms and masks. Thus, the number of ‘miscellaneous items’ has been subtracted 
from the total. The number appearing in this Table covers the rifles, pistols, machine guns, mortars, anti-tank weapon systems, missiles, 
grenades and mines collected during the amnesty. The number for 2001 includes all of the above as well as 75 ‘uncategorised support 
weapons’.
  Data for 2001 and 2002 obtained from op. cit., Khakee, A. and Florquin, N., p. 22. Data for 2003 from SEESAC, Clearing Guns, October 
2003.
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weapons in 2004 and 2005, suggesting an average seizure rate of 167 weapons per month.	Table 11 shows 
the actual weapons seizures for each month of 2004 and 2005. The figures include 436 bladed weapons that 
were not disaggregated from this data.
MONTH 004 00 TOTAL
January 218 206 424
February 111 143 254
March 189 128 317
April 145 240 385
May 207 227 434
June 145 187 332
July 170 224 394
August 182 241 423
September 159 214 373
October 181 184 365
November 207 175 382
December 179 200 379
TOTAL 2,093 2,369 4,462
Table 11: Police weapons seizures, UNMIK Police, 2004 – 2005
Total police weapons seizures increased by 13% in 2005 in comparison to 2004, with SALW seizures rising 
by almost 12%. However, UNMIK data does not record a corresponding increase in SALW-related crime in this 
period (see Section 3.2.1), and the increase is probably therefore due to improved data collection and record 
keeping. It is possible that it could also indicate increased police capacity in the detection and interception of 
unregistered SALW. 
Despite requests, data from KFOR on SALW seizures was not made 
available, so it is difficult to establish a detailed picture of the overall 
number of SALW removed from society since the end of the conflict. 
Since the start of its mandate in Kosovo, KFOR has been involved in 
regular SALW seizure operations, including random house searches 
and at vehicle checkpoints. During the past three years, KFOR has been 
routinely informing UNMIK Police and the KPS of its SALW seizures, or 
has carried out operations in cooperation with these forces. However, 
the research team were unable to clarify to their satisfaction whether 
the above UNMIK Police data incorporates items seized by KFOR.
Discoveries of large-scale SALW caches are much less frequent now 
seven years after the end of the conflict than in the immediate post-
conflict period, a fact that is attributable partly to changing KFOR 
manpower and tasking, and partly to the clearance of more accessible 
hides. However, the relatively high day-to-day seizure rates recorded by 
official agencies indicate the continued presence of large quantities 
of unregistered weapons in Kosovo. SALW were being seized at a rate 
of 5.4 per day during the period 01 January to 20 April 2006. During 
this period, security agencies in Kosovo seized a total of 591 SALW in 
  Official UNMIK Police data, received from Jan Shuerman, Chief of Staff, UNMIK Police, 10 March 2006.
  Correspondence, Shane Tench, Regional Investigations Liaison Officer, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica RHQ, UNMIK Police.
Greek KFOR soldiers disassemble collected 
firearms
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320 separate incidents, with seizures solely composed of ammunition occurring a further 18 times. According to 
UNMIK data, of the total number of SALW seized, 570 were firearms. 
...	 Geographic	distribution	of	SALW	seizures
UNMIK Police records show that during 2004 and 2005, the greatest number of SALW were seized in the Pejë/Peć 
region (1,509), followed by the Prishtinë/Priština region (1,181). According to the data, Pejë/Peć and Prishtinë/
Priština regions together account for more than half of all SALW seized in Kosovo during 2004 and 2005. Most 
notable here has been the sharp increase in the number of SALW seized in Prishtinë/Priština, though the number 
of SALW seized there remains lower than in Pejë/Peć. This data also showed Mitrovicë/Mitrovica to be the region 
with the lowest SALW seizure rate. It can be argued that this is at least in part due to a comparatively low police 
presence in that area.
REGION 004 00 TOTAL
Border Police 8 25 33
Gjilan / Gnjilane 359 303 662
Mitrovicë / Mitrovica 210 250 460
Pejë / Peć 746 763 1,509
Prishtinë / Priština 453 728 1,181
Prizren  317 300 617
TOTAL 2,093 2,369 4,462
Table 12: Seized SALW by region, UNMIK Police, 2004 - 2005
Similar patters are discernible in UNMIK records for the first four months of 2006. These show that, during this 
period, a notably larger number of SALW were seized in the south-west region of Kosovo than anywhere else, an 
area that includes the towns of Pejë/Peć and Podujevë/Podujevo. The Prishtinë/Priština region was a remote 
second, with substantially fewer firearms confiscated in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and Gjilan/Gnjilane regions. 
..4	 Types	of	illicit	SALW	seized
The most recent data regarding the number of seized or collected SALW was obtained from UNMIK Police, covering 
the years 2004 and 2005. The data includes both SALW that were seized because they were unregistered, and 
those that were seized because they were used in the commission of a criminal offence. The breakdown of the 
items seized by type, presented in Figure 2 below, can therefore be used to indicate the types of illicit SALW in 
circulation in Kosovo. However, the breakdown is weighed in two main respects. Firstly, the category ‘other’ is 
an aggregate of items such as ammunition and explosives. Secondly, the types of weapons seized during law 
enforcement operations obviously differ to an extent from the wider pool of unregistered weapons in society. For 
example, pistols are probably over-represented in these figures, while unregistered hunting rifles are likely to 
constitute a much larger proportion of illegally held weapons than suggested by this data.
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Figure 2: Type of SALW seized by the police in 2004 and 200530
Pistols, rifles and shotguns accounted for 76% of all SALW seized by police in 2005, and 79.5% of all SALW seized 
by the police in 2004. Pistols alone accounted for 39.4% of all SALW seized in 2004 and 2005 combined, with 
rifles accounting for a further 23.3%. However, the only categories of seized SALW for which there is a decrease 
between 2004 and 2005 are ‘rifles’ and ‘rocket launchers’; all other categories reporting increased seizures, 
with the number of machine guns seized increasing substantially from 193 in 2004 to 270 in 2005.
SALW	TYPE 004
PROPORTION	OF	
ALL	004	SALW	
SEIZURES
00
PROPORTION	OF	
ALL	00	SALW	
SEIZURES
TOTAL	FOR	004	
AND	00
PROPORTION	
OF	ALL	004	
AND	00	SALW	
SEIZURES
Machine Gun 193 10.2% 270 12.7% 463 11.5%
Pistol 703 37% 883 41.6% 1,586 39.4%
Rifle 517 27.2% 421 19.8% 938 23.3%
Rocket 
Launcher 5 0.3% 4 0.2% 9 0.2%
Shotgun 290 15.3% 310 14.6% 600 14.9%
Sub-Machine 
Gun 66 3.5% 76 3.6% 142 3.5%
Other 127 6.7% 161 7.6% 288 7.2%
TOTAL 1,901 - 2,125 - 4,026 -
Table 13: Weapons seized by the police during 2004 - 2005, by type
..	 Demand	for	illegal	SALW	and	their	use
Although it was widely acknowledged in KIIs that a large number of unregistered weapons remain in circulation in 
Kosovo, demand for SALW by groups involved in armed combat has waned since the end of the conflict. However, 
demand for firearms in Kosovo has not completely disappeared. Three of the main factors that drive demand for 
illicit SALW are presented below, although they should not be considered the only sources of demand for illegal 
SALW. Tradition has been omitted from this list as this reason is usually given for justifying possession, rather 
than stimulating demand for illegal SALW.  
0  Official UNMIK Police data, Jan Schuermann, 10 March 2006. It is unclear whether the data only covers seizures by UNMIK Police or 
whether it also includes seizures by the KPS.
Rocket Launcher, 9 
(0.2%)
Other, 288 (7.2%)
Sub Machine Gun, 
142 (3.5%)
Shotgun, 600 
(14.9%)
Machine Gun, 463 
(11.5%)
Rifle, 938 (23.3%)
Pistol, 1,586 (39.4%)
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n Lack of legal channels for acquiring a firearm: in the current legal environment, it is not possible for an 
individual to obtain a firearm legally. Individuals who wish to obtain a hunting or recreational rifle are forced 
to use the illicit market, due to the fact that there are no licensed SALW vendors in Kosovo. 
n To provide security and protection for oneself and one’s family and property: another important factor 
fuelling the demand and continued possession of illegal firearms amongst individuals is the lack of faith that 
citizens place in Kosovo’s security providers to protect them from crime and attacks against their person 
and property. HHS findings suggest that this is the main reason for SALW possession in Kosovo (see Section 
4.5). 
n To pursue criminal activities: this is a reason for which not only individuals but also groups may seek 
to acquire illegal SALW. It is believed that the SALW sought for criminal purposes tend to be of a higher 
specification than in the other two options presented here, with handguns being the preferred option. The 
data on SALW seizures in Kosovo and criminal preferences for handguns in Albania and Serbia would also 
support this assertion.
These demand drivers pose widely different law enforcement challenges, and present different degrees of threat 
to security and safety in Kosovo. At the one end of the spectrum is the demand for illicit hunting weapons, which 
is largely determined by the existing legal framework and an absence of alternative channels for obtaining such 
weapons. Demand for these weapons may be expected to decrease when conditions change. At the other end is 
demand for the higher-specification SALW by criminal groups. The control of the SALW possessed by these groups 
requires sophisticated investigation and law enforcement techniques.
..	 Sources	of	illegal	SALW
...	 Ex-Yugoslav	SALW	holdings
Under the terms of the ‘Military-Technical Agreement’ (MTA) between NATO and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) was required to withdraw its personnel, along 
with FRY’s other security forces, from Kosovo. Despite the official withdrawal of its forces on 12 June 1999, 
the MUP has maintained a parallel policing structure in Kosovo’s northern municipalities. Whether or not they 
remain employed by the MUP, many of the former police officers have retained their firearms, despite the fact 
that they are now illicit SALW within the new legal framework of Kosovo. It is also likely that former Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA) soldiers possess SALW that were previously owned by the Yugoslav army. SALW from JNA 
stores and soldiers who retreated from Kosovo in 1999 have almost certainly increased the number of illegal 
SALW in Kosovo. This has been confirmed by a number of KIIs in Kosovo’s northern municipalities, although no 
official register or estimate of these ex-Yugoslav MUP and JNA SALW is available. Furthermore, the 2003 Small 
Arms Survey report ‘Kosovo and the Gun’ estimated that between 9,900 and 13,800 SALW had been covertly 
supplied to Kosovo-Serb civilians and paramilitary groups in the 1990s.4 While it is highly likely that most of 
these SALW left the area with the fleeing Kosovo-Serbs, or were confiscated by KFOR, they too will have added 
to the pool of illegal SALW in Kosovo.
...	 SALW	looted	from	stocks	in	Albania
Many of the SALW looted from military depots in Albania in 1997 made their way to a range of different recipients 
in Kosovo. Apart from groups such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (see below), these SALW also reached 
Kosovan refugees who obtained them during their displacement in Albania in 1998 and 1999. According to a 
2006 report on SALW and security in Albania, an estimated 39,000 SALW were brought into Kosovo by refugees 
returning from Albania, and although this estimate should be viewed with a low degree of reliability, it is a known 
  Available at: http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm, accessed 26 June 2006.
  Interviews, unofficial MUP representatives, North Mitrovica, March 2006.
  KII, North Mitrovica, 13 March 2006.
4  Op. cit., Khakee, A. and Florquin, N., p. 15.
  It is estimated that approximately 450,000 refugees from Kosovo entered Albania, and according to estimates obtained by the 2005 
SALW Survey of Albania, about 70% of the family groups (counting eight people on average) would have taken a weapon with them when 
returning from Albania. This would suggest a rough estimate of around 39,000 SALW brought back from Albania by civilians. Holtom, P. et al., 
Turning the Page: Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania (CPDE/Saferworld, 2005), p. 41.
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fact that refugees did bring arms back into Kosovo after the conflict, and this should therefore be considered as 
an important source of illicit SALW. It should be noted that the SALW originating from looted Albanian stocks are 
mostly low-cost Chinese designed, but Albanian manufactured, assault rifles.
...	 Former	ethnic-Albanian	armed	group	holdings
It is now widely known that the KLA was armed from a variety of sources based in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Serbia and some NATO countries. It has been argued that at their 
peak, the KLA’s holdings would have been more or less sufficient to arm approximately 20,000 combatants, 
although it is unclear whether this estimate includes the 600 to 4,000 fighters of the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Kosovo (FARK), many of who fought under KLA insignia. The estimate of 32,000 to 40,000 weapons 
calculated by the Small Arms Survey in 2003 may be too high, given that the estimated combined peak holdings 
of the KLA, National Liberation Army (NLA) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia) 
and Liberation Army of Preshevo, Medvegje and Bujanovac (UCPMB) in Southern Serbia would have been only 
63,520 at the most. However, current levels of former KLA stocks in Kosovo are likely to have become depleted 
as a result of the following factors: 
n Voluntary surrender and confiscation in 1999: in accordance with its agreement with KFOR, the KLA 
voluntarily surrendered 8,500 weapons and six million rounds of ammunition within 90 days of the cessation 
of fighting. Following the end of this 90-day period, KFOR also seized around 1,400 SALW. 
n Supplies to other ethnic-Albanian insurgent groups in South Serbia and Macedonia: the 2003 study 
undertaken by the Small Arms Survey estimated that between 11,800 and 15,800 of weapons formerly held 
by the KLA were in the hands of other Albanian insurgent groups in the region, which constitutes between 
about thirty and forty percent of their estimate of the total KLA holdings in 1999. 
n Relocation to caches in Northern Albania: following the end of the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, and the 
establishment of an international presence, it is thought that a proportion of the illicit SALW held in Kosovo 
at that time were then moved over the border into Northern Albania where difficult terrain and a weaker law 
enforcement capacity create more favourable conditions for establishing and concealing illegal caches.
n Seizures: though it is highly likely that a proportion of the SALW confiscated by KFOR and the police through 
the ongoing seizure operations in Kosovo came from former KLA stocks, it is impossible to establish what 
proportion.
Therefore, if the Small Arms Survey’s highest estimate for KLA total holdings is subtracted from this figure, the 
weapons surrendered or confiscated (9,900) and the lowest estimate for former KLA weapons in the hands 
of Albanian insurgent groups (11,800), it is possible to estimate that around 20,000 former-KLA weapons are 
stored in caches in Northern Albania or illegally held in Kosovo. 
...4	 World	War	II	weaponry
A proportion of the SALW owned by households are very old, some dating back to World War II. As these are largely 
unserviceable and unreliable today, the families that keep them usually do so purely for reasons of tradition.
...	 Illegal	SALW	production
Seizure reports indicate that local, illegal SALW production is present in Kosovo, though only on a small scale. 
According to UNMIK records, home-made firearms accounted for only 3% of the 527 firearms seized between 01 
January and 20 April 2006. These items appear to be produced primarily for personal use.
  Heinemann-Grüder, A. and Paes, W-C., BICC Brief 20: Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(BICC, Bonn, 2001), p.13.
  Op. cit., Holtom, P. et al., p. 41.
  Op. cit., Khakee, A. and Florquin, N., p.14.
  Ibid.
15
SALW Survey of Kosovo 
(2006-08-24)
2.3.6.6	 SALW	trafficked	into	Kosovo
Media analysis and KIIs suggest that SALW are being trafficked 
into Kosovo on a much smaller scale compared with the period 
immediately following the conflict. These sources indicate several 
basic trends. The fact that a number of seized SALW have been 
manufactured outside the immediate region suggests that demand 
for high-specification SALW has not been exhausted in Kosovo. As 
noted above, criminal groups are thought to be the main source of 
demand for these SALW. Further, evidence suggests that weapons 
specifically adapted to maximise existing ammunition sources are 
also brought into Kosovo: for instance, MP5 sub-machine guns, 
possibly of Turkish origin, that have been adapted to use 7.62 
mm calibre ammunition have been found in Kosovo.40 Although 
the situation is believed to be improving, media reports in recent 
years highlight some continuing seizures at the border between 
Kosovo and Albania. For example, in November 2005, Italian KFOR were reported to have seized an unspecified 
large quantity of medium-calibre weapons, machine guns and mortars as well as thousands of units of Model 
56 cartridges, along with large quantities of marijuana, in the area of Pejë/Peć, near the Albanian border.4 
Sources in the Albanian police in the border area of Kukes, quoted in the article, linked the emergence of the 
armed group ‘Army for the Independence of Kosova’ (UPK) in October 2004, to increased trafficking of weapons 
and ammunition along the border between Albania and Kosovo.4 In September 2004, the media reported that 
UNMIK Customs had seized 4,900 rounds of ammunition of 7.62mm calibre in a vehicle moving into Kosovo from 
Albania.4 However, Albanian Ministry of Public Order officials interviewed for the 2005 SALW Survey of Albania 
claimed to have seen far fewer reports of SALW trafficking along this border since 2003.44 It is thought that the 
number of SALW trafficked into Kosovo in the post-1999 period is outweighed by the number of SALW removed 
(see Section 2.3.3).
2.3.7	 Trafficking	and	SALW	seizures	at	border	crossings
UNMIK Customs provided the research team with records of SALW intercepted at border crossings in Kosovo 
for the period January 2002-January 2006. During this time, the frequency of seizures by the Customs Service 
was low, with the high point occurring in 2002 when six discoveries were made, yielding 141 weapons and 
10,111 rounds of ammunition. While the quantity of SALW seized has been generally low, some seizures are 
worth highlighting. For example, laser lamps and rifle scopes were discovered in 2005, with nine of the thirteen 
seizures carried out at land border crossing points. However, these records do not appear to include all SALW 
seizures made by the Customs Service. For example, the seizure of ammunition referred to in the media report 
quoted above does not feature in these records. 
40  Interview, international official, Prishtinë/Priština, 14 March 2006.
4  Shekuli, ‘Daily reports on drug, weapons seizure on Kosovo-Albania border’, 17 November 2005. Available at: http://www.nisat.org/
default.asp?page=/search.asp, accessed 16 May 2006.
4  Ibid. See also ‘KFOR investigating existence of armed groups,’ 17 October 2005, SEESAC Daily SALW Media Monitoring Report. Available 
at: http://www.seesac.org/press/wms_23102005.htm - KFOR%20Investigating%20 Existence%20of%2 accessed 10 April 2005. 
4  ‘UN Customs seize ammo at Kosovo-Albania border,’ 3 September 2004, SEESAC Daily SALW Media Monitoring Report. Available at: 
http://www.nisat.org/default.asp?page=/search.asp accessed 29 June 2006.
44  Op. cit., Holtom, P. et al., p. 40.
Ammunition seized at Pristina International Airport
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YEAR AMMUNITION	(ROUNDS) FIREARMS OTHER
NUMBER	OF	
INCIDENTS
TYPE	OF	
CROSSING
2002 10,111 141 (140 were Shotguns) 6 Land (all)
2003 - 2 Rifles 1 Air
2004 Unspecified Unspecified 2 Land (all)
2005 1,138 1 Pistol 63 Lasers
95 Rifle Scopes
3 Air (2)
Land (1)
January 2006 750 3 Air Gun Sights 1 Air
Table 14: SALW interceptions at Kosovo border crossings, Customs Service, January 2000 - January 2006
(Source: Customs Service Data)
Improved border control and law enforcement, together with often difficult transport links, make it unlikely that 
SALW have been transited through Kosovo in large numbers in recent years. Rather, it has been argued that 
the preferred trafficking routes for SALW within SEE lead through Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
instead.4 As noted above, SALW from the KLA’s arsenal were moved from Kosovo to ethnic Albanian insurgent 
groups operating in Macedonia, Montenegro and southern Serbia in the period 1999 - 2003, while pan-Serb 
militia groups most probably also moved SALW into and out of Kosovo during this period.4 Some SALW from 
Kosovo were also returned to northern Albania in this period due to a belief that storage conditions were safer 
there (see Section 2.3.6.3). However, apart from this SALW trafficking in the immediate region after the end 
of the conflict, there is no evidence suggesting that large numbers of SALW are moved through Kosovo at the 
present. This is confirmed by the research undertaken for the earlier study of SALW in Kosovo, which concluded 
that ‘gun smuggling is not a major activity on the Kosovo borders, compared both with other types of smuggling 
and with gun smuggling in the region generally’.4
.4	 Legal	SALW	production	and	transfers
.4.	 SALW	production
Kosovo has never had a significant SALW manufacturing industry and does not currently have any officially-
sanctioned SALW-production facilities. 
.4.	 International	SALW	transfers	
.4..	 Exports,	transit	and	transhipment	of	SALW	
There are no known legal exports of SALW from Kosovo. Similarly, the research team were presented with no 
evidence of any transit or transhipment of SALW through Kosovo at this time.
.4..	 Import	of	SALW	for	the	civilian	market
UNMIK Regulation 2005/41 prohibits the importation into Kosovo of SALW, their parts or accessories (as defined 
by UNMIK Regulation 2001/7) unless explicitly authorised by UNMIK or KFOR. This regulation amends the original 
1999 UNMIK regulation on the establishment of the Customs Service. There have been no legal imports of SALW 
for the civilian market since the establishment of UNMIK.
.4..	 Import	of	SALW	for	security	agencies
Although firearms have been imported in the past for use by Kosovo’s security agencies, notably Glock pistols for 
KPS, the legal framework for regulating such imports is not clearly defined (see Section 5.10.1).
4  Interview, international official, Prishtinë/Priština, 14 March 2006.
4  Barnett, N., ‘KFOR tracks evolution of Albanian radicals’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 01 May 2001; Op. cit., Khakee, A. and Florquin, N., 
pp. 14-15.
4  Op. cit., Khakee, A. and Florquin, N., p. 27.
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	 Small	Arms	Impact	Survey	
This Section examines the direct and indirect impacts of SALW on Kosovo’s society, paying particular attention 
to their impact on public health and levels of crime. It also looks at indirect impacts of SALW, e.g. on the rule of 
law and inter-ethnic relations. 
3.1	 Data	sources	for	firearm-related	injuries	and	fatalities
The research team used a wide variety of sources to collect data on the impact of SALW in Kosovo. Researchers 
were given access to official records held by the University Clinical Centre of Kosova (hereafter the Pristina 
University Hospital), KPS and UNMIK, in addition to information provided by a number of officials interviewed 
from these agencies, the Ministry of Health (MOH) and legal professionals. A comprehensive review of Kosovo’s 
print media for 2005 has also helped to augment these sources of information on the impacts of SALW. HHS and 
focus groups also provided insights on areas not currently covered in detail by institutional data-sets.
The scope of the analysis has been limited by the quality and reliability of available data. The research team 
sought data on the impact of SALW on public health from the MOH and individual hospitals. The MOH information 
unit was unable to provide any statistical information on the number of firearm-related injuries treated by health 
institutions around Kosovo. Although the MOH has a computerised database for the collection of medical 
statistics from Kosovo’s 56 primary, secondary and tertiary health institutions, the system is at present not fully 
operational.4 The research team was however able to obtain statistical records for firearm-related injuries and 
fatalities from the Pristina University Hospital. Although firearm-related injuries can be treated in any of the 56 
health institutions in Kosovo, Pristina University Hospital is the main referral destination for such injuries. Whilst 
the records from this Hospital are useful as an indication of the nature and number of injuries in the Prishtinë/
Priština region, it is not possible to extrapolate for the whole of Kosovo. Further, the Pristina University Hospital 
records of firearm fatalities do not include figures for those who died from firearm-related injuries before the 
arrival of emergency services or arrival at the hospital. This information gap could have been addressed by data 
recorded by the police or morgue officials, although despite requests to both, the research team was unable to 
obtain relevant information.
The need to construct a comprehensive picture of the impact of SALW on all sections of Kosovan society has 
also been challenged by the fact that the research team has not always been able to access data for every 
ethnic group in Kosovo, with data on firearm-related injuries and fatalities sustained by Kosovo-Serbs proving 
particularly problematic to obtain. In general, Kosovo-Serbs seek treatment either in the Mitrovica North Hospital 
or in the Gracanica medical centre. Though statistics were repeatedly sought from Mitrovica North Hospital, the 
research team did not obtain them by the time this report was published. 
Data on SALW-related crime in Kosovo was sought from the KPS, UNMIK Police and the courts. No data on SALW-
related crime was available from any of the courts in Kosovo, with the partial exception of the Gjilan/Gnjilane 
District Court, which was able to provide information on the number of some firearm-related offences prosecuted 
there. Different and seemingly conflicting data-sets were received from the KPS and UNMIK Police. UNMIK Police 
and KPS data at times indicated very different patterns, with a notable example being the level of recorded 
suicides. Further, the official crime data received from UNMIK did not correspond to official UNMIK data quoted 
in some other recent reports (see Section 3.2.1). Officials responsible for data collection and analysis urged 
caution with the use of the crime data collected in Kosovo, as record-keeping procedures, especially in the past, 
have not been very rigorous.4 This fact needs to be borne in mind with regard to all data used in this Section. 
Despite these difficulties, the research team strove to present as comprehensive a picture of the impact of SALW 
on Kosovo’s society as possible, and data has been corroborated from other sources when available. As a result, 
it is believed that the general trends identified below present a reliable assessment of the situation in Kosovo.
4  Interview, Dr Xhevat Ukaj, Chief of Health Information System, Ministry of Health, 31 March 2006.
4  For example, correspondence, Paul Jordan, Head of UNMIK Crime Analysis, 17 May 2006.
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3.1.1	 Non-fatal	injuries
According to the records obtained, Pristina University Hospital treated 136 non-fatal firearm-related injuries 
during 2005. The chart below presents the data for this and previous years:0
Figure 3: Firearm-related injuries treated by Pristina University Hospital, June 1999 - December 2005 
The data for 1999 - 2002 is included here to illustrate the situation prior to 2003, where more reliable records 
began. The figures for the years 1999, 2001 and 2002 refer only to the number of ‘hospital visits due to 
firearms’. In other words, the records for these years do not distinguish between fatal and non-fatal firearm-
related injuries. As such, conclusions should not be made on the basis of comparisons of these figures with 
those for 2003 - 2005, which do distinguish between the two categories. 
It is clear that the dramatic increase of firearm-related injuries in 2004 is linked to the violent riots and ensuing 
tensions that occurred in that year. However, while the number of firearm-related injuries treated by Pristina 
University Hospital significantly dropped in 2005, the average of 11.3 injuries per month is higher than the 
average of seven injuries per month in 2003. It is also higher than the combined number of firearm-related 
injuries and fatalities recorded in 2001. More data is required to ascertain whether this observed increase in 
firearm-related injuries in 2005 when compared to 2003 is part of a long-term trend or not. 
Firearm-related injuries are reported at a similar rate of between 11 and 13 a month in UNMIK official records 
for the period 01 January - 20 April 2006. Of the 48 firearm injuries reported in this period, 11 were self-inflicted, 
with the remaining 37 having been inflicted by another person.
In 2003 and 2005, unsurprisingly, around a quarter (24%) of those admitted to Pristina University Hospital 
with firearm-related injuries came from Prishtinë/Priština municipality.4 During the violence of 2004, Prishtinë/
Priština municipality accounted for around a third (32.7%) of those admitted to the Hospital with firearm-related 
injuries. In 2003 and 2005, the second highest proportion of patients came from Podujevë/Podujevo, with 
the number of firearm-related injuries coming from there steadily rising in the period 2003-2005. Mitrovicë/
0  Data for the years 2003 - 2005 was received from Dr Fadil Beka, Executive Director, Pristina University Hospital, 07 April 2006. Data for 
the years 1999, 2001, 2002 quoted in op. cit., Khakee, A. and Florquin, N. Data for 2000 is not available. The records for 1999, 2001 and 
2002 provided by Dr Beka do not distinguish between fatal and non-fatal injuries. Data for 2003 - 2005 in the graph is for non-fatal injuries 
only.
  Op. cit., Khakee, A., and Florquin, N.
  Op. cit., interview, Dr Fadil Beka.
  This could, however, be a result of poor record-keeping in 2001.
4  Prishtinë/Priština accounts for approximately a third of the total population of Kosovo, i.e. 700,000 inhabitants out of a total of around 
two million. In 2003, 23.5% of patients came from Prishtinë/Priština municipality and in 2005, 24.2%.
  In 2003, 9.4% of patients came from Podujevë/Podujevo. In 2005, they accounted for 14.7% of patients.
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Mitrovica accounted for the second highest number of firearm-related injury patients in 2004, with 13.8%. 
Pristina University Hospital also treated over 20 people for firearm-related injuries during the period 2003 - 
2005 from Ferizaj/Uroševac, Lipjan/Lipljan and Vushtrri/Vucitrn. In these cases, as for the total sample, 2004 
represented the peak. 
MUNICIPALITY 00 004 00 TOTAL
Prizren/Prizren 4 2 4 10
Suharekë/Suva Reka 0 1 1 2
Dragash/Dragaš 0 1 1 2
Rahovec/Orahovac 0 0 3 3
Malishevë/Mališevo 2 3 5 10
Gjakovë/Ðakovica 0 10 3 13
Deçan/Decane 2 1 2 5
Pejë/Peć 8 2 3 13
Klinë/Klina 0 0 3 3
Istog/Istok 0 1 1 2
Skenderaj/Srbica 4 6 8 18
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 6 30 4 40
Vushtrri/Vucitrn 6 10 7 23
Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok 0 0 0 0
Leposaviq/Leposavić 0 0 0 0
Podujevë/Podujevo 8 14 20 42
Prishtinë/Priština 20 71 33 124
Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje 5 9 4 18
Gllogoc/Glogovac 4 7 4 15
Lipjan/Lipljan 1 12 9 22
Shtime/Štimlje 1 2 5 8
Shtërpcë/Štrpce 0 2 0 2
Ferizaj/Uroševac 8 12 5 25
Kaçanik/Kacanik 0 5 1 6
Gjilan/Gnjilane 2 3 4 9
Viti/Vitina 0 2 3 5
Kamenicë/Kamenica 0 1 1 2
Obiliq/Obilić 1 5 0 6
Other 2 5 2 9
TOTAL 84 217 136 437
Table 15: Firearm-related injuries by patient’s municipality of residence, Pristina University Hospital, 2003 - 2005 
As part of the HHS undertaken for this report in March 2006, respondents were asked to assess the level 
of firearm-related injuries in their community. Just under a quarter of all respondents (24.5%) thought there 
were either ‘a few’ or ‘many’ incidents in which people were injured by firearms in their community. A slightly 
higher percentage of male respondents (7.5%) than female respondents (2.7%) thought that there were ‘many 
incidents.’ Almost two thirds of male respondents, and three-quarters of female respondents, stated that there 
were ‘no incidents’ in their community in which people were injured by firearms. 
  Pristina University Hospital data, received from Dr Fadil Beka, 07 April 2006.
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RESPONSE MALE FEMALE TOTAL	
No, no incidents 65.3% 72.5% 66.8%
Yes, a few incidents 18.2% 17.2% 18%
Yes, many incidents 7.5% 2.7% 6.5%
Don’t know/no 
answer
9% 7.7% 8.8%
Table 16: Household survey responses to the question: ‘Are there incidents in your community in which people are 
injured by firearms?’ (By gender and total)
However, the responses to the question ‘Are there incidents in your community in which people are injured by 
firearms?’ vary significantly when categorised by ethnicity. Notably, Kosovo-Serb respondents believed injuries 
caused by firearms happened much more frequently than Kosovo-Albanian respondents did. While 79.5% of 
Kosovo-Albanian respondents thought there were ‘no incidents’ in which people were injured by firearms in their 
community, only 12.4% of Kosovo-Serb respondents concurred. The most frequent Kosovo-Serb response, ‘yes, 
a few incidents,’ accounted for 51.4% of all Kosovo-Serb responses, while ‘yes, many incidents’ accounted for 
33.5%. As data from Mitrovica North Hospital was not received, it is not possible to ascertain to what extent these 
differences in perception reflect the situation on the ground. 
RESPONSE KOSOVO-ALBANIAN
KOSOVO-
SERB BOSNIAN ASHKALI ROMA OTHER
No, no incidents 79.5% 12.4% 72.7% 71.4% 12.5% 66.7%
Yes, a few 
incidents 10.3% 51.4% 9.1% 28.6% 37.5% 25%
Yes, many 
incidents 0.3% 33.5% 9.1% - 25% 8.3%
Don’t know/no 
answer 10% 2.8% 9.1% - 25% -
Table 17: Household survey responses to the question: ‘Are there incidents in your community in which people are 
injured by firearms?’ (By ethnicity)
On the basis of the available medical records and HHS responses, it is possible to conclude that the impact of 
SALW on public health in Kosovo in the period 2003 - 2005, whilst significant, was not severe. However, the 
level of firearm-related injuries rose sharply in the period of heightened tension and violence in March 2004. 
The fact that firearm misuse occurs most frequently during periods of tension supports the findings contained 
in the Perceptions Survey in this report, which indicate that people hold SALW primarily for the protection of 
themselves and their family. Combined with a high level of uncontrolled civilian SALW ownership (see Section 
2.3), this common motivation indicates a significant yet latent potential for future SALW misuse in the event of 
deteriorated security. 
3.1.2	 Fatal	injuries
Pristina University Hospital recorded 27 deaths caused by firearms over the period 2003-2005. Firearm fatalities 
constituted 3.5% of all fatalities handled at this hospital over this period. Exempting deaths due to natural causes, 
firearms accounted for 15.3% of all remaining fatalities, second only to traffic accidents, which accounted for 
63.8%.
  All percentages given in this Table and subsequent tables are rounded to the nearest decimal place and thus may not total 100%.
  The small number of respondents of other ethnicities makes precise comparison difficult. In general terms, the responses to this question 
given by Bosnian and Ashkali respondents closely corresponded to those given by Kosovo-Albanian respondents, while answers by Roma 
respondents corresponded more closely to those given by Kosovo-Serb respondents.
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CAUSE	OF	DEATH 00 004 00
TOTAL	
(00	-	
00)
%	OF	ALL	FATALITIES	
(00	-	00)
Firearms 7 15 5 27 3.5%
Bladed weapons 1 1 3 5 0.7%
Traffic 28 44 41 113 14.7%
Natural death 166 191 233 590 76.9%
Other 12 8 12 32 4.2%
Table 18: Cause of fatalities recorded by Pristina University Hospital, 2003 - 2005
Pristina University Hospital’s records show that 15 fatalities were caused by firearms in the peak year of 2004. 
A third of the deaths in 2004 came from Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, yet the Hospital’s records show that there were no 
reported firearm fatalities from this municipality in 2003 or 2005 (see Table 19). 
MUNICIPALITY 00 004 00 TOTAL
Malishevë/Mališevo 1 0 0 1
Gjakovë/Ðakovica 0 1 0 1
Skenderaj/Srbica 1 0 0 1
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 0 5 0 5
Vushtrri/Vucitrn 0 2 1 3
Podujevë/Podujevo 2 0 0 2
Prishtinë/Priština 0 3 1 4
Lipjan/Lipljan 1 2 0 3
Ferizaj/Uroševac 1 1 0 2
Gjilan/Gnjilane 0 1 1 2
Viti/Vitina 0 0 1 1
Other 1 0 1 2
TOTAL 7 15 5 27
Table 19: Firearm fatalities by patient’s municipality of origin, Pristina University Hospital, 2003 - 2005
For reasons stated above, the Pristina University Hospital records represent a very incomplete picture of firearm-
related fatalities in Kosovo. An alternative snapshot can be taken from the available UNMIK data. The number of 
deaths (14) due to firearms recorded by UNMIK in the period 01 January - 20 April 2006 only, is almost three 
times the number of all fatalities recorded by Pristina University Hospital for the whole of 2005. The majority 
of firearm-related fatalities in this period occurred in the south-west region of Kosovo, which includes Pejë/Peć 
and Podujevë/Podujevo, the towns that were most frequently perceived by KIIs and focus group participants as 
having the highest incidence of firearm-related violence. Extrapolated over a year, this could suggest around 46 
firearm-related fatalities across Kosovo, or almost four a month.0 
  Official UNMIK data.
0  Ibid.
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..	 Homicide
Research data reveals that SALW-related murders represent a significant and increasing proportion of all 
murders in Kosovo. However, there are two differing sets of statistics available for assessing the numbers of 
SALW-related murders in Kosovo: those provided by UNMIK Police, and those provided by the KPS. For the period 
January 2000 - April 2006, UNMIK Police recorded a total of:
n	 470 murders committed with a firearm; and 
n	 817 attempted murders involving the use of a firearm. 
However, these statistics differ to those provided by the KPS, which, for the period January 2000 - March 2006, 
recorded a total of:
n	 386 murders committed with a firearm; and
n	 753 attempted murders involving the use of a firearm. 
It is extremely unlikely that the difference between these two sets of data can be accounted for by the lack of 
KPS statistics for the month of April 2006, and the research team was unable to obtain an explanation for this 
discrepancy. However, additional information can be obtained from UNMIK Police data relating to SALW seizures, 
which record that in 2004, 70 SALW were seized in relation to murder cases, with a further 91 SALW seized in 
2005.
In contrast to KPS statistics, the UNMIK crime data is disaggregated by year as well as being more detailed, thus 
permitting an analysis of trends over time. Figure 4 below details the number of murders that were committed 
with the use of a firearm for each year between 2000 and 2005, and during the first four months of 2006, as 
recorded by UNMIK:
Figure 4: All murders and murders committed with a firearm (January 2000 - April 2006)
(Source: UNMIK Police Data)
According to UNMIK crime statistics, a total of 911 murders and 1,154 attempted murders were committed 
between 2000 and April 2006. Therefore over half (51.6%) of all murders recorded in Kosovo over this period 
  This may have been affected by improved record-keeping and data-management procedures.
  UNMIK Police data, received from Paul Jordan, 19 May 2006. The data refers to ‘weapons’ but the Directorate of Crime Analysis has 
confirmed the data refers to firearms only. Correspondence, Major Nazmjija Basovic, Head of Directorate of Crime Analysis, 05 July 2006.
  KPS data, received from Major Kllokoqi, Department of Public Order, 24 April 2006.
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were committed with a firearm, while 70.8% of recorded attempted murders involved a firearm. As Figure 4 
demonstrates, both the total number of murders committed annually and the number of murders committed with 
a firearm have been declining since 2000; in 2000, the rate of SALW-related murders was high at approximately 
7.4 per 100,000 people, but this decreased to approximately 2.3 by 2005.4 However, it is important to note that 
as there is no reliable population figure for Kosovo during these years, these rates are only approximate. 
YEAR FIREARM	MURDERS	
PER	00,000	
PEOPLE
2000 7.4
2001 4.9
2002 3.4
2003 2.4
2004 2.6
2005 2.3
Table 20: Murders committed with a firearm per 100,000 people
(Source: UNMIK Police Data) 
Despite the declining murder rate, the proportion of all recorded murders involving SALW has increased from 
51.8% in 2000 to 58.4% in 2005. Although this is lower than that for the peak year of 2004, which was 61.4%. 
When compared with other states in SEE for which data was available, this is extremely high; for example the 
Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs recorded only 118 homicides committed with firearms between January 
2000 and November 2005, a figure that represents just five percent of all homicides committed during this 
period. Further, official statistics from the Ministry of Interior in Bulgaria show that 16.2% of all recorded 
homicides during the period January 2000 - December 2005 were committed with firearms. 
A further source of information regarding SALW-related homicide is the media. During 2005, the print media in 
Kosovo detailed 61 different cases of SALW-related murder, and a further 52 cases of SALW-related attempted 
murder. Further, in March 2006, two different cases of SALW-related murder and 12 cases of SALW-related 
attempted murder were reported in the print media that was monitored. The cases detailed in the media during 
2005 clearly total more than the incidents recorded by UNMIK and KPS, though this may be a result of the media 
revisiting cases that had been committed in previous years.
The district court in Gjilan/Gnjilane also provided the research team with firearm-related statistics for the years 
2002 and 2003. In 2002, Gjilan/Gnjilane district court dealt with 19 cases of murder and ten cases of attempted 
murder involving the use of a firearm, and in 2003, dealt with a further six SALW-related murders and 14 SALW-
related attempted murders. However, due to a lack of information regarding the total number of murders and 
attempted murders prosecuted before this court during 2002 and 2003, it was not possible for the research 
team to establish the proportion of total cases that involved firearms.
It is clear from the preceding analysis that the available statistics for SALW-related homicide is incomplete, but 
it remains that the use of firearms in the commission of such crimes in Kosovo is both significant and increasing 
as a proportion of recorded murders. This becomes especially apparent when compared to other countries in 
SEE for which comparable data is available (see above). However, establishing an accurate assessment of SALW-
4  The most recent data still represents an elevated proportion; comparable data indicates that in Serbia in 2002, the rate of SALW-related 
homicides was 1.14 per 100,000 people. Op. cit., Taylor, Z. et al, p. 30.
  The rates have been calculated on the basis of the population estimate of two million people, provided by the Statistical Office of Kosovo. 
Available at: http://www.ks-gov.net/esk/index_english.htm accessed 20 June 2006.
  Wood, D. et al., SALW Survey of Moldova (SEESAC, Belgrade, 2006) p. 39.
  The research team conducted a review of articles published in 3 Kosovo-wide daily newspapers (Kosova Sot, Zëri and Koha Ditore) 
between 01 January 2005 and 31 December 2005. Additionally, the three dailies as well the main news programmes of two Kosovo TV 
stations, RTK and KTV, were monitored between 01 March and 31 March 2006. The numbers reflect the numbers of incidents reported at 
least once rather than the total number of reports.
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related homicide in Kosovo will continue to be problematic unless data collection and management by the police, 
MOH and Ministry of Justice (MOJ) significantly improves.
3.1.3.1	 Regional	distribution	of	firearm-related	murders
Available data reveals that the greatest number of SALW-related murders during the period January 2000-April 
2006 were recorded in the Prishtinë/Priština region, closely followed by the Pejë/Peć region. Although accurate 
statistics regarding the population of these regions is unavailable, it is known that the Pejë/Peć region is less 
heavily populated than Prishtinë/Priština. As the level of SALW-related murders in the Pejë/Peć region is close 
to that recorded in Prishtinë/Priština, it is thus reasonable to assess that Pejë/Peć has a higher rate of SALW-
related murders per capita. Further, whilst there was a rise in SALW-related homicides in 2004 when compared 
with the previous year, this increase was most noticeable in Prishtinë/Priština:
REGION 000 00 00 00 004 00 JANUARY-APRIL	00 TOTAL
Gjilan / Gnjilane 15 16 4 8 7 9 1 60
Mitrovicë / Mitrovica 26 18 11 5 5 6 - 71
Pejë / Peć 21 29 23 22 14 8 9 126
Prishtinë / Pristina 63 20 17 8 18 13 5 144
Prizren 22 14 12 5 7 8 - 68
Border (Recorded by 
Border Police) - - - - 1 - 1
TOTAL 147 97 67 48 51 45 15 470
Table 21: Recorded murders committed with a firearm, by region
(Source: Gjilan/Gnjilane District Court)
3.1.3.2	 Gender,	age	and	ethnic	distribution	of	firearm-related	murders
UNMIK Police statistics permit an analysis of SALW-related murders in relation to the gender, age and ethnicity 
of both suspects and victims. Between January 2000 and April 2006, males accounted for 95.3% of murder 
suspects, with women constituting 5%. However, women were the victims in almost 13% of SALW-related 
murders:
GENDER 000 00 00 00 004 00 JANUARY-APRIL	00 TOTAL
SUSPECT’S GENDER
Female 5 3 5 3 5 2 - 23
Male 121 94 73 72 72 77 20 529
Unknown - 2 1 - - - - 3
TOTAL 126 99 79 75 77 79 20 555
vICTIM’S GENDER
Female 14 15 14 12 9 10 5 79
Male 151 95 73 72 61 57 23 532
Unknown - - - - - - - -
TOTAL 165 110 87 84 70 67 28 611
Table 22: Recorded murders committed with a firearm, by gender of suspect and victim
(Source: UNMIK Police Data)
  It should be noted that in the data provided to the research team by UNMIK, the total number of victims of SALW-related murders was 
higher than the total number of recorded SALW-related murders. It is quite possible that this discrepancy is a result of recording multiple-
victim murders as just one case.
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UNMIK Police data also adopts three age-related categories to classify victims and suspects of crime; ‘child’ (0 
- 12 years), ‘juvenile’ (13 - 18 years) and ‘adult’ (19 years and above). The available data establishes that 90.1% 
of those suspected of using a firearm to commit a murder between January 2000 and April 2006 were ‘adults,’ 
whilst 8.7% were juveniles. However, the failure to further disaggregate the category of ‘adult’ makes it difficult 
to more accurately assess the age range of murder suspects. For the same period, seven percent of those 
murdered with firearms were juveniles (where the age was known) and a further 1.8% were children:
AGE 000 00 00 00 004 00
JANUARY-
APRIL	
00
TOTAL
SUSPECT’S AGE
Child (0-12) 1 1 2
Juvenile (13-18) 9 8 8 7 6 3 2 43
Adult (19 +) 103 76 57 56 64 76 17 449
Unknown 14 14 14 11 7 - 1 61
TOTAL 126 99 79 75 77 79 20 555
VICTIM’S AGE
Child (0-12) 1 1 - 5 1 1 - 9
Juvenile (13-18) 8 6 7 5 7 1 2 36
Adult (19+) 127 80 62 62 58 59 18 466
Unknown 29 23 18 12 4 6 8 100
TOTAL 165 110 87 84 70 67 28 611
Table 23: Recorded murders committed with a firearm, by age of suspect and victim
(Source: UNMIK Police Data)
An analysis of the ethnic breakdown of suspects and victims of SALW-related murders reveals that whilst 6.1% 
of persons suspected of committing murder with a firearm in the period January 2000 - April 2006 were Kosovo-
Serbs, 11.1% of victims were Kosovo-Serbs. As Kosovo-Serbs constitute an estimated 7% of the population 
in Kosovo, they were therefore victims in a disproportionately high number of cases. In the same period, 
Kosovo-Albanians constituted 83.3% of all victims of SALW-related murders, while 89.5% of persons suspected 
of committing such murders were Kosovo-Albanian. This reinforces the suggestion that Kosovo-Serbs were 
proportionately more likely to become a victim of a SALW-related murder than members of other ethnic groups 
in Kosovo during the period January 2000 - April 2006. However, it should be noted that murder rates amongst 
both ethnic populations have been decreasing in recent years.
  Statistical Office of Kosovo, Living Standard Measurement Survey 2000. 
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ETHNICITY 000 00 00 00 004 00
JANUARY-
APRIL	
00
TOTAL
SUSPECT’S ETHNICITy
Kosovo-Albanian 113 87 66 65 69 77 20 497
Bosnian - - - 3 1 - 4
Roma - - 2 3 - - 5
Kosovo-Serb 10 5 9 2 6 2 - 34
Other 3 7 2 2 1 - - 15
TOTAL 126 99 79 75 77 79 20 555
vICTIM’S ETHNICITy
Kosovo-Albanian 119 95 78 69 60 60 28 509
Bosnian 3 1 - 1 1 - - 6
Roma 7 2 1 - 1 - - 11
Kosovo-Serb 31 10 6 11 6 4 - 68
Other 5 2 2 3 2 3 - 17
TOTAL 165 110 87 84 70 67 28 611
Table 24: Recorded murders committed with a firearm, by the ethnicity of suspect and victim
(Source: UNMIK Police Data)
..4	 Suicide
KPS and UNMIK Police statistics on suicides differ substantially. At the higher end, KPS records show that there 
were 234 cases of suicide committed with a firearm between January 2000 and March 2006. At the lower end, 
UNMIK data record only 79 cases of suicides committed with a weapon in the period between January 2000 and 
April 2006.0 Further, UNMIK records that the firearm-related suicides totalled 11 in both 2004 and 2005. This 
tallies more closely with UNMIK Police seizure data, according to which in 2004 police seized seven SALW that 
had been used in suicides, and five in 2005. 
Print media in Kosovo reported twenty-four suicides committed with a firearm in 2005, with stories on another 
four suicides with a firearm reported in March 2006. Several members of the public interviewed for this Survey 
also commented on suicides committed with a firearm. However, the figures cited above do not enable satisfactory 
comparison of the Kosovo data with that of other cases in the region or the rest of the world. 
..	 Firearms	use	in	domestic	violence
According to KPS records, there were 1,310 reported cases of domestic violence against women in 2004, with a 
further 1,370 in 2005. In 2005 there were also 257 reported cases of domestic violence against men. Firearms 
were involved in 17 recorded incidents of domestic violence in 2005 and in 13 cases in the first six months 
of 2006. In all but one of these incidents, men were the suspected perpetrators, while 81% of victims were 
women. 
0  Moreover, the number is an aggregate number for all weapons, not only firearms. UNMIK Police data, received from Paul Jordan, Head of 
Crime Analysis, 19 May 2006.
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PERIOD REGION
NUMBER	
OF	
INCIDENTS
TYPE	OF	
INCIDENT	IN	
WHICH	FIREARM	
WAS	INVOLVED
SUSPECT’S	
GENDER
GENDER	AND	
NUMBER	OF	
VICTIMS
January - December 2005 Prishtinë/Priština 3 Threat Male (3) Female (3) Male (1)
January - December 2005 Prizren/Prizren 8 Threat Male (8)
Female (8)
Male (3)
January - December 2005 Pejë/Peć 3 Threat Male (3) Female (3)
January - December 2005 Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 3 Threat Male (3) Female (3)
January - December 2005 Gjilan/Gnjilane 0 - - -
January - December 2005 Ferizaj/Uroševac 0 - - -
January - June 2006 Prishtinë/Priština 2 Threat Male (2) Female (3)
January - June 2006 Prishtinë/Priština 1 Murder Male (1) Female (1)
January - June 2006 Prizren/Prizren 5 Threat Male (5)
Female (5)
Male (2)
January - June 2006 Prizren/Prizren 1 Attempted murder Female (1) Male (1)
January - June 2006 Pejë/Peć 2 Attempted murder Male (2) Female (2)
January - June 2006 Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 2 Threat Male (2) Female (2)
January - June 2006 Gjilan/Gnjilane 0 - - -
January - June 2006 Ferizaj/Uroševac 0 - - -
TOTAL 30
29 (M) 1 (F) 30 (F) 7 (M)
30 37
Table 25: Domestic violence incidents involving firearms, January 2005 - June 2006
(Source: Unit for the Investigation of Domestic Violence, KPS)
In the vast majority of cases, firearms were used by a man to threaten a woman; only in three cases were firearms 
used exclusively by a man against another male member of the household, while men were attacked jointly with 
women in a further three cases. The statistics available do not, however, indicate how many individuals involved 
in these incidents were children. 
The KPS data establishes that one murder and three attempted murders involving the use of firearms were 
recorded during January - June 2006, while none were recorded in the whole of 2005. Should the proportion 
of SALW-related domestic violence incidents continue to increase at the rate evidenced in the first six months 
of 2006, it would mark an increase in the number and severity of incidents when compared with 2005. This 
elevated rate of recorded incidents may however be a reflection of improved efficiency in record-keeping and 
investigation of such incidents. Further, whilst it is clear that firearms are used in the commission of domestic 
violence, KPS statistics suggest that they are involved in just 1.3% of all reported incidents.
A slightly different picture was revealed by KIIs. The NGO Medica (based in Gjakovë/Ðakovica) provides psycho-
social counselling to women traumatised by violence in the town and its environs. Between mid-2003 and mid-
2004, Medica’s counsellors treated 65 women who had been victims of violent domestic abuse. In 23% of these 
cases (15), firearms were used, and Medica’s records show that in several of these cases the threats were made 
by men under the influence of alcohol. Further, in three of the 65 cases, ‘cold steel’, such as a kitchen knife or a 
hatchet, was used. Medica counsellors were unsure whether the difference in the number of reports of firearms 
and bladed weapons was due to a greater use of firearms in domestic violence, or because a higher percentage 
of women who had been threatened with SALW sought counselling. However, they informed the research team of 
  Medica’s official records, data received from Veprore Shehu, Executive Director, 26 April 2006.
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the following case, a particularly useful illustration of a typical domestic abuse incident involving firearms: when 
a man heard rumours that his 19 year old daughter had been seen with a man from another village, a different 
man to the one whom her father had arranged for her to be married, he reportedly beat his daughter. The girl’s 
mother tried to intervene on her daughter’s behalf, but also incurred her husband’s wrath. As a result of his 
wife’s intervention, the husband used his firearm to support his verbal threat that if he heard more rumours of his 
daughter’s romantic liaisons with the man from another village, and not her betrothed, then he would kill them. 
The man’s wife was admitted to hospital for injuries that were not firearm-related. However, a neighbour of the 
family reported the case to the local police, who confiscated the man’s weapon and held him for an undisclosed 
period of time.  
.	 Crime	attributed	to	SALW
3.2.1	 Number	of	reported	firearms-related	crimes
UNMIK official crime statistics show that the overall number of reported crimes increased slightly in the years 
2003 - 2005, although it remained below the totals recorded for 2001 and 2002. The overall increase in 
recorded crimes is accounted for by an increase in ‘crimes against society’ and crimes classified as ‘other’. All 
other categories of crimes and offences, including ‘crimes against the person’ and ‘crimes against property,’ 
are decreasing, according to the statistics. Official records also show a small but steady decline in the number 
of firearm-related crimes for this period (see Figure 5 below), which can be accounted for by a decrease in the 
number of reported crimes against persons and property. However, UNMIK statistics also show a rise in firearms 
being used in ‘crimes against society’:
Figure 5: All criminal cases and criminal cases involving weapons per year, UNMIK Police data,  
January 2000 - May 2006 4
Although the statistics contained in Figure 5 were prepared by the UNMIK Crime Analysis Section, they do not 
correspond to UNMIK statistics used in a number of other reports. For example, UNMIK statistics quoted in 
the UNDP Early Warning Report for the period October - December 2005 indicate very different crime trends. 
  Gjakovë/Ðakovica, mid-2003.
  This could have been affected by improved record-keeping and data-management procedures.
4  It should be noted that the figure for 2006 is projected, based on actual statistics of 25,932 criminal offences and 1,072 criminal offences 
involving weapons for the period January to May 2006.
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According to the UNDP report, the overall number of crimes in 2005 dropped by one percent in comparison to 
2004, with SALW-related crimes rising by seven percent during the same period. 
3.2.2	 Types	of	crimes	involving	firearms
Although UNMIK has expressed concerns that data regarding SALW-related crime is unreliable, it is still useful 
to examine recorded figures in order to gain a general impression of activity in this area. The UNMIK crime data 
available establishes that there were a total of 2,515 criminal discharges of firearms between January 2000 and 
April 2006. Further, firearms were involved in 1,346 cases of assault, 796 cases of robbery and 543 cases of 
grievous assault during this period: 
Figure 6: Criminal cases involving firearms (selected), January 2000 - April 2006
According to UNMIK Police data, 2,369 weapons were seized in relation to a criminal offence in 2005, 2,125 
of which were SALW. This represents a 13% increase in the total of weapons seized, and a 12% increase in the 
total SALW seized, when compared to 2004 (2,093 weapons, of which 1,901 were SALW). Almost 60% (1,441) of 
the weapons seized by the police in 2005 were confiscated as a consequence of illegal possession, an increase 
of 157 since 2004 (1,284). A further 8.5% of the total seizures were a result of ‘discharge of a firearm’, while 
4.9% were related to ‘intimidation’, 3.8% to ‘murder’ and 3.8% to ‘assault’. There were notable increases in the 
total number of firearms seized in 2005 when compared to 2004, especially in the categories of ‘discharge 
of a firearm’ (202 compared to 126), ‘intimidation’ (115 compared to 92), ‘murder’ (91 compared to 70) and 
‘assault’ (89 compared to 76). Only seizures relating to ‘grievous assault’ (44 in both cases) and ‘burglary’ (3 
compared to 4) did not increase from 2004 to 2005. 
  UNDP, Early Warning Report No. 12, October-December 2005, p 25. Available at: http://www.kosovo.undp.org/publications/ews12/
ewr12_eng.pdf accessed 16 May 2006.
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Figure 7: Seized weapons by offence type (selected), 2004 - 2005
(Source: UNMIK Police Data)
It is interesting to compare these statistics with the results of the HHS. In response to the question ‘what types 
of crimes occur most frequently in your community?’ the main response, identified by 11% of respondents, was 
armed robbery. However, there were significant differences between ethnic groups: only 3.7% of Kosovo-Serb 
respondents identified armed robberies as the crime occurring most frequently in their area, whilst 28.6% of 
Ashkali respondents, 18.2% of Bosnian, 12.7% of Kosovo-Albanian and 6.3% of Roma considered such crimes 
to occur most frequently in their communities:
ETHNIC	GROUPING NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Kosovo-Serb 8 3.7%
Kosovo-Albanian 126 12.7%
Roma 1 6.3%
Bosnian 2 18.2%
Ashkali 2 28.6%
TOTAL 139 11.0%
Table 26: Number and percentage of HHS respondents who considered armed robbery to be a frequent occurrence in 
their community (Base N = 1,258)
It is likely that this perception is also influenced by media reports. For example, the research team’s media review 
revealed that 65 different cases of armed robbery were reported in three daily newspapers in 2005, a figure that 
accounts for around a third of robberies of all kinds reported in these newspapers. And in March 2006, four of 
the 18 robberies featured in the news involved firearms. 
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TYPE	OF	INCIDENT 00 MARCH	00
Shooting 100 8
Armed Robbery 65 4
Armed Threats 36 5
Armed Attack 31 2
Firearms Confiscated 224 36
Foray for Firearms 48 4
Firearms Declared 3 1
Firearms Surrendered 11 0
Firearms Found 13 0
Firearms Licensed 1 0
Sentences for illegal SALW 3 0
Firearms Trafficking 3 0
TOTALS 538 60
Table 27: Media reports of firearm incidents  
In response to the HHS question ‘what types of crimes occur most frequently in your community?’ the second 
most frequently identified crime involving weapons was ‘armed threats’. This accounted for 3.8% of respondents 
overall, and ten percent of Kosovo-Serb, 14.3% of Ashkali and just 2.4% of Kosovo-Albanian respondents. 
Fears relating to robbery and threats more generally were also highlighted in a focus group conducted with 
businesspeople. Although not a single focus group participant discussed an instance of where they or their 
business had been the subject of an armed robbery or threat, the majority expressed a desire to carry a weapon 
to protect their business. 
..	 Types	of	SALW	used	in	crimes
While the total number of SALW seized showed an increase in 2005 when compared to 2004, according to 
UNMIK Police data, the total number of SALW confiscated for use as evidence in criminal cases dropped from 
207 items in 2004 to 144 items in 2005. Pistols remained the most common weapons seized as evidence in 
criminal cases in both 2004 and 2005. However, although the total number of pistols seized decreased from 79 
in 2004 to 75 in 2005, they increased as a proportion of weapons seized as evidence in a criminal case from 
38% in 2004 to 52% in 2005. This is in part due to the fact that the number of rifles and shotguns taken as 
evidence fell sharply between 2005 and 2004. Thus, while 30 rifles and 41 shotguns were seized as evidence in 
2004, only 15 and 11 respectively were seized in the following year.
Though the data breakdown provided by UNMIK Police does not include information on the seizures of explosives 
in relation to crime, UNMIK crime data records a total of 139 attacks with the use of grenades, mines or other 
explosives committed in the period January 2000 - April 2006. The majority of these were recorded in immediate 
post-war years (60 incidents recorded in 2000 and 33 in 2001), with the number of recorded incidents falling 
substantially to 11 in 2004 and only 6 in 2005. However, other UNMIK records, together with KIIs and media 
reports indicate that the criminal use of explosives may be more widespread than revealed by the official police 
data. UNMIK data for the period 01 January–20 April 2006 record 22 explosions caused by a hand grenade or a 
  Reported in Koha Ditore, Kosova Sot and Zëri between 01 January and 31 December 2005 and in Koha Ditore, Kosova Sot and Zëri and 
on the RTK and KTV television stations, between 01 March and 31 March 2006. The number reflects the number of incidents reported at 
least once rather than a total number of reports.
  UNMIK Police data, received from Paul Jordan, Head of Crime Analysis, 19 May 2006. 11 incidents were recorded in 2002 and 15 in 
2003.
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bomb, while media reports reveal that 47 different explosions (excluding controlled explosions) were reported 
in 2005 and 13 in March 2006. Further, UNHCR interviewees were of the belief that grenades were the weapons 
most frequently used in armed inter-ethnic attacks (see Section 3.3.1 below).
3.2.4	 Geographic	patterns	of	firearm	related	criminal	cases	
Although UNMIK Police statistics show a declining number of criminal cases involving firearms as a whole since 
2001, there are fluctuations in the year-by-year records for Kosovo’s different regions. Nevertheless, it appears 
that armed crime is most prevalent in the Pejë/Peć and Prishtinë/Priština regions. The number of criminal cases 
involving firearms in these regions is almost double those for Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Gjilan/Gnjilane and Prizren/
Prizren in the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. 
REGION 000 00 00 00 004 00
JANUARY-
APRIL	
00
TOTAL
Gjilan/Gnjilane 277 583 380 436 532 502 152 2,862
Mitrovicë/
Mitrovica 484 718 643 492 553 393 143 3,426
Pejë/Peć 628 1,440 990 996 939 974 318 6,285
Prishtinë/
Priština 1,160 1,495 940 898 850 899 330 6,572
Prizren/Prizren 335 503 446 484 416 397 115 2,696
Border Police 54 19 10 17 15 45 14 174
TOTAL 2,938 4,758 3,409 3,323 3,305 3,210 1,072 22,015
Table 28: Criminal cases involving firearms, UNMIK Police, January 2000 - April 2006
.	 Other	impacts
..	 Impacts	of	SALW	on	inter-ethnic	relations	
It remains a difficult task to try to assess the impact of SALW on inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. According to 
a forthcoming report by the NGO, Collaborative for Development Action, this is because the dynamics of the 
relationship are very complex. For example, it can be difficult to clearly identify an instance of inter-ethnic crime, 
as distinct from a crime that has economic or other criminal motives. This has not stopped the report’s authors 
from arguing that since 2002, inter-ethnic crime has consistently accounted for between eight and ten percent 
of all crime in Kosovo. In their opinion, inter-ethnic crime, like other forms of crime, is conditioned at least in part 
by factors such as high unemployment and weak law enforcement, rather than being tied purely to inter-ethnic 
relations or political events. This is a viewpoint with which a recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report appears 
to concur, as it argues that although an increasing proportion of property-related crime and theft is thought to 
have involved inter-ethnic factors, this is probably due to opportunism rather than ethnic tensions.0 
UNHCR conducts regular monitoring of ethnically motivated incidents in Kosovo, and has found that the number 
of large-scale incidents has been decreasing for the past three years. However, the organisation also reports 
that this decline appears to have been accompanied by a growing number of small-scale incidents. Interviewees 
from UNHCR informed the research team that although hand grenades seem to be involved in most violent inter-
  UNMIK official data.
  Collaborative for Development Action (CDA), What difference has peace building made? A study of Peacebuilding and the March 2004 
Riots in Kosovo: Summary of findings, March 2006.
0  ICG, Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, 17 February 2006, p. 8. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/
balkans/170_kosovo___the_challenge_of_transition.pdf accessed 17 April 2006.
  UNHCR Kosovo staff, 04 April 2006. 
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ethnic incidents in recent years, one should note that ‘recurrent verbal assault and graffiti are as important a 
factor as grenade attacks in influencing the perceptions of security among communities in a minority situation 
and among returnees’. Therefore, SALW are simply one factor in a complex matrix of factors that influence 
security perceptions in Kosovo. On the basis of their experience on the ground, UNHCR interviewees believed that 
one of the main routes to changing security perceptions, especially within minority communities, is to improve 
law enforcement and the prosecution of perpetrators of violent crimes. 
The UNDP Early Warning Reports for July - September 2005 and October - December 2005 note a potential 
relationship between particular armed incidents and perceptions of security. For example, a UNDP opinion poll 
conducted in September 2005 recorded an increase in Kosovo-Serb respondents who considered inter-ethnic 
relations between Kosovo-Albanians and Serbs to be tense from 76% in June 2005 to 98.5%.4 It has been 
argued that this sharp increase in negative perceptions could have been significantly influenced by an armed 
attack on a car in the Shtërpcë/Štrpce municipality at the end of August 2005, in which two Kosovo-Serbs were 
killed and two others were injured. A similar opinion poll conducted in December 2005 showed that attitudes 
towards relations between Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs relations had improved in comparison to the 
September 2005 poll, but still remained worrying, with 83.2% of respondents considering inter-ethnic relations 
to be tense. A number of incidents between late October and December 2005, in which it seemed that Kosovo-
Serbs had been attacked, can be used to explain these perceptions. Further, complaints have been reported 
by Kosovo-Serb villagers in central and south-east Kosovo that they have been subjected to recurring gun and 
grenade attacks as part of a wider campaign of pressure to sell their property to Kosovo-Albanians. 
In fact, there is a striking difference in perceptions of the prevalence of armed threat among Kosovo’s different 
communities. While 9.8% of Kosovo-Albanian HHS respondents thought there were ‘a few’ armed threats 
occurring in their community, only 0.2% thought that there were ‘many’ such incidents. On the other hand, 
36.2% of Kosovo-Serb respondents thought that there were ‘many’ incidents in which people where threatened 
by firearms, 46.2% thought that there were a ‘few’ such incidents and only 13.8% stated that such incidents did 
not occur in their community. The majority of Roma respondents also felt that cases of armed threat occurred 
in their community, with almost 19% believing that there were ‘many’ and almost 44% stating that there were ‘a 
few’ such incidents.
RESPONSE ALBANIAN SERBIAN BOSNIAN ASHKALI ROMA OTHER
No, no incidents 74.3% 13.8% 36.4% 57.1% 12.5% 50%
Yes, a few incidents 9.8% 46.8% 9.1% 14.3% 43.8% 41.7%
Yes, many incidents 0.2% 36.2% 9.1% 0% 18.8% 8.3%
Don’t know/no answer 15.7% 3.2% 45.5% 28.6% 25% 0%
Table 29: ‘Are there incidents in your community in which people are threatened by firearms?’ (By ethnicity) 
(Base N = 1,258)
These responses do not explicitly identify the ethnic group to which the threatening individuals or groups belong, 
but they clearly highlight the communities in Kosovo that believe that they are particularly exposed to intimidation 
with firearms. 
Although levels of reported armed crime in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica are lower than in other parts of Kosovo, focus 
group participants in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica were able to recall more instances of firearm-related incidents 
that affected them or their family in the last year, in comparison to focus group participants from other parts 
  Ibid. 
  Ibid.
4  UNDP, Early Warning Report No. 11, July-September 2005, p. 25. Available at: http://mirror.undp.org/kosovo/publications/ews11/
ewr11_engl.pdf accessed 19 May 2006.
  The report further points out that the total number of Kosovo-Serb victims of crime recorded in this period was very low. Op. cit., UNDP, 
Early Warning Report, No. 11, p. 25.
  Op. cit., ICG, Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, p. 8.
of Kosovo. Of the eight women present in the northern Mitrovica focus group, three stated they had not been 
affected by firearm incidents in the last year, but expressed a fear that they might be in the near future. The 
incidents recalled by the other participants are contained in the box below: 
Box 1: Mitrovicë / Mitrovica focus group participants experiences of firearms over the last twelve months.
‘Unfortunately, I was wounded in the hand. It happened in November 2005. I was watching TV when I heard some 
strange noises in front of my house. I went out onto the balcony to see what was going on and someone shot me. It was 
in the evening and my neighbour was shot too’ (Female, 58 years). 
‘As you can see, I am dressed in black. My sister was murdered two months ago. Maybe you heard about the lady who 
was abused and murdered…before that, she was robbed many times and she lived poorly here in Mitrovica, in the 
Bosnian mahala. No one was arrested, but there are some suspects’ (Female, 56).
‘A month ago, we were attacked and our car was stolen. No-one came although we called the police. They told us to go 
to the police station and report the case’ (Female, 35).
‘Thank God, I have not been a victim. But my parents have. They live in Milosevo. Also, my neighbours were attacked in 
the building where I live, in the ‘Three Towers’ area’ (Female, 53).
‘Personally, I was not attacked but my husband’s cousin was. Last year, in the autumn, he was the victim of a bomb 
attack on the bridge over the river Ibri. Since then, he cannot walk anymore’ (Female, 26).
..	 Impact	on	governance	and	the	rule	of	law
It is obvious that SALW possession and use in Kosovo has had a detrimental impact on politics, justice and law 
enforcement. District courts, judges and police officers have all been the subjects of a number of armed attacks, 
while it is thought that local government authorities have also been targeted. 
Many of the district court judges and prosecutors interviewed for this report expressed concerns about the 
potential for violent intimidation in the course of their duties. Approximately half of the KIIs from the legal 
profession expressed a desire for ‘additional protection’ to protect themselves against threats, such as the right 
to bear arms or be assigned bodyguards. However, as with the focus group of businesspeople, not a single specific 
case of armed intimidation, threat, injury or fatality to legal personnel was offered to support the proposal for 
permission to carry firearms, though in January 2006, two security guards at the Graçanicë/Gracanica court 
were wounded by shots fired from a moving vehicle while they were changing shifts. The Radio Television of 
Kosovo (RTK) reported that the KPS had arrested the suspected perpetrators, seizing their car and SALW, but did 
not discuss the possible motives for this attack. Therefore, it is unclear if this was an attack on the court, the 
security guard firm responsible for guarding it, or the individual security guards. 
In 2005, two Kosovo-Serb KPS officers were murdered and a further ten attempted murders and 57 assaults 
were perpetrated against KPS and UNMIK officers. It has been argued that Kosovo-Serb police officers have 
been the main targets of these attacks, as they were, for example, subjected to a number of armed assaults in 
southern Kosovo between August and October 2005.0 These attacks are not only the result of fairly widespread 
civilian and criminal firearms possession, but more worryingly, they demonstrate a lack of respect for those 
charged with enforcing the rule of law. 
Municipal authorities have also been targeted by SALW attacks. For example, in August 2005, it was reported 
that ‘unidentified individuals opened fire with an automatic weapon in front of Zubin Potok’s municipal building 
  RTK TV, ‘Kosovo: Two arrested after shooting of court guards in Gracanica’, 08 January 2006. Available at: http://www.seesac.org/
wms2006/2006-01-08.htm - Kosovo:%20Two%20arrested%20after%20shoot. Accessed 13 May 2006.
  Op. cit., UNDP, Early Warning Report No. 12, p. 28.
  Ibid.
0  Radio Free Europe, ‘Gunmen attack Serb police officers in southern Kosova’, 27 October 2005. Available at: http://www.seesac.org/
press/wms_31102005.htm - Gunmen%20attack%20Serbian%20police%20off accessed 19 May 2006.
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and threw two hand grenades into the parking lot’. This attack caused minor damage to the yard behind the 
building, which houses the police station and municipal offices, and seriously damaged some police and UN 
vehicles. 
..	 Impacts	of	SALW	on	children	and	young	people	
According to the teachers interviewed for this report, SALW are not visible in Kosovo’s schools. This appears to 
corroborate the findings of a recent report on bullying in schools, which was commissioned by UNICEF, which 
did not consider that it was worth mentioning the use of firearms in school bullying. However, several teachers 
stated that SALW searches were not conducted, so they cannot comment on efforts to conceal SALW in Kosovo’s 
schools. One of the teachers interviewed did express concern about the number of bladed weapons found among 
pupils at his school, and also stated that during a recent random search, organised in collaboration with KPS and 
UNMIK Police, two gas-powered guns were found. Several KIIs also stated that while firearms are not visible 
in schools, they do affect children and young people beyond the school gates. For example, a secondary school 
teacher in North Mitrovica recalled how one of his pupils, a 16-year old female, was shot dead by her jealous 
boyfriend in 2005.4 
Media reports also comment on the ways in which children and young people are affected by SALW in the 
domestic environment. For example, the daily Zëri reported on 07 March 2006 that: ‘an 11-year old girl was 
accidentally shot by her father while he was cleaning his weapon. The incident, which took place in south 
Mitrovica, was reported by the spokesperson of the regional UNMIK Police. The girl received medical treatment 
for her light injuries, while the police confiscated the TT-revolver and arrested the 35-year old man, who was 
subsequently released by the prosecutor’. 
Interviewees and focus group participants also provided qualitative data on the impact of firearms on children 
and young people. One interviewee from Gjakovë/Ðakovica recalled an incident in which her relatives’ 12 year-
old son was accidentally shot dead using his father’s gun while playing with it with another 12 year-old. This 
interviewee also asserted that such incidents were by no means rare in her area. 
Yet not all interviewees confined themselves to commenting upon accidental shootings by and of children and 
young people. Several focus group participants expressed concerns about the ways in which the young people in 
their neighbourhoods were the perpetrators of armed violence. For example, a 45 year-old male from Prishtinë/
Priština stated: ‘I live in the Kodra e Trimave neighbourhood. There is a lot of insecurity there. The young people 
are entertaining themselves with guns…It’s an aggressive neighbourhood. At night it is dangerous, as there are 
robberies and stabbings. It is especially dangerous near schools…I have a shop in front of a school and can bear 
witness to these events.’ (Focus group participant, male (45), Prishtinë/Priština).
The belief that young people possess SALW, in particular pistols, was expressed by elderly participants in a 
number of focus groups. These concerns were also shared by young people during focus group discussions who 
expressed fears that firearms were present in nightclubs. 
  KosovaLive, ‘Municipal building in Kosovo attacked with machine guns, hand-grenades’, 09 August 2005. Available at: http://www.
seesac.org/press/wms_15082005.htm - Municipal%20building%20in%20Kosovo%20att accessed 15 May 2006.
  Interview, Robert Fuderich, Head, UNICEF Kosovo, 05 April 2006.
  Interview, Director of Secondary School, Prishtinë/Priština, 04 May 2006.
4  Interview, Secondary School teacher, North Mitrovica, 06 April 2006.
  Interview, Gjakovë/Ðakovica, 30 March 2006.
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4	 Small	Arms	Perception	Survey
4.	 Perceptions	of	security
An extensive HHS undertaken with heads of households and a series of focus group discussions conducted in 
different regions of Kosovo, were used to explore the attitudes and perceptions of Kosovan citizens towards 
security and SALW issues. The findings of the HHS and focus groups suggest that, whilst feelings of security do 
not differ significantly between males and females, they do vary greatly between the different ethnic groups and 
regions of Kosovo. In general, the Kosovo-Albanian majority perceived the security situation in Kosovo in a more 
favourable light than the Kosovo-Serb minority. Kosovo-Albanian respondents felt that their communities were 
safer and expressed fewer concerns with crime than respondents from other ethnic groups. They also tended to 
express higher levels of trust and confidence in Kosovan and international security providers. One of the most 
worrying findings of this report is that Kosovo-Serbs have very little confidence in the Kosovan and international 
security providers, suggesting that they do not believe that these agencies will protect them and their interests. 
Another important finding from the HHS relates less to the information that was provided, and more to the 
information that was withheld. A large proportion of respondents either refused to answer or opted for ‘do not 
know’ options in response to a number of HHS questions on SALW possession and visibility. It therefore appears 
that the HHS questionnaire elicited high levels of suspicion from a considerable number of interviewees. For 
example, ten percent of respondents reported a sense of discomfort with the content of the HHS; with a large 
number of respondents stating that they found the questions ‘provocative’ or ‘suspicious’. It is likely that this is, 
in large part, a result of the current macro-political and security context; the ongoing final status negotiations 
and the ensuing tensions that they have generated are likely to have increased levels of suspicion regarding the 
purpose of this Survey. However, the significant degree of discomfort reported helps to explain the high number 
of ‘no answer’ and ‘do not know’ responses in the findings discussed below. It should not be assumed that these 
respondents have something to hide, but it does suggest that caution is warranted when attempting to read 
general patterns and trends for SALW ownership based solely upon the data contained in this Section. 
4..	 Causes	of	insecurity	
The results of the HHS and focus groups indicate that the main concerns of Kosovans are related to with socio-
economic and infrastructure-related issues. Thus, the top three choices provided in response to the HHS question: 
‘In your opinion, what are the top three most serious problems that your community faces?’ in descending order, 
were unemployment, poor electricity supply and poor roads:  
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Figure 8: In your opinion, what are the top three most serious problems that your community faces? 
(Base N = 1,258)
These perceptions proved to be fairly consistent across Kosovo’s different ethnic groups, although a large 
proportion of the Kosovo-Serb minority considered environmental problems to be the most serious issue facing the 
community (45%). Socio-economic issues were also amongst the top choices revealed in previous SALW Surveys 
carried out in SEE. For example, when asked to identify the main cause of insecurity for themselves and their 
families, 33.9% of Bulgarian, 47% of Serbian and 32.5% of Moldovan respondents selected ‘economic insecurity’ 
as the most pressing concern. Further, in the Moldovan SALW Survey, 36.7% of respondents considered ‘job 
creation’ to be one of their community’s main problems. Thus, the significance attached to socio-economic 
issues and the correspondingly low importance placed on SALW-related concerns by those questioned in the 
HHS is not unique to Kosovo within SEE.
Only 15 HHS respondents out of a total of 1,258 (a little over 1%) identified ‘weapons-related problems’ as one 
of the three most significant threats to their community. All of these respondents were Kosovo-Albanian. The low 
ranking of SALW-related problems in Kosovo also conforms to the regional pattern, with SALW featuring as one of 
the main causes of insecurity for only 0.7% of respondents in Bulgaria, 1.6% in Moldova and 2.2% in Serbia. 
While focus group participants also continually identified high unemployment, poor economic conditions and 
extreme poverty as their main concerns, they also argued that these factors helped to create and nurture an 
atmosphere of insecurity. Unsurprisingly therefore, the proportion of citizens who are either themselves a victim 
of crime, or have had a criminal act directed against a member of their family appears to be high. 20.4% of HHS 
respondents stated that either they or a family member had been a victim of crime in the past twelve months. 
11.1% had experienced two criminal offences, and 5.6% had suffered three incidents during the last 12 months. 
The findings of a comparable HHS conducted in Albania in March 2005 as part of a national SALW Survey 
  Op. cit., Rynn, S. et al.; op. cit., Taylor, Z. et al.; op. cit., Wood, D. et al.; p. 48.
  Op. cit., Wood, D. et al., p. 48.
  Op. cit., Rynn, S. et al.; op. cit., Taylor, Z. et al.; op. cit., Wood, D. et al., p. 47.
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revealed that 7.2% of respondents had been a victim of crime, or were closely related to a victim of crime, a rate 
considerably lower than the responses to this question in Kosovo. 
Figure 9: Have you or a member of your family been a victim in any of the following types of crime/incident in the last 
twelve months? (Multiple responses) (Base N = 1,258)
The majority of crimes reported to HHS interviewers were robberies, theft, threats, assaults or beatings. 3.1% 
of all respondents stated that they or a member of their family had been involved in a crime that was clearly 
identified as weapons-related (e.g. armed robbery, armed threats, being shot at), with these incidents accounting 
for 8.1% of all the crimes reported to the HHS. However, this proportion could be even higher if SALW were used 
in the kidnappings, murders, rape, or other crimes listed in the Figure above. 
Although HHS findings did not suggest any significant variation between ethnic groups with regard to SALW-
related crime generally, 1.8% of Kosovo-Serb respondents reported that they or members of their family had 
been shot at. The corresponding statistic for Kosovo-Albanian respondents was 0%, and it is interesting to note in 
conjunction with this that data suggests that Kosovo-Serbs are proportionately more likely than Kosovo-Albanians 
to become a victim of SALW-related homicide (see Section 3.1.3). Further, several Kosovo-Serb participants in 
focus groups cited examples of armed violence directed against their friends and family. This issue warrants 
further examination, as it would appear to explain the higher levels of insecurity and elevated perceptions of 
SALW-related injuries amongst the Kosovo-Serb population (for further discussion, see Sections 3.1.1 and 3.3.1). 
However, it is not possible to draw any firm conclusion regarding the motivations behind the highlighted attacks 
without a much more detailed investigation. 
4..	 Perceptions	of	security
4...	 General	perceptions	of	security	and	regional	variations
According to the HHS, 63.5% of respondents stated that their communities were ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’, while 17.6% 
considered their community to be either ‘unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’. The proportion of Kosovan respondents that 
  Op. cit., Holtom, P. et al., p. 17.
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perceive their communities to be ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’ is higher than comparable sets of responses gathered 
during SALW Surveys in Albania (54.3%) and Serbia and Montenegro (52.7%).00 
Figure 10: How would you describe your community? (Base N = 1,258)
From such data, one could infer that perceptions of public safety levels are fairly high in Kosovo in comparison 
to other areas in the SEE region. Such an assumption would, however be misleading; the results in this instance 
conceal a significant variation in responses between Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs. For example, while 
the overall percentage of HHS respondents declaring their communities to be ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’ correlates fairly 
closely with the 68.3% of Kosovo-Albanians who selected these options, it does not closely correspond with the 
20.2% of Kosovo-Serbs who expressed such feelings. 
Perceptions of an unsafe community amongst Kosovo-Serbs were also expressed during focus group discussions. 
In particular, violent attacks directed towards participants and their families were mentioned on several occasions. 
One focus group participant noted the particular danger for Kosovo-Serbs; ‘in the south of Kosovo, you can’t 
move around without an escort. If they find out that you are a Serb then you can expect a bullet’.0
Perceptions of community safety also vary across Kosovo, with several areas identified as being particularly 
safe, such as Gllogoc/Glogovac, Istog/Istok and Leposaviq/Leposavić, all of which were rated as ‘safe’ or ‘very 
safe’ by more than ninety percent of the HHS respondents living there. It is perhaps unsurprising that these sites 
were more or less mono-ethnic communities.0 Amongst the communities identified as most dangerous by HHS 
respondents was Gorazhdec/Goraždevac, a Kosovo-Serb enclave with a history of inter-ethnic violence: 100% of 
HHS respondents living in this area described their community as ‘very unsafe’.0 Further, Shtërpcë/Štrpce was 
considered to be particularly dangerous by its inhabitants. Again, there has been a history of violence directed 
against Kosovo-Serbs in this community.04 Despite widely held feelings of insecurity, almost half of all HHS 
respondents considered their community to be more secure than other regions of Kosovo, and just under a third 
believed that the level of safety in their community was comparable to that in other parts of Kosovo:
00  Zvekic, U., Criminal victimization in countries in transition (UNICRI, No. 61, Rome 1998), p. 82. Available at: http://www.unicri.it/wwd/
analysis/icvs/pdf_files/No61/c07_61.PDF accessed 17 May 2006.
0  Focus group participant, male (44), Leposaviq/Leposavić.
0  See: OSCE, Municipal Profile: Gllogovc/Glogovac, December 2005. Available at: http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/02/1183_
en.pdf accessed 19 May 2006; OSCE, Municipal Profile: Istog/Istok, November 2005. Available at: http://www.osce.org/documents/
mik/2005/02/1186_en.pdf accessed 19 May 2006; OSCE, Municipal Profile: Leposaviq/Leposavić, November 2005. Available at: http://
www1.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/02/1192 _en.pdf accessed 19 May 2006.
0  For example, in August 2003, two Kosovo-Serb youths were shot dead, and another four injured, whilst playing in the river. US Department 
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003: Serbia and Montenegro, 25 February 2004. Available at: http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27874.htm accessed 03 June 2006.
04  OSCE, Municipal Profile: Štrpce/Shtërpcë, November 2005. Available at: http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/02/1203_en.pdf 
accessed 05 June 2006.
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Figure 11: Do you think that your neighbourhood is safer or more dangerous than other regions of Kosovo?  
(Base N = 1,258)
4...	 Perceptions	of	crime
The widely varied perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo are consolidated by research results concerning 
Kosovans’ fear of crime. It is interesting to note that, whilst 20.4% of HHS respondents reported a crime directed 
towards either themselves or a member of their family, only 32% were afraid that they would become a victim 
of crime in the future. This would appear to support the relative degree of security felt within parts of Kosovo 
society and compares favourably with other countries in SEE.	For example, the 2006 SALW Survey of Moldova 
revealed that 58% of HHS respondents feared that either they or their family would become a victim of crime in 
the future.0
There were, however, a range of concerns when crime fears were broken down by different ethnicities. Kosovo-
Albanians and Ashkali appeared to be the least concerned by crime, with only 20.1% of Kosovo-Albanian and 
14.3% of Ashkali respondents expressing a fear that they might become a victim of crime. More than half of 
the Bosnian respondents (54.5%) also expressed the view that they did not think that they would be victims of 
crime, while 56.3% of Roma respondents thought that they might become a victim of crime in the near future. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of Roma respondents fearing becoming a victim of crime was still lower than that 
of Kosovo-Serbs, with 83.9% of them expressing a fear that they would become a victim of crime. The rationale 
for these widely divergent perceptions is perhaps best explained by the fact that while only 8.6% of Kosovo-
Albanian respondents reported that they or a member of their family had been a victim of crime in the preceding 
12 months, 71.1% of Kosovo-Serb and 68.6% of Roma HHS respondents stated that they or a member of their 
family had been a victim of crime over the same period. 
Figure 12: Concerns about becoming a victim of crime in the future vs. having been a victim of crime in the last twelve 
months (Base N = 1,258)
0  Op. cit., Wood, D. et al., p. 50.
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The HHS also revealed that although only 13.7% of female HHS respondents had had a crime directed against 
themselves or their family in the last 12 months, a significantly lower proportion than the male HHS respondents 
(22.2%), there was also a significant gap between the percentage of females (25.6%) and males (33.6%) that 
expressed a fear that they would be a victim of crime in the future. 
Although only 1.2% of respondents considered weapons-related issues to be one of the three most serious 
problems facing their community, 11% of HHS respondents stated that armed robbery occurred frequently in their 
area, with a further 3.8% of people considering armed threats to be a frequent event within their community:
Figure 13: According to you, what types of crime occur frequently in your area? (Multiple answers)  
(Base N = 1,258)
It is difficult to determine if these perceptions of armed violence are based upon personal experience, as although 
only 1.1% and 1.3% of HHS respondents reported an occurrence of armed robbery and armed threat respectively 
in the last year, the HHS survey did not gather information on incidents that may have occurred more than a 
year ago. Armed violence may well have been used against members of the community that were not members 
of the respondent’s immediate family, and they may therefore have indirectly come into contact with armed 
violence. It is also likely that exposure to reports of armed violence in the media have had an influence upon their 
perceptions and response to this question. 
During research for this report, Ashkali respondents reported far more exposure to armed violence than any 
other ethnic group. While Bosnian respondents, after Ashkali, were the group most concerned about armed 
robbery as a frequent occurrence in their community (18%), Kosovo-Serbs were the second most concerned 
ethnic group with regard to armed threats (10.1%). Kosovo-Serb perceptions of armed threats were particularly 
high in Gorazhdec/Goraždevac and Zupç/Zupče, with 60% and 50% of the respondents respectively from these 
communities perceiving them to be a frequent occurrence. This perhaps helps to explain why respondents in 
both of these areas declared their communities to be ‘unsafe’ (see Section 4.1.3).
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Figure 14: Perceptions of arms-related crime occurring frequently within a community (Base N = 1,258)
The pattern of responses changed slightly when HHS respondents were asked: ‘Do you think there are incidents 
in your community where people are threatened by firearms?’
Figure 15: Do you think there are incidents in your community where people are threatened by firearms? (Base N = 
1,258)
In response to this question, only ten percent of Kosovo-Albanians knew of ‘a few’ instances in which members 
of their community had been threatened by firearms, while no respondent suggested that there had been ‘many’ 
such instances. In contrast, 36.2% of Kosovo-Serbs and 18.8% of Roma reported that they thought there had 
been many such incidents in their community, with a further 46.8% and 43.8% respectively reporting that there 
had been a few. This suggests that these minority groups perceive significant levels of armed intimidation within 
their communities, though they do not explicitly express the origins of these threats. A similar pattern is discernible 
in HHS responses to the question: ‘Do you think there are incidents in your community where people are injured 
by firearms?’. Once again, the overall average differed significantly from both Kosovo-Serb and Roma perceptions 
of firearms injuries; while 66.8% of all HHS respondents reported that there were no firearms injuries in their 
communities, only 12.4% of Kosovo-Serbs and 12.5% of Roma concurred.
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Figure 16: Do you think there are incidents in your community where people are injured by firearms?  
(Base N = 1,258)
4..	 Changing	perceptions	of	security
HHS findings show that while 42.2% of Kosovo-Albanian respondents reported increasing levels of security, only 
5.5% of Kosovo-Serb respondents felt the same way.0 Whilst the majority of Kosovo-Serb respondents (51.4%) 
felt that security levels had remained the same compared with three years ago, a significant proportion (32.6%) 
considered the situation to have deteriorated. This is perhaps indicative of the general sense of insecurity 
indicated by Kosovo-Serbs during the HHS and focus group discussions.
Figure 17: Compared to three years ago, how do you think the levels of safety in your community have changed?
(Base N = 1,258)
Several Kosovo-Albanian focus group participants stated that the period immediately following the 1999 conflict 
witnessed the highest levels of crime, followed by a steady decrease thereafter. However, the opinions of Kosovo-
Serb focus group participants supported the view of those HHS respondents who declared that safety levels 
were deteriorating. It is therefore possible that the March 2004 riots and ensuing tensions have helped to foster 
perceptions of deteriorating safety levels amongst the Kosovo-Serb population, though general crime levels in 
Kosovo-Serb communities may have also played a role in this. Moreover, heightened tensions in four northern 
towns in June 2006 will likely contribute to further the feelings of insecurity amongst Kosovo-Serbs.0     
0  The majority of the 5.5% respondents hailed from the Kosovo-Serb majority area of Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok, Leposaviq/Leposavić and 
Zveçan/Zvecan. An exception to this rule were the respondents from the Kosovo-Albanian dominated village of Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje. 
0  The recent escalation in violence led to a ‘state of emergency’ being declared in four towns in June 2006, accompanied by a severance 
of relations with both UNMIK and the Kosovan institutions. Though UN officials have stated that there is no evidence to suggest ethnic 
motivation, Kosovo-Serb leaders have labelled the attacks as ‘systematic, planned crimes to intimidate and ethnically cleanse the Serb 
population from Kosovo’. ‘Kosovo Serbs sever ties with UN, provincial institutions’, Southeast European Times, 06 June 2006. Available at: 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2006/06/06/feature-01 accessed 12 June 2006.
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4.	 Perceptions	of	security	providers
There are several elements of the HHS that can be used to assess public perceptions of, and attitudes towards, 
security providers. This report assesses this issue by analysing:
n	 Data relating to peoples levels of trust in various institutions; 
n	 Assessments of security provider efficiency; and
n	 To whom respondents would turn if faced with potentially violent encounters. 
One of the key indicators for public perceptions of security providers in Kosovo are the levels of trust that 
respondents place in key institutions. The HHS results indicated that the KPC enjoyed the full trust of 50.1% of all 
HHS respondents, with KFOR and the KPS enjoying the full trust of 34.4% and 27.7% of respondents respectively. 
About 30% of HHS respondents placed average levels of trust in institutions such as the judiciary (30.8%), 
local authorities (31.4%), the government (30.4%) and religious leaders (33.7%). A further fifth of respondents 
announced that they had no trust at all in Kosovo’s politicians (22%), the judiciary (21.5%) or the local authorities 
(20.3%).  
Figure 18: How much trust do you have in the following institutions? (Base N = 1,258)
However, these general perceptions do not accurately reflect the views of particular population groups. For 
example, Kosovo-Serbs expressed particularly low levels of trust in most of Kosovo’s institutions and security 
providers, as Figure 19 below shows. This lack of confidence is echoed in the focus groups, where a large number 
of Kosovo-Serb participants stated that they would not rely on any security provider due to a feeling that ‘no-
one cares’, a possible reflection of Kosovo-Serbs’ feeling of exclusion from Kosovo’s governance and security 
structures.
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Figure 19: Kosovo-Serb levels of trust in various institutions (Base N = 218)
Several Kosovan respondents also perceived a number of the institutions listed above to have ties with organised 
crime groups. For instance, 14% of Kosovo-Albanians, 17% of Kosovo-Serbs and 19% of other minority groups 
stated that they had personally encountered apparent linkages between organised crime and the Customs 
Service, UNMIK Police and the KPS.0 
4..	 Perceptions	of	the	KPS
The issue of KPS performance was discussed at length during focus groups, with the general consensus being 
that not only was the KPS inefficient, but that its officers were poorly trained and unwilling to proactively combat 
crime. Participants of only one focus group expressed a general level of satisfaction with the work of the KPS and 
this appeared to be related to the fact that the KPS officers in that respondent’s community were well-known to 
the population. 
A small number of Kosovo-Albanian focus group participants argued that the Serbian police had been more 
prepared to investigate SALW possession and proactively prevent violent crime than the KPS. This was a common 
and important perception from the focus groups, i.e. that the KPS seems unwilling to intervene or investigate 
violent incidents. It was generally believed that KPS officers were apparently more concerned with their own 
personal safety than contributing to increasing the overall safety of the community (see Box 2).
Box 2: Focus group participants’ perceptions of the KPS
n	 'It is possible to bribe the police with a coffee’. (Male, 48, Glloboçicë/Globocica). 
n A pizza order from a restaurant will reach you faster than the police’ (Male, 23, Prishtinë/Priština).
n If one does not trust the KPS then unfortunately the only option is to carry a gun for your own protection’. 
(Female, 24).
n ‘When have they ever solved anything? Never, nothing’. (Male, 59, Graçanicë/Gracanica).
Yet when questioned whom they would call if threatened with violence, 80.2% of HHS respondents selected the 
KPS:
0  Op. cit., UNDP, Early Warning Report No. 12, p. 26.
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Figure 20: Who would you call if you or your family were threatened with violence?  
(Multiple possible answers) (Base N = 1,258)
It is perhaps to be expected that the response to this question also varied according to ethnicity. 89.4% of Kosovo-
Serbs consider the police to be either inefficient or very inefficient (see below), and it is reasonable to expect 
that a large proportion of HHS respondents considered this issue with the KPS in mind. However, despite this low 
level of confidence, 53.7% of Kosovo-Serb respondents would contact the KPS if threatened with violence. They 
would, however, be more likely to call UNMIK Police in such a situation (82.1%), with 53.2% preferring to request 
the help of their families and friends and 43.1% prepared to protect themselves.
Nevertheless, it remains that 78% of Kosovo-Serb respondents to the HHS place little or no trust in the KPS. 
Focus groups with Kosovo-Serbs suggest that this is due to a belief that the KPS care very little about their 
community. As one focus group participant remarked: ‘what can you expect from them?... They would rather we 
were dead (gone)’.0
In addition to specific questions relating to the KPS, the HHS included a more generic question aimed at gauging 
public perceptions of ‘police’ efficiency. When asked how efficient they considered the police to be, 9.9% of HHS 
respondents answered ‘very efficient’, 27.6% ‘efficient’, and 27.6% said ‘neither efficient nor inefficient’. 19.6% 
of HHS respondents perceived the police to be ‘inefficient’, with a further 12.4% considering them to be ‘very 
inefficient’. Kosovo-Albanian, Ashkali and Bosnian respondents had more positive impressions of the police, 
whilst Kosovo-Serbs had particularly negative perceptions, with 48.6% considering the police to be ‘inefficient’, 
and 40.8% perceiving them as ‘very inefficient’.
Figure 21: How efficient do you judge the police to be in solving crime and protecting people?  
(Base N = 1,258)
0  Focus group participant, female (43), Graçanicë/Gracanica.
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4..	 Perceptions	of	international	security	providers
The international security providers, KFOR and UNMIK, elicited a range of responses when HHS respondents 
were asked to express their levels of trust in them. Overall, both seem to enjoy fairly positive perceptions in 
comparison with other institutions in Kosovo. However, Kosovo-Albanian respondents place greater trust in KFOR 
and UNMIK than do Kosovo-Serbs. Thus, 29.4% of Kosovo-Albanian respondents had complete or very high 
levels of trust in UNMIK, with only 5.5% of Kosovo-Serb respondents giving a similar assessment. Further, 72.5% 
of Kosovo-Albanians trust KFOR ‘very much’ or ‘completely’, compared to only 1.8% of Kosovo-Serbs. These 
results are significantly lower than the findings of a recent UN report, in which 90.3% of Kosovo-Albanian were 
reportedly ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with the work of KFOR, compared to 28.4% of Kosovo-Serbs.0 They also 
suggest that KFOR is the Kosovo-Albanians’ ‘preferred’ international security provider. Conversely, Kosovo-Serbs 
generally expressed a high level of dissatisfaction with KFOR, but there are some indications that it might also 
be viewed as the only force capable of providing physical protection. However, in more than one KII, it was noted 
that although KFOR was perceived to provide protection to the Kosovo-Serb minority immediately following the 
1998 - 1999 conflict, this trust was significantly damaged as a result of KFOR’s perceived inaction during the 
March 2004 violence. 
Despite the generally neutral or positive perceptions of the international security providers, focus group 
participants, especially Kosovo-Serbs, expressed the view that most international security providers were only in 
Kosovo for personal reward and gain. One participant summarised this viewpoint thus: ‘they don’t care about the 
local community. They don’t know who is Albanian or Serbian. They don’t even know why they are here’. Many 
Kosovo-Serb focus group participants suggested that the only body in which they would place a significant degree 
of trust is the Serbian military. The low levels of trust outlined above, and suggestions such as these, suggest that 
Kosovo-Serbs do not think that they have ‘ownership’ of Kosovo’s current security providers. 
4..	 Perceptions	of	the	KPC
This perception may, in part, be explained by an accompanying belief, exhibited in both interviews and focus 
groups, that the KPC has access to a considerable quantity of undeclared SALW in addition to its limited active 
holdings and the larger reserve stocks that are well controlled by KFOR (see Section 2.2.2.4). While there appears 
to be no supporting evidence for such claims, the Office of the KPC Co-ordinator also noted a tendency in some 
Serbian media outlets to portray the KPC as a well-equipped ‘army in waiting,’ and urged caution with regards to 
such reports and the public perceptions that they may encourage. 
When questioned about the future of the KPC, fifteen percent of HHS respondents stated that they thought that 
the KPC should be disbanded, with 83.9% of all Kosovo-Serb respondents calling for the break up of the KPC. 
The fact that 87.2% of Kosovo-Serb respondents had no trust in the KPC, with a further 11.5% placing little trust 
in the body, helps to explain their lack of support for the KPC’s continuation. 
4.2.4	 Perceptions	of	the	judiciary
The relatively low levels of trust in Kosovo’s institutions, such as local authorities and the judiciary (see Section 
4.2), suggest that there is little public faith in the rule of law in Kosovo. Almost one fifth of respondents did 
not feel able to comment on the fairness of the judicial system and those who did give their opinion on this 
matter expressed fairly polarised views. Thus, although 28.5% of respondents considered the courts to be 
neither fair nor unfair, 17.7% of respondents perceived Kosovo’s judges and courts to be unfair, with a further 
14.5% deeming them very unfair. While Kosovo-Serbs, when they expressed an opinion, had particularly negative 
attitudes towards the judicial system, Ashkali respondents were extremely positive in their assessments. 
0 	Op. cit., UNDP Early Warning Report No. 12, p. 25. 
  Focus group participant, male (59), Gracanicë/Gracanica.
  Interview, Lt Col Iain Macdonald, Office of the KPC Coordinator, 09 March 2006.
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Figure 22: How fair do you consider the judges and courts to be? (Base N = 1,258)
The general level of disillusionment with the judiciary is also probably due to perceptions of pervasive corruption 
within the court system. Of those HHS respondents who stated that the courts were ‘unfair’ or ‘very unfair’, 
67% considered corruption to be the greatest challenge for the judiciary in Kosovo. For 76.9% Kosovo-
Albanian respondents, corruption was the main challenge, a view shared by 53% Kosovo-Serbs. Overall, 40% 
of respondents perceived the courts to be subject to undue political interference, with 51.5% of Kosovo-Serb 
respondents concerned with this problem, compared with 33.7% of Kosovo-Albanians. A further 36.2% of 
respondents perceived incompetence as the greatest challenge for the judicial system. 
4..	 Security	providers	and	border	management
Focus groups revealed that border region inhabitants were particularly sensitive to a range of security issues, 
with the cross-border activities of criminal gangs cited as the main cause of concern. Accompanying this is an 
assessment by many participants that such insecurity presents a legitimate reason for those in border regions 
to be armed. The question of who should be trusted to guard Kosovo’s borders is therefore of obvious relevance 
when examining the perceptions of security providers within Kosovo.
Figure 23: Who would you trust to guard Kosovo’s borders? (Base N = 1,258)
HHS results indicate that the KPC is the institution most trusted to provide border security, followed by KFOR. Of 
particular concern is the fact that the Border Police were trusted with this role by only 10.8% of respondents. Yet 
again, a more diverse pattern emerges when these responses are broken down by ethnicity. 
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Figure 24: Who would you trust to guard Kosovo’s borders? (By ethnicity) (Base N = 1,258)
While the KPC was chosen as the preferred border security service by 48.5% of Kosovo-Albanians, 63.3% of 
Kosovo-Serb HHS respondents stated that they would prefer an institution ‘other’ then the KPS, KPC, KFOR, 
Border Police or UNMIK to protect Kosovo’s borders. If the HHS respondents were of a similar mindset to the 
Kosovo-Serb participants in the focus groups, then one would assume that this ‘other’ institution would be the 
Serbian military or security forces. This further strengthens the argument that the Kosovo-Serb minority does not 
feel as if its interests are represented by the current officially sanctioned security actors in Kosovo. 
Despite the poor levels of trust placed in the KPS with regards to border security, a number of focus group 
participants thought that this should be the responsibility of the police, citing EU regulations on border security 
as the reason for this. However, both in border regions and amongst Kosovo-Albanian focus group participants 
more generally, the KPC was cited as the most appropriate institution to carry out border security functions. Once 
again, it would appear that the different ethnic groups prefer the security provider that appears to most closely 
match their group’s composition and interests. Such a polarisation of opinion and feelings in relation to ‘our’ and 
‘their’ security providers will undoubtedly hamper efforts to guarantee border security in the short to medium 
term. 
4.	 Perceptions	of	a	Kosovan	‘gun	culture’
There is a widely held assumption that the men of SEE, and Albanians in particular, have a strongly developed 
and pervasive gun culture.4 The Kanun, the customary method of maintaining law and order used for several 
centuries in northern Albania and Kosovo, is often used to explain the presumed current Albanian, and Kosovo-
Albanian attachment to SALW, as it makes numerous references to SALW and their use. Despite these 
assumptions, the HHS results for this research suggest that SALW do not play a significant role in everyday 
Kosovan life, (though the more open and confident discussion engendered by focus groups suggested a more 
significant prevalence of SALW use than the negligible one indicated in the HHS). However, a substantial majority 
of focus group participants stated that they had heard gunshots in their neighbourhood, usually considering 
these to be the result of celebratory shooting and one focus group participant suggested that the use of SALW 
in this manner ‘points to nothing but a culture, a way in which this particular person was raised, as to how he 
perceives the joys of life’. However, results of the HHS challenge a view of ‘gun culture’; only one percent of 
  For example, focus group participant, male (22), Businessperson.
4  For an in-depth analysis of this assumption, see Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War, (Oxford, 2005) pp. 205-
227; Gounev, P. et al., ‘The rifle has the devil inside’: Gun Culture in South Eastern Europe, (SEESAC, 2006).
  For a more detailed discussion, see op. cit., Khakee, A. and Florquin, N., p. 31.
  Focus group participant, male (23) Prishtinë/Priština. For further discussion of celebratory shooting, see Section 4.5.
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respondents said that they would choose to own a firearm due to the logic that ‘everyone has one’ and an even 
smaller proportion (0.9%) thought that one might purchase a firearm in an attempt to increase self-confidence. 
Box 3: Focus group discussion participants’ attitudes towards ‘gun culture’
n ‘We have always had arms and we can never stop’. (Male, Gllogoc/Glogovce).
n ‘In Kosovo, if you do not have a son and a gun, it is the same as if you have nothing. Here people are not 
people if they do not have weapons. And when you have one, you also have problems. That is how it is’. (Male, 
59, Graçanicë/Gracanica).
n ‘One can live in a very safe environment but still feel unsafe. There is this ruling in Hobbesian philosophy: I 
shoot you before you shoot me’. (Male, 23, Prishtinë/Priština).
n ‘People must understand that the firearm is the most preferred toy for a Kosovo person, regardless of his 
beliefs’. (Male, 38, Graçanicë/Gracanica).
n ‘I think that this is the biggest problem with Albanians. We see it as more morally right to kill someone than 
report it to the police’. (Male, 20).
n ‘We, since the times when the Albanian nation was created, did not live without arms. Now has come the time 
when we should not use them’. (Male, 72, Prishtinë/Priština).
For some commentators, the recent armed conflict in Kosovo has contributed to a (re)creation and maintenance 
of a Kosovan ‘gun culture’. The echoes of war in contemporary life have inevitably resulted in an elevated 
number of SALW and, like in many other areas of the world, this probably has an effect on youth culture. Whilst 
the 26 - 35 and 36 - 65 age groups were perceived to be the primary SALW holders in Kosovo by more than 
half of all HHS respondents (28.2% and 28.6% respectively), 16.6% of HHS respondents perceived weapon 
ownership to be greatest amongst those within the 19 - 25 age group, a viewpoint shared by several focus group 
participants. The rationale for this selection may, in part, stem from a belief that the young people of Kosovo want 
to emulate their ‘war heroes’, an argument developed in a recent ICG study. However, these perceptions are 
not supported by responses from the HHS’ younger respondents.   
Figure 25: In what age group do you think firearms are most common? (Base N = 1,258)
Whilst the data available has indicated a wide range of opinions and perceptions regarding a so-called ‘gun 
culture’, it is not possible to establish a generalised sense across those interviewed that this is in evidence in 
Kosovo. This is especially so considering that the incidents of celebratory shooting highlighted by participants 
may not be considered by participants to be a ‘small arms issue’. Further, though some areas of Kosovo are 
  Op. cit., Small Arms Survey, pp. 205-227.
  ICG, Kosovo After Haridinaj, 26 May 2005, p. 7. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/163_
kosovo_after_haradinaj.pdf accessed 29 May 2006.
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naturally more heavily armed than others, this is probably more a reflection of the history of conflict, rather than 
an engrained Kosovan-Albanian gun culture. Without a much more detailed analysis of attitudes in this area, the 
existence or otherwise of such a phenomenon is impossible to ascertain. 
4.4	 Perceived	distribution	of	SALW
4.4.	 Perceptions	of	community	and	individual	possession
The HHS and focus group revealed a wide range of opinions regarding SALW ownership in Kosovo: 89.1% of HHS 
respondents stated that their household did not have a firearm, with 79.5% of respondents also stating that they 
did not know anyone who owned a firearm. However, while two-thirds of respondents were unwilling to give an 
estimate for the proportion of houses in their neighbourhood with firearms, 12.1% of HHS respondents asserted 
that there were no households with firearms in their neighbourhood. Therefore, while the overwhelming majority 
of HHS respondents suggested that they knew of no one who possessed a firearm, they still believed that there 
were SALW in their community. Focus group respondents were also evasive when asked to discuss personal 
possession of firearms in their homes and in their communities. 
Only 8.2% of HHS respondents admitted that their household kept a firearm, with a small number of focus group 
participants also stating that they kept a firearm at home. Most focus group firearms-owners stated that they 
kept their weapon for self-protection, although veterans of the conflict thought that those who had fought should 
be allowed to keep their weapon as ‘a trophy’. Focus group participants were also more willing to state that they 
knew somebody who owned a firearm and thus focus group results would appear to correlate with the HHS finding 
that only 14.9% of respondents could confidently state that there were no firearms in their community. Just over 
a third of HHS respondents (36.1%) were unwilling to describe the firearm situation in their community. 
Figure 26: How would you describe the number of firearms in your community? (Base N = 1,258)
It is worth noting that all of the HHS respondents who agreed with the statement that ‘almost everyone (in my 
community) owns a weapon’ were Kosovo-Albanians. Further, all but two of those agreeing with the description 
that many people owned a SALW in their community were Kosovo-Albanian. 
When questioned where they saw people carrying firearms, almost three-quarters of respondents either did not 
answer, or stated that they did not know or never saw people carrying firearms in Kosovo:
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Figure 27: Where are you most likely to see people carrying firearms in your neighbourhood (excluding police or KFOR 
officers)? (Base N = 1,258)
However, 20.2% of respondents stated that they saw firearms at celebrations. It would therefore appear that 
several of the 85.2% of those HHS respondents who stated that they never saw civilians carrying firearms in 
Kosovo suddenly recalled an incident in which they had seen people carrying firearms in their neighbourhood 
when it came to answering this particular question.
When HHS respondents were questioned about regions of Kosovo they thought may have a high proliferation 
of SALW, Pejë/Peć (20.5%) and Drenice/Drenica (10.4%) were the most popular responses. This perception is 
partially supported by official statistics, with SALW used in the perpetration of criminal offences most frequently 
seized in the Pejë/Peć region, followed by Prishtinë/Priština. However, whilst Gllogoc/Glogovac was considered 
by HHS respondents to be one of the least armed areas of Kosovo, 25.9% of the 4.1% of HHS respondents who 
reported seeing firearms in their community on a daily basis were located in Gllogoc/Glogovac. 
One of the key findings of the HHS is that more than a third of respondents (38.7%) considered the number 
of firearms in their community to have either decreased or significantly decreased since 2003. Less than five 
percent of respondents thought that the number of SALW had increased, although it is advisable to treat this with 
caution as 43.3% of respondents stated that they ‘did not know’ or did not answer this question: 
Figure 28: How do you think that the number of firearms in your neighbourhood has changed compared to three years 
ago? (Base N = 1,258)
This point can be generalised, and is crucial; the inevitable sensitivity that accompanied the questions regarding 
SALW ownership and possession in the HHS is a significant factor when considering the large degree of 
unwillingness of participants to divulge information, and the largely contradictory data that was produced by 
those who were. This can also, in part, be used to explain the large discrepancies between perceptions indicated 
by focus groups, the HHS and KIIs. A deeper understanding of public attitudes and perceptions towards SALW 
might however be attained through follow-up research, using qualitative research methods more extensively. 
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4.4.	 Gun	owners	and	types	of	weapon
Discounting the security forces, criminal groups were seen as the primary holders of firearms in Kosovo by a large 
majority of HHS respondents (63.5%). The proportion of Kosovo-Serb respondents who thought that war veterans 
were the most significant group of gun-owners in Kosovo was 18.8%, significantly higher than the overall level of 
5.9%. 
Figure 29: In your opinion, besides the security forces, who do you think has the guns? (Base N = 1,258)
Kosovo-Albanian focus group participants appear to believe that most illicit SALW in Kosovo are in the possession 
of Kosovo-Serbs or are concentrated in areas where Kosovo-Albanians are ‘under threat from the Serbs’, such as 
Drenice/Drenica, Podujevë/Podujevo, Pejë/Peć, or Graçanicë/Gracanica. A mirrored perception was held by 
Kosovo-Serb focus group participants, who conceded that all SALW types were to be found in all ethnic groups 
and all regions of Kosovo, but who still thought that there was a higher level of gun-ownership amongst Kosovo-
Albanians. 
Almost half of all HHS respondents thought that SALW-owning people in their neighbourhood possessed pistols/
revolvers (46.7%), with a similar percentage considering hunting rifles (42%) to be the most common.
Figure 30: What type of firearms do people from your neighbourhood have? (Multiple possible answers) 
(Base N = 195)
  Focus group participant, male (22), Businessperson.
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It is unclear from the HHS data whether this perceived preference for pistols/revolvers amongst Kosovo’s firearms-
owning population is related to criminal or self-protection activities, two of the most common reasons for handgun 
possession. The fact that 11.8% of respondents also considered automatic rifles to be in the possession of their 
neighbours suggests that many SALW from the conflict remain in civilian possession. This is a situation that 
would appear to be supported by sections of the Kosovo-Albanian community, which deem ‘trophy weapons’ for 
war veterans to be acceptable according to participants of the War Veterans’ focus group held for this research. 
4.4.	 Licences	and	illegal	SALW
Focus group participants thought that because it is very difficult, if not impossible, to purchase a weapon legally, 
the majority of SALW in Kosovo must have been obtained illegally. This perception is also reflected in the HHS 
results, where 51.1% of respondents stated that less than a quarter of firearms were legally owned. As with other 
questions relating to firearms possession, a significant proportion of respondents refused to answer or preferred 
not to express an opinion (40.5%). 
Figure 31: In your opinion, how many of the firearms in private possession are legally held?  
(Base N = 1,258)
While almost a third of HHS respondents did not know about, or were unwilling to express an opinion on 
the reasons for illegal firearms possession, 18.1% thought that people did not want to be officially recorded 
as possessing a firearm. 28.9% of Kosovo-Serb and 18.2% of Bosnian respondents considered a feeling of 
discomfort when registering SALW with the police to be one of the main reasons for illegal possession, although 
only 5.1% of Kosovo-Albanians gave this response (which is perhaps indicative of the lower levels of confidence 
in the KPS to be found amongst the Kosovo-Serb population).
Another significant difference between Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serb responses relates to the inheritance 
of firearms. While 12.5% of Kosovo-Albanian respondents thought that this was a key factor in decisions not to 
register a firearm, only 0.9% of Kosovo-Serb respondents selected this factor. A Kosovo-Albanian focus group 
participant stressed that although he did not personally like firearms, his household possessed a firearm 
because: ‘in our family, it is a tradition’.0
The majority of reasons for illegal possession given in the figure below suggest that HHS respondents thought 
that it would not be in the interests of those in possession of firearms to register their ownership. This is a finding 
echoed in the Serbia SALW Survey, where 34% of HHS respondents stated that they did not wish to be recorded 
as firearms owners. 
0  Focus group participant, male (22), Businessperson.
  Op. cit., Taylor, Z. et al., p. 44.
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Figure 32: In your opinion, why do people choose to illegally possess guns? (Base N = 1,258)
Just over half of HHS respondents (51.1%) thought that more than three quarters of the firearms held in Kosovo 
were unregistered. However, when asked how they themselves would purchase a weapon, HHS respondents 
were less willing to provide an answer. This is perhaps unsurprising given the degree of suspicion and discomfort 
with which some questions relating to SALW ownership were met. Whilst the issue was not discussed in great 
detail during the focus groups, participants appeared to suggest that it is easy to obtain a firearm despite the 
legal restraints since they are widely available on the illicit market. 
4.	 Attitudes	towards	SALW	possession	and	use
The overwhelming majority of HHS respondents (70.0%) stated that they would not acquire a weapon even 
if they were able to do so. For 82.7% of these respondents, this disinterest stemmed from the fact that they 
did not like guns, with just over a quarter stating that they did not feel the need for one (26.8%). Focus group 
participants also blamed civilian-owned firearms for a number of society’s ills. The perception of SALW ownership 
as both a cause and effect of insecurity was summarised by one participant who stated: ‘if you want to destroy a 
population, allow them to keep arms’. 
Figure 33: Why would you/your family choose not to own a firearm? (Base N = 961)
However, of the 23.6% of HHS respondents who said that they would acquire a firearm if it were possible to do 
so, 76.8% cited the need to protect themselves and their family as the main motivating factor. This finding is 
reinforced by the fact that around a quarter (24.1%) of all HHS respondents thought that possession of firearms 
  Focus group participant, male, Pejë/Peć.
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would increase their levels of safety. Though comparable to the corresponding statistic in Serbia, this figure is 
higher than the 13.3% of Moldovan respondents who considered civilian firearms possession necessary.
Figure 34: What is the main reason you/your family would choose to own a firearm?  
(Multiple responses) (Base N = 297)
The second most popular choice, ‘protection of property and business’, was selected by 32.7% of respondents, 
increasing to 52.2% amongst wealthier respondents. Protection of business was also the second most popular 
choice in research undertaken by the Centre for Rural Studies in Albania (8.2%) and the third most popular 
choice in the Serbia SALW Survey (32%).4 
Whilst 22.6% of Kosovo-Albanians questioned for the HHS stated that they would acquire a firearm if they were 
able to, a larger proportion (28.9%) of Kosovo-Serbs felt the same way. Further, Kosovo-Serb HHS respondents 
(32.6%) were significantly more likely than Kosovo-Albanians (15.1%) to cite self-protection as a reason for 
owning a firearm, possibly due to the increased sense of insecurity within this population group. The response 
of ‘community protection’ also produces a similar pattern: 25.7% of Kosovo-Serb respondents cited this as a 
main motivating factor for owning a firearm, compared to just 0.6% of Kosovo-Albanians. Kosovo-Serb HHS 
respondents were also more likely to justify SALW ownership by referring to a fear of future conflict: 22.5% cited 
this as a significant motivation as opposed to 2.1% of Kosovo-Albanians. However, a minority of focus group 
participants perceived the uncertain political future of Kosovo as a reason why citizens should not possess SALW: 
‘if Kosovo were to be a safe country, it would be normal for some to possess arms. But the current situation is 
very complex and the possession of arms is therefore dangerous’.
Although the majority of focus group participants believed that civilians should not generally possess SALW, 
several argued that civilian firearms possession could be justified for those inhabiting border regions. Although 
this position was justified by concerns with cross-border criminal activities and gangs, it could also have been 
influenced by fears of conflict. 
Although celebratory shooting is believed by HHS respondents to be the most common form of firearm discharge 
(78%), it also seemed to be an unpopular form of celebration with 83.9% of respondents stating that they 
disliked, or extremely disliked the practice. Only 5.5% of respondents reported liking it or liking it very much. 
Focus group participants expressed concerns that because this practice was regarded as part of the ‘heritage’ 
of Kosovans, it would continue in future generations. 
  Op. cit., Taylor, Z. et al., p. 44; op. cit., Wood, D. et al., p. 66.
4  Center for Rural Studies, United Nations Development Programme Small Arms and Light Weapons Project: Socio-economic Analysis and 
Impact Assessment (Tirana, 2002), Table 38. Op. cit., Holtom, P. et al.; op. cit., Taylor Z. et al., p. 44.
  For example, focus group participant, male (23), Prishtinë/Priština.
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Furthermore, the vast majority of HHS respondents believed that illegal SALW proliferation poses a threat to the 
future prosperity of Kosovo (87%), with only 6.6% believing that it did not. 
4.	 Attitudes	towards	domestic	SALW	Control
More than half of HHS respondents thought that additional controls on firearms would increase safety in their 
community. 
Figure 35: How much do you think each of the following will increase safety in [respondent’s town]?  
(Base N = 1,258)
4.	 Attitudes	towards	SALW	Collection
As previously noted, voluntary SALW Collections in Kosovo have not resulted in the surrender of significant 
numbers of firearms. According to 39.6% of HHS respondents, fear of conflict and instability is the main cause for 
the civilian population’s reluctance to surrender its SALW. Focus group participants also explained that voluntary 
surrender of SALW will not take place in earnest until people feel more secure and the prospect of conflict has 
significantly diminished. Further, 26.6% of HHS respondents suggested that a lack of trust in security providers 
is the primary factor for such low surrender rate. 
While just over a third of HHS respondents felt that a future amnesty from prosecution for owners of illicit SALW 
would prove either successful or very successful (35.1%), a fifth of HHS respondents thought that it would 
either be unsuccessful or very unsuccessful (21.2%). Pessimism was most prevalent amongst the Kosovo-Serb 
respondents, with 46.8% stating that any future amnesty would either be unsuccessful or very unsuccessful. 
Figure 36: How successful do you think a future weapons amnesty would be…? (Base N = 1,258)
Almost half of the HHS respondents believed that the success of future amnesties is dependent upon the 
resolution of Kosovo’s final status (47.2%), with just over a third of respondents linking the success of future 
amnesties to an improvement in the economic situation (36.9%). Almost all focus group participants stated 
that SALW Collection programmes or amnesties would continue to fail until Kosovo’s final status was decided. 
In contrast, incentives and pro-active efforts by community leaders did not elicit particularly positive feelings 
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from the HHS respondents. Although a number of focus group participants supported community development 
projects, lotteries and financial rewards as a means of helping to collect greater numbers of illegally-held SALW 
from civilians who are not involved in criminal activities, Kosovo-Serb participants questioned how this would 
work in practice. 
Figure 37: In your opinion, which of the following would best stimulate people in your community to hand in their illegal 
weapons? (Base N = 1,258)
Almost a third (29.9%) of HHS respondents considered that an amnesty administered by the KPC would be 
the most successful. This opinion was not as popular among Kosovo-Serbs, with only one Kosovo-Serb HHS 
respondent selecting the KPC as the organisation best suited to administering an effective SALW Collection 
programme. Every Kosovo-Serb focus group participant stated that they would prefer to surrender unregistered 
SALW to the Serbian army or police, though several stated that they would consider KFOR as an alternative. 
However, Kosovo-Serb HHS respondents looked more favourably upon the use of celebrities, religious leaders 
and political parties in the SALW Collection process than their Kosovo-Albanian counterparts. 
Figure 38: Which of the following would be best placed to get people to surrender their weapons?  
(Ranked 1-3) (Base N = 1,258)
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	 Small	Arms	Capacity	Survey	
.	 International	and	regional	standards	on	SALW	Control			
During the last decade, an interlocking set of agreements, treaties and customary norms have emerged which 
either directly address the issue of SALW Control, or have an important bearing upon it. While the United Nations 
has arguably functioned as the leading international forum for the development and adoption of common 
understandings and instruments to combat the proliferation and destabilising accumulations of SALW since 
the mid 1990s, a range of authoritative standards have emerged from other fora that are either supplementary, 
or complementary to those of the UN. The table below lists the main international and regional SALW Control 
standards in question.
INTERNATIONAL	INSTRUMENT DETAILS
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 08 June 1998
EU Joint Action on SALW EU Council Joint Action on the European Union’s contribution 
to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of 
small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 
1999/34/CFSP, (2002/589/CFSP), 12 July 2002
EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and 
Trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition
Council of the European Union 5319/06 of 13 January 2006, 
(adopted 15-16 December 2005)
OSCE Document on SALW FSC.JOUR/314, 24 November 2000
OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional 
Ammunition
FSC.DOC/1/03, 19 November 2003
OSCE Decision on Man-Portable Air Defence Systems 
(MANPADS)
Decision No. 7/03, FSC.DEC/07/03, 23 July 2003
OSCE Decision on End User Certificates and Verification 
Procedures for SALW Exports
Decision No. 05/04, FSC.DEC/5/04, 17 November 2004
OSCE Decision on Principles for the Control of Brokering 
in SALW
Decision No. 08/04, FSC.DEC/8/04, 24 November 2004
Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan - Combating 
the Proliferation of SALW
28 November 2001, revised May 2006
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies, Elements for Export Controls of Man-
Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
Agreed at the WA Plenary, 01 December 2000
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies, Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms 
Brokering
Agreed at the WA Plenary, 2003
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies, Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of 
SALW
Adopted at the WA Plenary, 11-12 December 2002
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components 
and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN 
Firearms Protocol)
Entered into Force on 03 July 2005
United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat 
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects
UN Document A/CONf.192/15, July 2001
   Table 30: International agreements on SALW Control
 Also, the related Open-Ended Working Group on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (OEWG) and Broad-Based Consultations on 
Arms Brokering Controls.
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These agreements, together with guidelines and standards designed to aid implementation at the operational 
level such as the OSCE Best Practice Guides, NATO Allied Ammunition Storage and Transportation Publications 
(AASPT) 1 and 2 and SEE Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards/Guidelines (RMDS/G), provide good 
guidance for policy-makers in South Eastern Europe and elsewhere on the control functions required of national 
institutions.
..	 Kosovo	legislative	and	regulatory	framework
Law-making and legal supervision in Kosovo are presently accomplished through a confused array of actors and 
processes. On the most basic level, the 2001 Constitutional Framework for Kosovo provides the basic framework 
for all law-making in Kosovo. It is however, the Office of the SRSG that promulgates all primary legislation (UNMIK 
Regulations) and secondary ‘Administrative Directives’. When considering the introduction of legislation on more 
controversial or difficult matters, UNMIK will also seek the advice of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO), Department of Political and Legal Affairs (DPLA) and ultimately the approval of the UN Secretariat in New 
York. Since its creation in 2001, the Assembly of Kosovo, a PISG institution, has been able to debate, develop 
and adopt legislation, provided it does not exceed its competencies and consider ‘reserved power’ areas that 
fall within the responsibility of the international administration. Despite having this role, laws developed within 
the Assembly of Kosovo must subsequently be signed-off by UNMIK before it comes into force. In all of the 
above, UNMIK’s legal department, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), plays a leading role. Lastly, though it is often 
confusing and controversial, Yugoslav law may, at times, apply to matters where regulations have not yet been 
developed. 
Although provision has been made in some cases for inclusion of UN administration representatives to 
participate in some fora (e.g. Regional Steering Group, UN Review Conference), Kosovo’s current status as an 
internationally-administered territory means that it is not eligible to accede or adhere to the majority of the 
agreements listed above. However, given that this collection of norms, guidelines and agreements represents 
the emerging consensus and agreed best practices for SALW Control, it follows that an effective regulatory 
framework to control SALW in Kosovo should, at an absolute minimum, closely follow the guidance that these 
documents and fora collectively provide.
In line with both the priorities of the ISSR, which takes a functional approach towards analysis of security issues, 
and the standard UNDP-SEESAC research methodology for SALW Surveys, which requires an assessment to 
be made of indigenous capacities to achieve adequate SALW Control, this Section of the report considers the 
capacity and readiness of all relevant actors within Kosovo to control those SALW falling within their jurisdiction, 
broken down across the functional areas listed below:
n Production: Regulation and maintenance of adequate controls and records on the manufacture of SALW;
n Internal trade: Regulation and maintenance of adequate controls and records over the trade in SALW within 
national (or juridical) territory;
n Possession and use of SALW: Ensuring that the acquisition and use of SALW by all individuals and groups 
under the jurisdiction of the territory (both state and non-state actors) is regulated in line with national 
values and policies, providing for the legitimate defence and security needs of institutions and individuals 
without allowing a destabilising internal accumulation and proliferation of SALW and/or uncontrolled armed 
crime or societal violence;
n Stockpile management: Maintenance of safe and secure SALW and ammunition stockpile management 
procedures, including the completion of routine inventories;
n Information management: Developing or enhancing national mechanisms for the collection, analysis and 
dissemination of data on armed violence;
n Education and SALW Awareness: Developing and implementing targeted national and community-based 
public information and awareness campaigns on the risks associated with inappropriate SALW use and 
possession;
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n SALW Collection programmes: Conducting safe, secure and successful collections and seizures of SALW;
n SALW Destruction programmes: Adopting national policies for determining surpluses of SALW, ammunition 
and explosives, and subsequently implementing destruction programmes to safely dispose of recovered or 
surplus SALW, ammunition and explosives in accordance with international best practices and environmental 
protection issues;
n International transfer control and border management: Establishing and maintaining an effective system 
for the control of SALW export, import, brokering, transit and transhipment including elements such as 
controls over end-use. For enforcement purposes, law enforcement authorities, including the police, customs 
and border control, must also work effectively to prevent and combat illicit SALW trafficking;
n International cooperation and information exchange: Routinely exchanging information between 
governments on holdings, production and international transfers of SALW and encourage cooperation 
between border police and customs authorities cooperation through regional information exchange and 
joint exercises;
n Transparency and oversight: Developing and implementing measures to promote transparency in all 
decisions on small arms at all levels of government, such as the publication of all relevant laws, policies 
and procedures, and the regular publication of detailed and comprehensive reports on arms transfers 
undertaken with official approval;
n Coordination and policy formulation: Creating and maintaining systems and procedures to facilitate 
coordinated action by national regulatory agencies responsible for maintaining SALW Controls, including the 
development, implementation and oversight of national policy.
The Table below provides an overview of the laws and regulations that currently govern the control of SALW in 
Kosovo across the functional areas listed above. The subsequent Sections of the report provide more detail 
on the content, virtues and failings of these laws, and on the quality of their interpretation and enforcement. Law 
enforcement and rule of law issues therefore recur continuously in the analysis that follows, indicating that the 
current and confusing division of competencies between UNMIK/PISG and their individual institutions does not 
lend itself well to the adoption of a coherent package of laws and regulations in an area as complex as SALW 
Control. 
  Section 1(f) of UNMIK Regulation 2001/7, ‘On the Authorisation of Possession of Weapons in Kosovo’ (21 February 2001), defines the 
types of weapons and persons that are regulated: ‘’weapon’ means an instrument designed or used or usable for inflicting bodily harm. It 
shall include, but not be limited to, all forms of ammunition, crossbows, bows and arrows, pepper spray, CS gas, blank firing weapons, replica 
weapons, stun guns, tasers and all categories of weapons set out in Schedule A annexed to the present regulation or similar weapons.’ 
Schedule A goes on to provide a comprehensive list of regulated items ranging from automatic rifles to explosives, mines, grenades and 
ammunition.
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.	 Production
The Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo (UNMIK Regulation 2003/25, 06 July 2003) explicitly forbids the 
unauthorised manufacture of SALW in Kosovo. Accordingly, although the illicit production and modification of 
SALW appears to occur on a small scale (see Section 2.3.6.5), there is no officially regulated production capacity 
in the territory.
.	 Internal	trade
The internal supply, transportation, exchange or sale of SALW, both hunting and self-defence weapons, are not 
permitted under the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo ‘without UNMIK authorisation’. The import of SALW 
by non-governmental actors is also prohibited without the express permission of UNMIK or KFOR. This unique 
arrangement means that those wishing to acquire SALW through legal channels (e.g. gun shops) are unable to 
do so, except by obtaining permission to exchange SALW already registered using WACs or Weapon Registration 
Cards (WRCs) (see below). Despite the fact that most WAC-authorised SALW are drawn from official stocks, this 
unique arrangement means that a substantial number of legally registered SALW in Kosovo, including both self-
defence and hunting/recreational weapons, are sourced from the illicit market.0 Efforts to establish a regulated 
civilian weapons registration system have certainly been undermined in this respect, and will continue to be so 
until more legitimate channels are established. More importantly perhaps, the system currently in place for 
the registration of SALW in Kosovo also functions as a driver for the illicit market. 
.4	 Possession	and	use	
Firearms possession and use is governed by two main regulations. Section 10 of UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 
on ‘The Authorization of Possession of Weapons in Kosovo’ specifies the agencies and persons permitted to 
hold SALW in Kosovo without special authorisation (i.e. in the form of a WAC, see below). These are: KFOR, 
authorised UN security officers, UNMIK Police, the Kosovo Police Service, the Kosovo Correctional Service, legal 
persons who are international security providers registered and licensed by UNMIK, and those holding ‘KFOR 
authorised weapons’ (SALW belonging to the KPC). Since June 2006, SALW used by officers of the Forestry and 
Customs Services are also exempt under Regulation 2001/7 (UNMIK Regulation 2006/35 ‘Amending UNMIK 
Regulation 2001/7 on the Authorization of Possession of Weapons on Kosovo’). A range of institutions share 
the responsibility for regulating the possession and use of SALW, primarily UNMIK Police, KPS and KFOR. The 
handling, usage and control functions of these institutions, but also other societal actors, are explored below.
  Under Article 327, the offence is punishable with a fine of up to €7,500 or one to eight years imprisonment, with stiffer penalties for 
the production of larger numbers of weapons. Article 330 prohibits the manufacture of weapons in the knowledge that they will be used to 
commit a criminal offence.
  Articles 327(1) and 327(2) stipulate a penalty of €7,500 or imprisonment of one to ten years for offences involving larger amounts. The 
procurement of weapons in the knowledge that they will be used to commit criminal acts is prohibited under Article 330. Although the buying 
of SALW under normal circumstances is not regulated by law, buying weapons in the knowledge that they will later be used for criminal acts 
is also prohibited under the Code.
0  UNDP’s ‘Handbook on Hunting Weapons’ (23 April 2003), p.19 points to a similar lack of clarity in the laws in this area. The origins of 
such weapons are discussed in more detail elsewhere in the report, but although illicit SALW are likely available across the territory, past 
reports have indicated that areas bordering Montenegro and Albania, such as Pejë/Peć, and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, which borders Serbia, 
are hot-spots for the illicit internal trade in SALW. According to a report published in 2005 by IWPR, Italian KFOR troops have discovered 
more illegal weapons in the Pejë/Peć region during the first two months of 2005 than in the whole of 2004: ‘Investigation: Kosovo’s wild 
west’, Balkan Crisis Report No. 542, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, 18 February 2005. A second article that appeared in the Kosovo 
daily Koha Ditore describes the thriving market in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, where a wide variety of weapons can be bought or specially ordered. 
Mustafa, M., ‘The Black market offers all kinds of light weapons’, Koha Ditore, 06 February 2005 (translated by the KFOR public information 
office).
  Interview, Naim Maloku, Vice Director of National Assembly and Director of the Parliamentary Commission for Emergencies, 04 April 
2006.
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.4.	 Governmental	actors
Personnel within a number of different governmental agencies in Kosovo currently hold and use SALW in the 
course of their duties, including the KPS, UNMIK Police, KFOR, KPC, Customs and Forestry personnel and the 
Kosovo Correctional Service. Estimates of the extent of official SALW holdings are provided in Section 2.2.2.
KPS: In December 2005, new legislation was adopted that gave the KPS legal grounding for the first time. 
However, the new ‘Law on Police’ is regarded as a skeleton police regulation, which stipulates only the most 
essential guiding principles for the police force, with further details left to PISG institutions for future elaboration. 
As such, it does not address the use of force and firearms by police officers, or the handling of SALW possessed by 
KPS officers. Instead, these aspects continue to be regulated only by internal police standards.4 All KPS recruits 
undergo practical and theoretical training during their basic course at the Kosovo Academy of Public Safety and 
Development (KAPSED), which includes practical scenario-based training using simulation equipment. Although 
the KAPSED training curriculum does not specifically reference international standards in the field, such as the 
‘UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials’ and ‘UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms 
by Law Enforcement Officials’, the KPS Code of Conduct, which provides guidance for police officers on their 
conduct, is said by KAPSED interviewees to draw on such standards. UNMIK official data for the period 01 
January - 20 April 2006 records four incidents in which discharge of KPS firearm resulted in injury and one that 
resulted in death. Of these, two were in self-defence. Information on the details of each case was not available. 
The research team did not uncover any proven cases of serious firearm misuse by KPS officers, with only one 
reference to a case of misuse encountered. 
KFOR: KFOR’s Standard Operating Procedure 3009, ‘Weapons Policy for Kosovo’ (last updated 28 April 2005), 
promulgates the international security force’s SALW policy in Kosovo and provides guidance to units on its 
implementation. This document is primarily concerned with KFOR’s role in regulating the possession and use of 
SALW by civilians, the KPC and law-breakers, and no reference is made within the document to the procedures 
concerning the handling and use of SALW in active use by KFOR units. Despite requests, no further information 
was provided to the research team, but it is presumed that standard regulations do exist. Although one dramatic 
case of SALW misuse by KFOR troops was reported in July 2006, this appears to have been a one-off incident 
with no immediate repercussions; it is not representative of normal practice.
KPC: SALW in the possession of KPC personnel are regulated according to KFOR’s Standard Operating Procedure 
3009, ‘Weapons Policy for Kosovo’, Annex C (2). This document stipulates that KFOR Headquarters may authorise 
KPC members to carry and use SALW for self-defence purposes on behalf of the Commander of Mission (COM) 
KFOR. Authorised KPC personnel may carry one pistol of up to 9mm calibre, provided they have first been issued 
a WAC by KFOR. KPC members who are assigned special high-risk duties may also be assigned up to three 
bodyguards, each of whom may carry a pistol or a short-barrelled automatic weapon not larger than 9mm. When 
not on duty, such SALW are to be stored at the site to which KPC members are assigned. WACs may be issued 
to no more than 5% of KPC members at any given time. The research team found no evidence of SALW misuse 
by KPC personnel.
  UNMIK Regulation 2005/54 ‘On the Framework and Guiding Principle of the Kosovo Police Service’ (20 December 2005).
  Interview, Nick Booth, Senior Security Advisor to the DSRSG for Police and Justice, 09 March 2006. 
4  Kosovo Police Service Code of Conduct, (30 March 2000, last updated 19 February 2003).
  UNMIK official data.
  Focus group discussion, Prishtinë/Priština, 12 March 2006.
  Under the Military-Technical Agreement signed by KFOR and the respective governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia at the close of the conflict, the international security force is authorised to ‘take all necessary action to establish and 
maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission’. Military Technical Agreement between the 
international security force ‘KFOR’ and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 09 June 1999. 
Available at: http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/documents/mta.htm accessed 05 June 2005. UNSCR 1244 of 10 June 1999 also mandated 
KFOR with ‘ensuring public safety’.
  According to an announcement by KFOR’s spokesperson, an Italian KFOR contingent fired a number of rounds from automatic rifles and 
hand-held mortars in the predominantly Kosovo-Serb village of Grabc/Grabac, central Kosovo, when celebrating Italy’s victory in the July 
2006 World Cup semi-final. SRNA (BBC Monitoring Service), ‘Italian troop’s gun celebration damages Kosovo-Serb homes’, 05 July 2006.
  According to Section 1(b) of UNMIK Regulation 2001/7, ‘a ‘KFOR authorized weapon’ means a weapon in the possession of a KPC 
member for which a weapon authorization card has been issued by KFOR’.
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Other government actors: Selected personnel within the Customs and Forestry Services were empowered to carry 
firearms in June 2006 with the amendment of UNMIK Regulation 2001/7.40 Training courses in SALW handling 
at KAPSED are currently anticipated for such staff, although 90% of forest guards are said to have received 
SALW-training and held SALW as part of their duties under the Yugoslav system.4 No detailed information was 
made available to the research team on the possession and use of firearms by other armed actors such as 
UNMIK Police or the Kosovo Correctional Service.
.4.	 Non-governmental	actors
Users of self-defence SALW: UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 authorises individuals holding a WAC to possess and 
carry a firearm (usually sidearm pistols, but also short-barrelled automatic weapons in exceptional circumstances) 
for self-defence purposes. Applicants wishing to acquire a WAC must first undergo an assessment by UNMIK’s 
WAS. A Threat Assessment Committee (TAC), consisting of three UNMIK officials, reviews evidence in relation 
to particular applications, which is primarily provided by local police stations, in order to determine whether 
applicants are in fact subject to ‘the threat or use of deadly force’, and then makes recommendations for the 
issuance or denial of WACs on that basis. However, the final decision on all applications resides with the UNMIK 
Police Commissioner who may issue or deny WACs entirely at his or her discretion.4 Where applicants are 
successful, WACs are issued in relation to a particular weapon, though the TAC does not have any guidelines 
outlining the types of weapons that they may issue. Once issued, WACs contain a full description of each weapon, 
including the manufacturer, model, serial number, as well as any other identifying information. They are valid only 
for one year, after which time the individual must re-apply if still under threat.4 According to WAS personnel, 
recipients of WACs are typically politicians’ bodyguards, judges, businessmen, and witnesses in court cases. 
Kosovo’s IPSCs (those who may be licensed to carry SALW) may also be issued with WAC cards.44
40  UNMIK Regulation 2006/35, ‘Amending UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 on the authorisation of possession of weapons in Kosovo’, (06 
June 2006). The authorisation will allow ‘a limited number of personally identified customs officers and forest guards on duty’ to carry semi-
automatic pistols. Correspondence, Piotr Zavgorodni, Senior Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Advisor, UNMIK, 21 June 2006.
4  Interview, Muzafer Luma, Chief Executive, Kosovo Forestry Agency, 21 April 2006.
4  UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 is supplemented by UNMIK Police Weapon Authorization Section’s Weapon Authorisation Policy and 
Guidelines, July 2001, Section 2 of which details the procedures for assessing WAC applications, issuing permits and revoking them. Section 
2.1 details special exemptions, including the temporary issuance of permits where an applicant’s livestock is endangered by predators. 
Section 6 details the procedures for issuing permits to international PSCs. This includes a requirement to provide a list of employees to allow 
for background checks but specifically prohibits the issuing of WACs to nationals of former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or states 
‘neighbouring’ Kosovo (i.e. Albania). UNMIK Regulation 2000/33 ‘On Licensing of Security Services Providers in Kosovo and the Regulation 
of their Employees’, (25 May 2000), Section 2.4, contains a similar provision.
4  The above information is drawn from Sections 1(e) and 3 of UNMIK Regulation 2001/7.
44  Additional regulations cover the work of PSCs: UNMIK Regulation 2000/33 ‘On Licensing of Security Services Providers in Kosovo and 
the Regulation of their Employees’, (25 May 2000); UNMIK Police Policy and Guidelines ‘On the operation of Security Service Providers in 
Kosovo’; Business Registration Unit Administrative Instruction No. JIAS/BRU/AI/2000/1 ‘On general requirements for license to operate a 
business’.
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Box 4: Private Security Companies4
Companies wishing to operate as PSCs must first register with the Ministry of Trade and Industry before registering 
themselves and their employees with UNMIK’s Weapon Authorization Section and Security Service Providers Inspection 
Unit (SSPIU), applying for an individual licence for each employee.4 The SSPIU is in fact the central actor in the control 
system, performing background checks on would-be employees, inspecting companies periodically, and regulating 
the training that security guards undergo.4 Section 3 of UNMIK Regulation 2000/33 sets out the requirements for 
possession, usage, storage and maintenance of SALW by PSCs, prohibiting the use of weapons for ‘law enforcement’ 
activities. It is important to note that there is currently a two-tier system for arming private security companies in Kosovo. 
Under Regulation 2000/33, international staff of PSCs may be permitted to acquire and carry firearms during their work, 
while local staff, and staff who are nationals of any of the ex-Yugoslav successor states (or states neighbouring Kosovo) 
may not. This legal distinction, presumably introduced because of valid concerns such as organised crime affiliations or 
the misuse of PSC firearms for political or other purposes, is unlikely to prove sustainable or desirable over the long-term 
since, amongst other things, it puts companies that employ international staff at an unfair advantage. 
One other consequence of this distinction is the commercial success of the bodyguard industry in Kosovo. With 
most PSCs unable to provide armed close protection services, most VIPs have hired individuals registered separately 
in law as bodyguards. Registered bodyguards (typically 80-90 in number)4 are licensed to carry firearms to protect 
vulnerable persons.  Such staff now outnumber the armed close protection staff supplied by international PSCs (mainly 
to international businesses), and since they operate as freelancers, are difficult to control and monitor. In addition, no 
specialised training is required for those operating as bodyguards in Kosovo.  
Previous research indicates that PSCs are generally seen as a positive contribution to effective law enforcement in 
Kosovo. The controls exercised by the SSPIU appear to be sufficient, with few reports of inappropriate conduct by PSC 
personnel or of bad practice by companies. However, it remains to be seen how well Kosovo’s newly empowered or 
established oversight institutions (see below) will manage their upcoming responsibilities in this sector, with two and 
a half thousand additional security practitioners who may well acquire the right to carry firearms at some stage. The 
ongoing possibility of inappropriate links developing between PSCs, political parties, ex-combatants and armed groups of 
various kinds makes the challenge all the greater.
4444
According to Section 4 of UNMIK Regulation 2001/7, WACs shall not be issued to any person who, in the opinion 
of the UNMIK Police Commissioner, is considered unsuitable to hold a weapon. All applicants (and bodyguards), 
are therefore subject to background checks that review their suitability, carried out by UNMIK Police and KFOR. 
Checks must cover, at a minimum, the following:4
a) Criminal history, including any criminal investigation, indictments or convictions;
b) Record or history of violent behaviour (including domestic violence);
c) Record of mental health problems affecting the applicant’s suitability to hold a weapon;
d) Police reports of call-outs involving disturbances caused by the applicant or other relevant complaints 
of disorderly conduct against the applicant; and
e) Local authority records concerning history of applicant’s confrontation with police.
4 This Section draws heavily on Page, M., et al., SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: A Cause or Effect of 
Insecurity? (SEESAC, Belgrade, 2005), pp. 96-108.
4 UNMIK Regulation 2000/33, Section 1: Issuance of Licenses and Section 2: Registration and Issuance of Permits. ‘UNMIK Police Policy 
and Guidelines on the Operation of Security Service Providers (SSPs) in Kosovo’, Section 3: General Regulations.
4 UNMIK Regulation 2000/33, Section 2.2; UNMIK Police Policy and Guidelines on the Operation of Security Service Providers (SSPs) in 
Kosovo, Section 4a: Requirements for employment in Security Service Providers.
4 The private security sector in Kosovo is marked by the distinction between ‘local’ and ‘international’ PSCs, the different security services 
they offer, and their client base. Whilst there is some degree of overlap in the range of services offered by these two groups, the ‘international’ 
PSCs, unlike their ‘local’ counterparts, are licensed to provide armed security guards by way of ‘international’ staff: UNMIK Regulation 
2001/7 Sections 1(c) and (d) and Section 3.2. Although the KPS Protection Unit has been empowered to provide close protection service for 
VIPs since 2004, officials tend to retain their own bodyguards.
4  These requirements are supplemented by Section 2.5 of UNMIK Police Weapon Authorization Section’s Weapon Authorisation Policy and 
Guidelines, July 2001.
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While the TAC is presumed to follow the above guidelines, in the view of the research team, there is insufficient 
guidance for staff working within local police stations on how to gather and present reports on some of the 
above, particular in relation to difficult matters such as the mental health of applicants.0 This represents a 
possible loophole or weakness in the control system that might easily lead to inappropriate decisions by the TAC, 
or might even be exploited in future by unscrupulous applicants.
Users of hunting and sporting weapons: The current legal framework for the regulation of hunting and sporting 
weapons is somewhat confused. UNMIK has so far only introduced primary legislation covering the acquisition 
of hunting weapons rather than their use. Yugoslav legislation is still considered by some to apply in certain 
areas. Although an attempt has since been made to introduce primary legislation on hunting, the ‘Draft Law on 
Hunting’, passed by the Assembly of Kosovo in June 2005, has yet to be signed off by the Office of the SRSG. In 
an attempt to clarify the current legal situation with respect to hunting, UNDP Kosovo commissioned a ‘Handbook 
on Hunting Weapons’ (23 April 2003), containing information on the relevant laws and procedures in this area 
and examined problematic cases that had arisen in recent years. Aside from Administrative Direction 2003/1, 
applicable Yugoslav laws are thought to include the Kosovo ‘Law on Acquisition, Possession and Carrying of 
Weapon and Ammunition of 1980’ (Official Gazette of Kosovo No. 40/80); the ‘Weapons and Ammunition Act 
1992’ (Official Gazette of Serbia); and the ‘Law on Hunting of 1979’ (Official Gazette of Kosovo 37/79). While 
Law No. 40/80 is technically in compliance with Regulation 2001/7, the question of whether these laws may still 
be applied is by no means certain. 
However, in 2003, legislation was also introduced to regulate the possession of hunting and recreational 
weapons (UNMIK Administrative Direction 2003/1, 17 January 2003). Consequently, long-barrelled rifles and 
shotguns (but not automatic rifles) can now be registered to individuals who have been issued a WRC by the WAS. 
Demand for WRCs, which are valid for two years, has been high since their introduction. For example, in 2004 
alone, there were a total of 29,695 applications for WRCs, of which 28,890 were approved, the vast majority of 
which being for hunting. The extent to which this high level of demand reflects a genuine interest in hunting 
is, however, unclear. In fact, the findings of the HHS and focus groups conducted for this research make it likely 
that many of those seeking WRCs have taken the opportunity to legalise hunting and recreational weapons that 
they retain because of feelings of insecurity (see Section 4.5). Those possessing hunting or recreational weapons 
are limited to the possession of a maximum of 50 rounds of ammunition per registered weapon, though 
there are no limits as to the number of SALW that individual WRC-registered 
owners may have. The same applies for WAC holders. Section 5.1 of UNMIK 
Administrative Direction 2003/1 also regulates the transportation of hunting 
and shooting weapons, stipulating that unless expressly authorised otherwise 
by UNMIK Police, a weapon may only be transported by a person in whose 
name such weapon has been registered. SALW may only be transported for 
the purposes of hunting and club shooting, but when they are, they must be 
openly displayed with ammunition held in the boot of the vehicle. 
Unfortunately there are some confusions and ambiguities present within 
Administrative Direction 2003/1. Under Sections 3.1 and 3.2, hunting and 
recreational weapons can only be used by the registered owner and only 
during a ‘current hunting season announced by the competent governmental 
authority’. Previous attempts by the Ministry of Agriculture to introduce 
hunting seasons have not borne fruit since UNMIK has refused to grant final 
0  This finding is reflected in other parts of South East Europe; see for example op. cit., Taylor, Z. et al.
  ‘Handbook on Hunting Weapons’, 23 April 2003, p.18.
  Rynn, S., et al. South Eastern Europe SALW Monitor 2005. Interview, Carlos Meireles, Chief of Weapon Authorization Section, Prishtinë/
Priština, 16 February 2005. As with applicants for WACs, those applying for WRCs are also subject to background checks and may be refused 
registration under Section 2.2(c) of UNMIK Administrative Direction 2003/1. Section 9 provides for the revocation or refusal of WRCs, 
stipulating that the Police Commissioner may refuse to issue a registration card at his or her discretion, or revoke it at any time. The ‘Police 
Administrative Instruction for Registration of Hunting Weapons and Recreational Weapons’, valid from 01 February 2004, also details the 
procedure for background checks on WRC applicants and allows for the revocation of WRCs.
 	Section 9.2, ‘Police Administrative Instruction for Registration of Hunting Weapons and Recreational Weapons’.
Winter hunting expedition
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authorisation,4 and therefore, in the absence of such an ‘announced’ and ‘current’ hunting season, any use 
or carrying of registered firearms outside the home, other then for hunting predatory animals that threaten 
livestock, is illegal (except for those with a WAC). Consequently, at the present time, a WRC effectively only 
permits possession, not use, of hunting weapons. This does not, however, seem to have prevented hunting, 
and according to the President of the Hunters Association, surveys of local associations report that poaching is 
routine. Whether those involved in illegal hunting are in possession of WRCs remains an unanswered questions, 
since there have been no prosecutions. Further, there is no requirement for those applying for hunting weapons 
to be registered members of the hunting association.
In the absence of legal channels for the acquisition of firearms, WAS operates a ‘no questions asked’ policy 
regarding the weapons’ origins when issuing permits. Although it is clear that the majority of SALW being 
presented for registration under WACs or WRCs have their origins in the illicit market, the authorities appear to 
take the view that it is better that civilians are encouraged to legally register their SALW than to continue with 
illegal possession. Despite its practical reasons, the reliance of the regulatory system for SALW Control on the 
illicit SALW market clearly constitutes a problem. 
.4..	 Penalties	and	enforcement
On paper, the legal sanctions for unlicensed SALW possession are severe, with a maximum of ten years’ 
imprisonment and fines of up to €10,000. The penalties for inappropriate use are similarly harsh. Under 
Article 328 of the Provisional Criminal Code, anyone who owns, controls or uses a weapon without a valid WAC is 
liable to a fine of €7,500 or one to eight years’ imprisonment. If larger numbers of SALW are involved, ten years’ 
imprisonment may be imposed. Also, anyone who uses a weapon in a threatening, intimidating or otherwise 
unauthorised manner, or directs another person to do so, is liable for a fine of up to €10,000 or one to ten years 
imprisonment. 
Virtually all sources consulted during this research indicated that implementation and enforcement of the laws on 
the possession and use of SALW are significantly flawed, with local and international law enforcement agencies 
failing on occasion in this area. Key informant interviews indicate that the laws on SALW possession are routinely 
flouted in Kosovo, with law enforcement and security personnel often simply overlooking illicit possession. 
Interviewees who raised this problem were either of the view that security personnel are too overwhelmed with 
other duties to rigorously enforce the law, or that many among their ranks have understandably come to view 
illicit SALW possession as a fact of life in Kosovo. In too many cases, it seems, those found with unregistered 
SALW,0 particularly where no other offence has been committed, are not prosecuted in accordance with the 
law but are either given a warning or held in custody for 24 to 48 hours. Although KPS records show a marked 
increase (13%) in the number of weapons confiscated by the police in 2005 in comparison with 2004, the 
total number of seizures still appears to pale in comparison with assumed overall rates of illicit possession in 
4  Interview, Piotr Zavgorodni, 30 March 2006. Under annex 10 of Administrative Directive No. 2004/16 ‘On Implementing the Regulation 
2001/19 for the Executive Branch of the Institutions for Self-Government’ (30 June 2004), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural 
Development is the body responsible for the regulation of hunting and hunting grounds. It is also worth noting that prior to the SALW 
Collection campaign held in 2003, the hunting association were given assurances by UN personnel that hunting would be allowed in the near 
future. This commitment was not fulfilled. Correspondence, Adrian Wilkinson, Head, SEESAC, 26 July 2006.
  Interview, Piotr Zavgorodni, 16 February 2005.
  A new law on hunting which would require all WRC applicants to first become members of the association was passed by the Kosovo 
Assembly in June 2005 but has not yet been signed off by UNMIK. Interview, Qazim Krasniqi, Director, Hunters Association, 14 March 
2006.
 	Interview, UNMIK official, February 2005.
  ‘Provisional Penal Code of Kosovo’, Article 328(1) and (2).
  Still harsher penalties apply where the weapon is used in the commission of crime (Articles 153(2) and 193(3)(3), 195(3)(3), 198(5)(3), 
253(3), 254(2), 255(3), 256(1), 267(2), 268(2), 291(1), 316(2), 317(2)). Section 8 of UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 also sets out the penalties 
for breaches of the regulations on weapons possession and use. Article 329(1) of the Provisional Criminal Code states that those found to 
have provided false information when applying for a WAC, or who manufacture, possess, sell or purchase a fraudulent WAC, can be punished 
with a fine of €5,000 or imprisonment for up to 3 years. Article 329(2) details a fine of €2,500 or three months imprisonment for failing to 
present the authorised weapon, or provide full information on its whereabouts, on demand by police.
0  For example, focus group participants and a number of KIIs indicated that illegal firearms are commonly carried in discos (by bouncers) 
or in cars.
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Kosovo. Backlogs in the justice system appear in part to dictate this course of action, since the full and timely 
prosecution of the numerous offenders who are caught with such SALW on a daily basis is an unlikely outcome. 
The failure of law enforcement agencies to tackle Kosovo’s parallel intelligence structures, a proportion of whose 
members are certainly armed, is just one prominent example of these inadequacies. Although not officially 
recognised, intelligence structures affiliated to political parties and foreign governments (including the Serbian 
Ministry of Interior (MUP)) currently operate in Kosovo. They include the Institute for Researching Public Opinion 
and Strategies (IHPSO) and the Kosovo Information Service (SHIK). The Serbian MUP is also believed to 
employ operatives, some of whom also occupy official positions within recognised governmental structures. The 
services provided by these agencies ‘range from close protection of party officials to gathering information on, 
and intimidating, political opponents’, and they have been blamed for a number of acts of violence, including a 
series of assassinations of Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) officials between 1999 and 2002.	It seems 
clear that for reasons of political expediency, Kosovo’s illegal intelligence structures have not been challenged by 
the authorities, and neither has their possession and misuse of SALW. In this respect, the continued toleration 
of these groups demonstrates a failure by the international administration to establish the rule of law. Various 
other armed groups of uncertain provenance and purpose also tend to re-emerge at times of tension, though the 
international security forces are keen to emphasise their role in challenging them.4
It is also worth noting that while enforcement problems appear to be Kosovo-wide, they are obviously likely to 
be most severe wherever KPS effectiveness is lowest. It is therefore unsurprising that the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
region had the smallest number of weapons seized in connection with a criminal offence during 2004 - 2005. 
The research team was unable to ascertain precisely how UNMIK regulations on SALW possession and use 
are applied in northern parts of the territory where KPS efficacy is more limited, though the available evidence 
points to similar, or perhaps somewhat lower, levels of enforcement. Despite the fact that a significant number of 
Kosovo-Serbs living in these areas retain SALW permits issued in pre-war days by the authorities of the Republic 
of Serbia, no attempt appears to be made to enforce the relevant Serbian ‘Law on Weapons and Ammunition’. 
As previously noted, interviews indicate that some Kosovo-Serbs in northern areas, fearful of both disarming and 
of the KPS, still retain SALW registered under Serbian law but store them across the border beyond the reach of 
both KFOR and KPS. 
Developing the capacity for effective enforcement of the laws on SALW possession and use should be a high 
priority for the future. As the impact and perception Sections of this report note, perceptions of insecurity among 
communities are often exaggerated by a belief that the criminal justice system is unable to properly deal with 
criminals of all types, including the perpetrators of armed and violent crime. Interviews with district and municipal 
judges and prosecutors, the majority of who expressed concerns about threats and insecurity during their work 
and about a need for enhanced protection, further underline the problem. Firstly, the failure of Kosovo’s criminal 
justice system to tackle the routine illicit possession and use of SALW is a vivid demonstration of its failures. 
Secondly, widespread SALW possession, coupled with armed criminality, poses a threat to the workings of the 
system itself.
  UNMIK data does not record a corresponding increase in weapons-related crime in this period (see Section 3.2). It is difficult to determine 
whether the observed increase is a result of improved data collection and record-keeping or increased police capacity in the detection and 
interception of unregistered SALW.
  Xherra, J., ‘Kosovo’s Intelligence Services come in from the cold,’ 24 December 2005. Available at: http://www.csees.net/index.
php?page=country_analyses&country_id=8&ca_id=2007# accessed 29 June 2006. See also International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo: The 
Challenge of Transition,’ Report No. 170, 17 February 2006, p. 4.
163  Dugolli, I., and Peci, L., Enhancing civilian management and oversight of the security sector in Kosovo, (Saferworld, November 2005), 
p. 14. Allegations have also been made that they have been tolerated and even allegedly used by different parts of the international 
administration. ICG, ‘Kosovo after Haradinaj’, May 2005, quotes an UNMIK Police memo, reproduced by the Express newspaper on 15 April 
2005, which reveals routine information-sharing with one of the party intelligence structures, and a second source claiming that the rival 
party intelligence structures have had various undertakings from KFOR. See also op. cit., Xherra, J.
4  See for example, KosovaLive, ‘Kosovo NATO commander not concerned at reports of armed groups’, 18 October 2005. Available at: 
http://www.seesac.org/press/wms_23102005.htm#Kosovo%20NATO%20commander%20not% 20concerned%20at%20reports%20of%2
0armed%20groups accessed 13 June 2006.
  Interview, Oliver Ivanović, 13 March 2006.
  ‘Law on Weapons and Ammunition’, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 9/92, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 44/98, 39/2003.
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.	 Storage	and	stockpile	management
..	 Governmental	actors
SALW are held by a number of international and PISG agencies in Kosovo, amongst which stockpile management 
practices vary. 
KFOR: KFOR-held SALW are stored in the Multi-National Brigade Centre’s Safe Weapons Storage Site (SWSS). 
Although no information was forthcoming from KFOR on the relevant procedures in use at this site, it is presumed 
that they correspond with NATO standards. KFOR Standard Operating Procedure 3009, ‘Weapons Policy for 
Kosovo’, Section 10b(4) provides guidance to KFOR units on the storage of seized SALW, stating that SALW 
retained in connection with criminal investigations are to be held in KFOR’s central SWSS storage site until such 
time as they can be handed over to UNMIK Police.
KPS: Although KPS does not hold reserve SALW, SALW that are not in active use are held in a central store in 
Prishtinë/Priština. All other handguns issued to KPS officers are to remain in their possession when off-duty 
and are stored at home. In contrast, long-barrelled weapons for the use of special units or close protection are 
stored in the same way regionally. Failings within the judicial system mean that KPS evidence rooms often 
contain significant quantities of seized SALW, some of which have been stored for a number of years and are not 
adequately secured. Upgrades to the security and storage standards of such sites should therefore be carried 
out as a matter of urgency, and stocks held at more insecure locations should be regularly removed to central 
storage sites as a precautionary measure. Ultimately, these stocks will require destruction.
KPC: Responsibility for the storage and maintenance of KPC SALW is divided between the KPC and KFOR. The 
bulk of these stocks, though maintained by the KPC, are secured by a single multinational KFOR brigade (see 
Section 2.2.2.4). Annex C of KFOR Standard Operating Procedure 3009, ‘Weapons Policy for Kosovo’, provides 
the force with guidance on the storage and management of these weapons, emphasising KFOR’s right to inspect 
all SALW assigned to the KPC at any time without prior notice. It states that the 1,800 units held in trust are to 
be maintained between 10:00 and 16:00 daily by a ten-person KPC team and that lost or stolen SALW are to be 
reported to UNMIK Police within two hours of this fact having been discovered. The annex also details the amount 
of ammunition that KPC units are to be permitted, allowing a total stock of 4,000 rounds for the organisation 
as a whole and not more than two magazines with 20 rounds for long-barrelled weapons or 60 rounds for short-
barrelled weapons to be carried by any one individual. For training purposes, KPC personnel are also permitted 
15 rounds per pistol, and 30 rounds per short-barrelled weapon, per year. Only one theft of a KPC weapon has 
been recorded in the last six years and with this exception, all indications suggest that these stocks are securely 
stored and well maintained.
Other governmental actors: As previously noted, an amendment to UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 in June 2006 
provided the Customs and Forestry Services with the right to carry firearms. At the present time, it is anticipated 
that these SALW will be stored by off-duty officers at home. Although Kosovo Correctional Service personnel use 
SALW to guard the perimeter of prisons, no information was available on the SALW management procedures of 
the agency. Further, under Section 3 of UNMIK Regulation 2000/33, licensed ‘security service providers’ such 
as international PSCs are required to store registered SALW in a dedicated armoury on the company’s premises 
when not in use. However, no stipulations on the storage of ammunition are made.
..	 Non-governmental	actors
Section 4 of UNMIK Administrative Direction 2003/1 (17 January 2003) sets out the requirements for the 
storage of registered SALW other than hunting and sports weapons. It stipulates that with the exception of SALW 
in use for hunting or by shooting clubs, SALW must be stored in the residence of the registered owner separately 
 	Correspondence, Major Kllokoqi, 03 July 2006.
  Interview, Major Costica Paraschiv, KFOR Inspectorate for KPC, 09 March 2006.
  Interview, Nick Booth, 08 March 2006; UNMIK press release ‘Kosovan Commissioner for Kosovo Correctional Service appointed,’ 02 
February 2006. Available at: http://www.unmikonline.org/justice/pmd.htm accessed 22 June 2006.
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from ammunition.0 Under Section 4.4, shooting clubs are required to store SALW on their licensed premises. 
As further described above, the regulations governing several aspects of hunting and the use of hunting SALW 
remain ambiguous. The storage procedures for these SALW are one such example.
The findings of the research team on the storage practices of non-governmental actors holding illicit SALW echo 
those of previous research. Although a proportion of SALW seizures are made on the street, primarily from 
vehicles, the majority of unregistered SALW within Kosovo are secured in households or purpose-built caches. 
KIIs interviewed for this report were of the opinion that if anything, the tendency for illicit weapon holders to 
cache SALW outside the home has probably increased since 2003, partly to avoid ongoing search operations 
but also in response to gradual improvements in security. Although previous research on the question on SALW 
possession by non-governmental actors has highlighted the fact that some caches are likely to be held and 
maintained by those with political or criminal motivations, the research team was unable to investigate such 
claims in any detail.
.	 Information	management
In light of numerous difficulties encountered when seeking the official data related to SALW that was required 
to complete this Survey, the research team concludes that there are major gaps in the collection, collation, 
dissemination and analysis of data relating to SALW in Kosovo. While basic systems do exist for gathering and 
storing such data, difficulties in administering the system appear to cut across several institutions, with record-
keeping by the police, courts and health authorities falling below regional standards in this field. Reliable data on 
SALW issues such as crimes or injuries was not typically available from most institutions.
Firstly, no comprehensive data on deaths and injuries due to firearms is collected by the health system, making 
it difficult to measure the direct impacts of firearms on public health and impossible to draw out trends. As 
described in more detail in Section 3.1, the MOH information unit was unable to provide any statistical information 
on the number of firearm injuries treated by health institutions around Kosovo, and its existing databases are 
not fully operational. This information gap could have been addressed by data recorded by the police or morgue 
officials, but despite requests to both, the research team was unable to obtain relevant information. UNMIK 
data on firearms injuries and fatalities, based as it is on Police and KFOR reports only, cannot substitute for 
comprehensive hospital records.
There are also gaps in the production, collection and analysis of crime statistics by Kosovo’s law enforcement 
institutions. In the view of one key informant working within a department concerned with the collation of 
criminal justice information, data collection is very often inaccurate, with most records being based on the 
interpretation of non-standard initial reports, leaving open the possibility of inappropriate categorisations (for 
example, on more than one occasion, reported murders were eventually found to be accidents or suicides).4 
In the absence of a computerised crime recording system that tracks each case through to its conclusion, this 
sort of systematisation is difficult to envisage. This insider view reflects the experience of the research team 
who faced repeated delays, confusions and occasional obfuscation when trying to obtain and cross-check data 
from different criminal justice and health sector institutions. When information was ultimately provided, it was 
0  Section 4.1. It is also stipulated that weapons are to be stored separately from ‘any authorised weapon for which a WAC has been issued’. 
Section 6 of the Regulation requires that in the case of a registered weapon being lost, destroyed or stolen, the registered owner must notify 
the police within 24 hours.
 	Section 4.1 of UNMIK Administrative Direction 2003/1 does not clearly and unambiguously state the required procedures for storage 
of such weapons.
  Interview, Naim Maloku, 04 April 2006. See also op. cit., Khakee, A., and Florquin, N., pp. viii, 20, which concluded that ‘small arms tend 
to be stored indoors in purpose-built caches or buried outdoors relatively close to households.’
 	Op. cit., Khakee, A., and Florquin, N., p 11.
4  Correspondence, Paul Jordan, former Head of UNMIK Crime Analysis Department, 17 May 2006. A recent report by Human Rights 
Watch, ‘Not on the Agenda: the Continuing Failure to Address Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 2004’ draws similar conclusions about the 
criminal justice system and the lack of statistical information on investigations, prosecutions and convictions, noting that ‘Remarkably, there 
is no clear consensus about this information among the international agencies tasked with overseeing and monitoring the criminal justice 
system. In particular the number of people charged with criminal offences and the nature of those offences are matters of dispute.’ Human 
Rights Watch, Not on the Agenda: the Continuing Failure to Address Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 2004, May 2006, p. 23. Available 
at: http://hrw.org/reports/2006/kosovo0506/accessed 17 July 2006.
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unlabeled, undated or contradictory on more than one occasion. Further, there appear to be dual systems of 
record-keeping whereby different statistics are kept and produced by KPS and by UNMIK. It is also unclear how 
these data sets relate to one another. This lack of accurate record-keeping, and hence of reliable data, makes it 
difficult to develop sustainable and appropriate public policy responses to the public health or criminal impacts 
of SALW. 
Procedures and systems for the collection, analysis, management and sharing of official SALW-related data in 
Kosovo are clearly problematic at this time, and improvements to both the UNMIK and PISG systems can be made. 
In the short term, coordination between all agencies with a data management role, including, for example, UNMIK 
Police, KPS, KFOR, OPS and the Ministries of Health, Justice and Interior, will need to improve, and compatible 
methods for information collection and sharing should be agreed. In the longer term, as PISG institutions take 
on greater competencies, existing systems may require rationalisation to ensure effective transition to PISG 
ownership and the development of internal capacities to formulate evidence-based policy on SALW issues. 
Efforts already being made in this area, such as a programme within the MOH to support computerising its 
Health Information Unit, could be further supported. Further training for medical and data collection staff on 
using the ICD 10 system for diagnoses classification, or on the accurate recording of firearm injuries, might also 
be considered. Institutions such as the OPS, established in 2004 and conceived as a conduit for information 
exchange on security between UNMIK and PISG, could prove an effective advisory and coordination body for 
this work. Kosovo’s Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSCs) and Local Public Safety Committees (LPSCs), 
which the vast majority of local authority and police interviewees approached for this report consider to be 
valuable conduits for information sharing between the general public and justice and security sector institutions, 
might also play a role in this regard.
.	 Education	and	SALW	Awareness
SALW Awareness and education has been carried out in Kosovo since 2001. UNDP Kosovo has been the main 
sponsor of these programmes, which have often been sub-contracted to NGOs. This support was at its peak 
during the 2003 SALW Collection initiative, though the methods and messages used during this campaign were 
developed by UNDP Kosovo rather than by local civil society representatives. A more sustained but lower 
profile contribution to awareness-raising has been provided by the Ferizaj/Uroševac-based NGO Forum for Civic 
Initiatives (FIQ) since late 2005. In September of that year, FIQ opened a multi-lingual resource centre on SALW 
and related security issues in Ferizaj/Uroševac public library.
Given that past work in this area has singularly failed to encourage the surrender of civilian-held SALW, and has 
not been demonstrably proven to reduce casualty rates, the future of SALW Awareness in Kosovo is probably 
uncertain. Moreover, current funding for this type of work comes almost exclusively from UNDP Kosovo, and its 
renewal is not expected in 2006. Past trends suggest it is unlikely that indigenous actors and institutions will 
carry on similar work beyond that time. Since no discernible attempt has been made to apply best practices in 
this field, the capacities for effective and targeted awareness-raising are also likely to be limited. 
  Participating organisations included the Lipjan/Lipljan Youth Centre, the Kosovo Centre for International Cooperation, the Prishtinë/
Priština Youth Centre, the Kosovo Action for Civic Initiatives, Gender Research and Training Centre and the magazine Srpsko Slovo. 
Correspondence with UNDP Illicit Small Arms Control (ISAC) staff, 16 February 2004. UNDP Kosovo provided renewed funding for SALW 
Awareness as part of its ‘ISAC 2’ programme in December 2005, supporting the Gjilan/Gnjlane-based NGO, ‘Kosovo Center for International 
Cooperation’ to raise awareness in schools. Interview, Mike Dixon, 10 March 2006.
  Correspondence, Emine Qerkini and Ferdinand Nikolla, FIQ, 14 April 2006.
  The best practice material available on the subject of SALW Awareness suggests that while interactive activities on the subject of SALW 
may produce results over a long period provided it is locally appropriate and linked to other initiatives, campaigns relying on the distribution of 
formulaic ‘guns are bad’ messages and materials are much less likely to succeed. See SEESAC, SALW Awareness Support Pack (2003); also 
RMDS/G 06.10 3rd Edition 25 May 2006, Development and Implementation of SALW Awareness Programmes, available from http://www.
seesac.org/index.php?content=&page=crse&section=2; and, Coe, J. and Smith, H., Action Against Small Arms: A Resource and Training 
Handbook (International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld, 2003).
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.	 SALW	Collection
..	 Past	SALW	Collection	activities
SALW Collection, whether through voluntary surrender initiatives or seizure operations, has been ongoing in 
Kosovo since 1999. The legal foundation for these actions is provided firstly by Article 328(5) of Kosovo’s 
Provisional Criminal Code, which states that ‘unauthorised weapons will be confiscated’, and also by Section 
7 of UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 which details the circumstances under which SALW or WACs may be seized by 
law enforcement officers. UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 clearly states that WACs may be suspended or revoked 
at any time by UNMIK Police should information become available which, in the opinion of the UNMIK Police 
Commissioner, affects the suitability of the holder to possess a weapon, or for any other reason. Under Section 
7(1) of the said Regulation, enforcement authorities may immediately seize any weapon or WAC upon the 
occurrence of any of the following events:
a) Where a person’s WAC is suspended or revoked;
b) Where a person is in possession of a weapon for which he or she cannot, or is unwilling to, display a 
WAC immediately upon the demand of a member of a law enforcement authority;
c) Where a person is using a weapon in a threatening, intimidating or otherwise unauthorised manner;
d) Where there is a grounded suspicion, based on information known to law enforcement authorities, that 
a person has committed or is committing an offence against the said Regulation or under any other 
applicable criminal law; or
e) Where the UNMIK Police Commissioner determines that the authorised weapon is needed for the 
purpose of forensic, criminalistic (sic) or ballistic testing.
Two subsequent legislative measures have ensured that these provisions also apply to hunting weapons: Section 
7 of UNMIK Administrative Direction 2003/1 (17 January 2003), and UNMIK Police Administrative Instruction 
for Registration of Hunting Weapons and Recreational Weapons (entered into force on 01 February 2004), which 
also requires the confiscation of any weapons where its use, ownership or possession is unauthorised (Section 
9.4). UNMIK Regulation 2000/33 ‘On Licensing of Security Services Providers in Kosovo and the Regulation 
of their Employees’ (25 May 2000) also allows for the confiscation of weapons which are in the possession of 
‘security service providers’ (PSCs, etc) and found to be unlicensed or misused. Finally, KFOR SOP 3009, together 
with UNSCR 1244, provide the mandate for SALW Collection, whether on a voluntary or involuntary basis, by 
KFOR.
Although, at one point, SALW or ammunition were reportedly discovered during most search operations, seizure 
rates have apparently declined over time. Hidden weapon caches are now uncovered much less frequently 
than they once were (for example, in 2004, KFOR seized 2,071 weapons and 85,000 items of ammunition in 
450 operations, fewer than in previous years, but still yielding an average of over four SALW per operation).0 
KFOR has been the most proactive actor with respect to seizures, with troops having performed searches of 
civilian homes, open land and abandoned buildings with some regularity. In contrast, UNMIK Police, although 
responsible for the confiscation of SALW once they have been discovered by KFOR, recover SALW only in the 
course of law enforcement operations, such as house searches conducted as part of criminal investigations. 
Although no specified figures on SALW seizures by police or KFOR was provided to the research team for 2005, 
several units a day are routinely recovered through the combined efforts of KFOR and KPS.
  This is complemented by Section 8.13, which states that confiscation of an illicit weapon does not have to be compensated. This is 
supplemented by Section 9.4 of UNMIK Police Administrative Instruction, 01 February 2004, which describes the treatment of unauthorised 
weapons.
  Risser, H., ‘Disarmament in Kosovo stymied by future security’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 01 December 2004, Vol. 16, No. 12, p. 41.
0 	Interview, Colonel Yves Kermorvant (French Army), Chief of Public Information Office, KFOR HQ, Pristina, 17 February 2005.
 	Ibid.
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Since 1999, there have also been a number of amnesties to allow for the voluntary surrender of SALW. The 
first two amnesties, jointly organised by KFOR and UNMIK in 2001 and 2002, were a month long and resulted 
in the surrender of 777 and 1,391 units of SALW respectively. From February to May 2003, the third SALW 
Collection in as many years was held in Kosovo. On this occasion, UNDP Kosovo’s Illicit Small Arms Control in 
Kosovo (ISAC) project handled the awareness-raising and incentive aspects of the campaign, offering economic 
development incentives on a competitive basis to participating communities. A top-level Steering Committee 
(comprised of the Heads of UNDP, UNMIK Police and KFOR, and the Kosovo Prime Minister) and a Task Force 
were established to oversee and co-ordinate the implementation of the campaign. KFOR was the main body 
collecting the SALW at manned collection points, and distributing the majority of the publicity materials. It was 
also possible to surrender SALW at local police stations. Despite these arrangements, the campaign managed 
to collect only 155 SALW across the whole of Kosovo and the collection initiative is widely considered to have 
been a failure. Interviews indicate that the 2003 SALW Collection initiative was flawed in a number of ways. 
Among other things, a failure to consult adequately with target communities and civil society, and problems 
with inter-agency coordination are thought to have contributed to the low surrender rate. In addition, factors 
beyond the control of the project team, such as a deteriorating security situation and the continued availability of 
unconditional donor assistance to target communities during the course of the project (which served to weaken 
the incentives on offer), were also to blame. For the time being however, a more detailed analysis of the failings 
of the ISAC 1 SALW Collection initiative in 2003 cannot be provided since UNDP Kosovo has not commissioned 
a formal evaluation. Following the failure of the 2003 amnesty, no further large-scale voluntary collections have 
taken place in Kosovo.4
It is noteworthy that the absolute number of SALW surrendered during Kosovo’s successive SALW Collections 
compares poorly with results of similar campaigns conducted elsewhere in the region in recent years. For example, 
a SALW Collection held in Macedonia in 2003 returned a total of 7,571 SALW weapons and over 100,000 
rounds of ammunition in less than two months using a lottery incentive.	In Serbia, during a month long SALW 
amnesty in 2003, nearly 48,000 weapons and over two million rounds of ammunition were either voluntarily 
surrendered or legalised. Such comparisons should, however, be carefully made. Firstly, the national context 
under which SALW Collection programmes are run determines success or failure in large part, and conditions are 
never comparable across countries (e.g. in contrast to Macedonia, SALW seizures by Kosovo’s security agencies 
are routine). Secondly, SALW Collection programmes should not be rated simply according to the number of 
returned weapons, since other objectives relating perhaps to peace- and confidence-building or public safety 
may be relevant. It is vital, however, that involved institutions reach an understanding of the reasons behind the 
successes and failures of previous campaigns before attempting similar initiatives in the future.
..	 Capacity	to	conduct	future	SALW	Collection	activities
Previous attempts at collecting SALW in Kosovo on a voluntary basis may not have been glowing successes, but 
there is no reason to doubt the combined abilities of KFOR, UNMIK and the KPS to conduct safe and secure 
collections in the future. The required personnel, infrastructure and logistical capabilities for this all appear to 
be in place, though according to past evidence, inter-agency cooperation, transparency and public outreach 
may prove more difficult to undertake effectively. It is important to note, however, that the results of the HHS 
and focus groups carried out for this research suggest very clearly that any renewed SALW Collection prior to an 
  UNMIK Executive Decisions 2001/5 (11 April 2001), 2002/1 (25 February 2002) and 2003/10 (11 August 2003) provided the legal 
basis for these amnesties. Section 6.1 of each Decision required the law enforcement authorities conducting weapons collection to maintain 
a precise inventory of all types of weapons collected and to ensure that the storage, treatment and transportation of collected weapons were 
in conformity with the highest security and environmental requirements. Section 3 regulated the transportation of items. Section 6.2 required 
that all collected items be destroyed or rendered unusable, though no time limit was stipulated for this. Each Decision contained a provision 
stating that weapons discovered in law enforcement operations would not be eligible for voluntary surrender.
  See for example, Hirst, C., and Mariani, B., South Eastern Europe SALW Monitor 2004 (SEESAC, Belgrade, 2004); SEESAC, Clearing 
Guns, October 2003; Interview, UNDP ISAC Project Manager, March 2006.
4  Although a two-week localised SALW amnesty was planned for late 2005 in Novoberde/Novo Brdo municipality, this did not take place as 
a result of KFOR objections. Interview with Helena Vazquez, UNDP Kosovo, 17 July 2006. See also, ‘No weapons surrendered during UNMIK 
amnesty in Novo Brdo,’ 21 December 2005, SEESAC Media Monitoring, http://www.seesac.org/press/wms_2005_12_25.htm accessed 15 
May 2006.
  Op. cit., Rynn, S., et al., South Eastern Europe SALW Monitor 2005, p. 97.
  Op. cit., Taylor, Z. et al., p.65.
79
SALW Survey of Kosovo 
(2006-08-24)
agreement on Kosovo’s final status is likely to fail. The factors most clearly identified by respondents as having 
been responsible for the failure of previous collection programmes (continuing fear of conflict and instability, 
low levels of trust in security providers and, particularly among Kosovo-Albanians, family tradition) are all still in 
play.
HHS and focus group results do however point to the following as likely to stimulate surrender during a future 
SALW Collection programme: a decision on the final status of Kosovo; better economic conditions; and appropriate 
incentives. Consequently, in order to maximise the chances of success, a comprehensive assessment of 
the attitudes and perceptions of Kosovan SALW owners should be carried out during the preparation phase. 
Together with information provided by this Survey, such a study would allow the methods most likely to respond to 
community’s needs and vulnerabilities to be identified. In this way, a future SALW Collection programme, and any 
accompanying SALW Awareness campaign, will be able to take account of the very different reasons why people 
keep SALW, as well as the geographic disparities in possession and use across Kosovo. The actors most likely to 
secure high surrender rates might then be engaged to assist in collection (for example, most Kosovo-Albanian 
respondents to the HHS said they would trust the KPC to implement SALW Collection programmes, whereas 
Kosovo-Serb respondents would be more likely to surrender SALW to political parties and local government 
representatives; see Section 4.7), and build confidence both within and between communities. Previous failures 
also suggest that donor coordination may prove essential in setting appropriate incentives for communities and 
individuals, so donor agencies should also be involved in planning and consideration should be given to possible 
incentive schemes, including negative ones (i.e. limited conditionality). Finally, SALW Collections should not be 
understood as an alternative to law enforcement. The positive inducement of an amnesty period, and the related 
incentives, should be preceded and followed by rigorous enforcement of possession laws, and should link with 
attempts by the police and courts to improve provision of security and justice.
.	 SALW	Destruction
While no primary legislation has been passed in Kosovo to regulate the destruction of items of SALW or ammunition, 
KFOR routinely destroys confiscated SALW (presumably to KFOR regulations) on a regular basis. Facilities 
in Obiliq/Obilić and Janjevë/Janjevo have been used to melt pre-cut weapons.	Unfortunately, consistent 
information on destruction totals is hard to come by, but that which is available indicates that approximately 
19,000 weapons have been destroyed by KFOR to date.	The last reported KFOR SALW Destruction operation 
took place in November 2004 with the melting of 772 pre-cut weapons by a contractor, the ‘Metal Holding 
Company’.0 No information is available on ammunition destruction at this facility, though it is reported to take 
place. UNMIK Police and the KPS (with the prior permission of the Police Commissioner) also periodically 
destroy surplus items held in police stores, though no information on the number of weapons destroyed during 
2005 - 2006 was available. As previously noted, this remains a priority since large stocks of mainly confiscated 
items have accumulated in police armouries over previous years and storage standards are often poor. 
The destruction of licit small arms ammunition (SAA) does not present any significant challenges for Kosovo at the 
present time. All officially designated armed actors in Kosovo primarily retain SALW rather than heavier weapons, 
and there are no significant stores of ammunition that might present a public health or security threat as in 
neighbouring territories. Nevertheless, armed PISG actors in Kosovo will, in the near future, need to acquire the 
capability to plan and manage ammunition procurement and storage, as well as the disposal of any surplus.
  Correspondence, Helena Vazquez, 31 May 2006.
  Under its 2003 ISAC project, UNDP Kosovo provided KFOR with USD 40,000 to fund SALW Destruction at Janjevë/Janjevo in 2003-4 at 
an estimated cost of under USD 3.00 per weapon. Op. cit., Hirst, C., and Mariani, B. See also SEESAC, Short Mission Report – Clearinghouse 
Consultation in Kosovo, 14 - 17 May 2002, available at http://www.seesac.org/. The Government of The Netherlands has also funded 
upgrades to the Janjevë/Janjevo facility. 
  According to information provided to the Small Arms Survey in 2003, by the middle of that year, 18,000 SALW had been destroyed by 
KFOR. Op. cit., Khakee, A.. and Florquin, N., p.24.
0  The company in question apparently charged €1,000 per Tonne of weapons. The operation in question apparently cost €1,873. Interview, 
Colonel Yves Kermorvant, Chief of Public Information Office, KFOR HQ, Prishtinë/Priština, 17 February 2005.
  Op. cit., Hirst, C. and Mariani, B.
 	Interview, Carlos Meireles, 16 February 2005; visit by the research team to police storage rooms, March 2006.
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.0	 International	transfer	controls	and	border	management
.0.	 Transfer	controls
One important issue that Kosovo’s make-shift legislative and regulatory framework has so far failed to deal 
adequately with is the transfer (import, export, transit, trans-shipment, brokering) of SALW to and from the 
territory. Although, at one time, UNSCR 1160 and 1244 provided prohibitions on the transfer of SALW to and 
from Kosovo, detailed legislation on the subject of arms transfers that is binding on companies and individuals 
rather than states has yet to be introduced.	
As late as in September 2005, prior to the introduction of a new customs regulation banning the import of such 
goods (except with the ‘express permission’ of UNMIK or KFOR, and basically for the purposes of international 
security forces), the import, export and transit of SALW to and from Kosovo was not regulated at all.4 Annex 
4b of UNMIK Regulation 2005/41 of September 2005 banned the importation into Kosovo of any weapon (as 
defined by Regulation 2001/7), parts or accessories, except as authorised by UNMIK or KFOR. This Regulation, 
amending the original UNMIK Regulation 1999/3 ‘On the Establishment of the Customs and Other Related 
Services in Kosovo’, reserves the right of the SRSG to issue an Executive Decision granting exemptions for 
certain classes of weapons ‘in appropriate cases’, upon the recommendation of the Customs Service.
Dependent on the outcome of the final status negotiations, appropriate legislation and operative provisions to 
ensure that the system in Kosovo is, at a minimum, compatible with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 
should be developed in the near future. Provisions for the regulation of transits and imports will also be required, 
though the implications in terms of decentralisation and inter-ethnic relations will need to be taken into account 
in the preparation of these. Finally, consideration should be given to the concerns of minorities on sensitive issues 
such as imports of arms and military equipment, and steps taken to ensure that a high degree of transparency 
exists on decision-making on such matters, whether at the national level (e.g. within the Kosovo Assembly), or by 
would-be end-users such as the KPS, is advised.
.0.	 Border	management
Kosovo’s mountainous 605 km border perimeter presents obvious challenges for border management and, 
in recent years, concerns have been raised about the porosity of each boundary with Albania, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia. The task of enforcing international arms transfer controls (to the extent that they 
exist) falls to those agencies currently responsible for border control in Kosovo: the Border and Boundary Police, 
Customs Service, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development (MAFRD) and the Ministry of 
Environment and Spatial Planning. 
A number of valuable joint agreements and protocols have been agreed to allow Kosovo’s border management 
agencies to co-operate with their neighbours, including: a Protocol on Police Cooperation with Serbia and 
Montenegro (31 May 2002), which established a Joint Committee on Police Cooperation at the strategic level, a 
subcommittee on border issues, and allowed for 24-hour contact between Operational Control Centres on both 
 	UNSCR 1160 (31 March 1998) paragraph 8 and its annexes placed an embargo on transfers to the states of the former Yugoslavia, 
including Kosovo. The subsequent UNSCR 1244 (10 June 1999) paragraph 16 created an exemption for arms and related material for use 
by the international civil and security presence. However, in 2001, UN Security Council Resolution 1367 (10 September 2001) was passed, 
lifting the previous embargo.
4  A partial exception is the role allotted for KFOR in its Standard Operating Procedure 3009, ‘Weapons Policy for Kosovo’. Section 11(f) of 
the document states that commanders at all levels have a legal obligation to ensure that personnel comply with regulations concerning the 
transportation of dangerous goods and to ensure that weapons and military articles exported from ‘the theatre’ are correctly documented 
and their end-use is subject to adequate control and account. No additional elaboration or guidance is provided on this phrase however, 
rendering it of limited use.
  Annex 4c similarly prohibited the import of explosives except where a ‘Special Operations Permit’ has been obtained pursuant to Section 
39 of UNMIK Regulation 2005/3 ‘On Mines and Minerals in Kosovo’ (21 January 2005). The import of weapons for international and local 
law enforcement authorities are regulated according to the procedures of relevant institutions (such as the import of Glock service pistols for 
the KPS and some short-barrelled automatic weapons for elite police teams in 2005). Interview, Piotr Zavgorodni, 16 February 2005.
  Accounts of interceptions of trafficked SALW can be found with relative ease. See for example, op. cit., Institute of War and Peace 
Reporting; op. cit., Mustafa, M., op. cit., Taylor, Z., et al. See also SEESAC, SEESAC Weekly Media Review, 13 May 2004.
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sides; a Police Cooperation Agreement with Albania (09 September 2002), which ensures regular liaison and 
collaboration on investigations into human and drug trafficking, and provides for two subcommittees to operate 
on border security; and similar agreements with Macedonia (27 November 2002) and Montenegro (31 October 
2003). UNMIK also participates in Stability Pact and Council of Europe initiatives designed to strengthen police 
and judicial cooperation in the region.
While none of these agreements pertains specifically to SALW to the extent that they enhance capacities to 
combat trafficking, they are of benefit for SALW Control purposes. Work has also now been ongoing for several 
years to provide the territory’s border management agencies with the skills and resources to police the territory’s 
16 crossing points (not including Prishtina International Airport), and to facilitate joint working between them and 
their counterparts’ abroad. Through its implementing agency, the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), the 
EU has played a leading role in this, providing strategic advice, equipment and training worth €6 - 8 million per 
annum since March. Together with other interested parties such as the EC and US Government, EAR has tried 
to promote the adoption of a single Integrated Border Management strategy for Kosovo in keeping with the Ohrid 
Regional Conference on Border Security and Management of May 2003.
However, although problems with cooperation and joint working certainly remain among agencies tasked with 
border management and the combating of SALW trafficking, the declining frequency of SALW trafficking reporting, 
coupled with a progressive improvement of capacity and collaboration among relevant agencies both within and 
across borders, suggests that cross-border trafficking of SALW to and from Kosovo is not presently a major 
concern.00 This is not to suggest that cross-border SALW trafficking no longer occurs (as Section 2.3.6.6 of this 
report underlines, the smuggling of high-specification SALW into Kosovo by criminal groups continues), but as 
is the case elsewhere in the region, the trafficking of SALW to and from Kosovo varies according to demand. 
As tensions and instability in Kosovo and neighbouring territories have diminished in recent years, so too has 
the flow of SALW. Moreover, the significant concerns voiced by respondents to the HHS and focus groups about 
cross-border crime suggests that this issue remains a concern despite what appears to be a fall in the number 
of incidents.
.	 International	cooperation	and	information	exchange
As previously noted, Kosovo’s status as a UN-administered territory prevents its formal participation in most inter-
governmental organisations or fora. Information-sharing mechanisms, in which neighbouring states participate, 
such as annual reporting to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) under the UN Programme of 
Action (PoA), or to the OSCE Secretariat on SALW transfers under the OSCE Document on SALW, are consequently 
not open to Kosovo. Political realities also prevent Kosovo from exchanging information within the SECI0 Regional 
Centre in Bucharest, which allows a network of police and customs officers from South Eastern Europe to share 
intelligence on illicit SALW seizures. 
Despite this, cross-border cooperation with Kosovo’s neighbours on border control issues is reported by UNMIK 
to be frequent since Police Cooperation Agreements with neighbouring territories allow regular liaison on border 
control and security issues. For example, the Border Police Command Centre, established in Prishtinë/Priština 
in May 2003, is able to provide and receive information on border/boundary issues around the clock. UNMIK 
  See http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/oct04/focusklaw3.htm.
  Interview, Marian Fuchs, EAR, 04 May 2006. See also, EAR, Annual Action Programme for 2005 for Community assistance to Kosovo – 
Integrated Border Management.  Available at: http://www.ear.eu.int/kosovo/main/documents/2005Borders.pdf accessed 13 June 2006.
  In the absence of a coherent management policy or strategy for the work of the above institutions, EAR has sought the formal agreement 
of the roles and responsibilities of each agencies, compatible standard operational procedures, and the revision of problematic legislation. 
EAR has also identified a need to train Border Police in integrated border management techniques. EAR, Quarterly Report to the European 
Parliament, October to December 2005. Available at: http://www.ear.eu.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm accessed 27 June 2006. See also op. cit., 
EAR, Annual Action Programme.
00  For example a recent interview with KFOR suggested that, on the basis of information obtained during joint KFOR-Border Police operations, 
‘weapons smuggling is not a large scale activity’. Cenaj, A., ‘There are only 179 authorised weapons in Kosovo,’ Zëri, 11 February 2005 
(translated by KFOR Public Information Office).
0  Southeastern Europe Cooperative Initiative. The SECI Centre has run two multi-lateral exchanges of information between member states 
on trafficking of SALW: Operation Ploughshares (2002-3) and Operation SafePlace (2004-5).
82
SALW Survey of Kosovo 
(2006-08-24)
Police has set a good precedent in this regard, one that should be extended to other relevant institutions when 
the opportunity allows. 
Although Kosovo participates in a number of EU Stability Pact initiatives, one avenue for regional information 
sharing and cooperation that has not been adequately exploited is the Stability Pact Regional Steering Group 
(RSG). Composed of EU, UN and member state representatives from SEE, the RSG meets every six months 
to oversee the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan on SALW. Although provision has been made for 
Kosovan participation within the RSG, according to information provided by UNDP/SEESAC, May 2006 was the 
first occasion on which Kosovo was represented in this group since its inception in November 2001.0 
.	 Transparency	and	oversight
Transparency regarding SALW issues in Kosovo is extremely limited and, in some cases, levels of disclosure 
for this research fell short of the standards found elsewhere in the region. Transparency also varied between 
institutions depending on the issue (for example, while most agencies supplied information on their SALW holdings, 
others, such as the Kosovo Correctional Service and KFOR, proved unable or unwilling to do so). Further, while 
it is possible for dedicated researchers to obtain a reasonable amount of information on SALW Control issues, 
albeit with difficulty, access to information is much more difficult for ordinary Kosovans or civil society actors. In 
fact, beyond provisions for publishing laws and some regulations on websites and in legal gazettes, little public 
information is available on this issue. This has important implications for policy-making and oversight in the fields 
of security and justice: in order for Kosovans to feel that the security and justice sector is accountable to them, it 
needs to be transparent in all areas. This entails the publication of basic SALW-related information such as crime 
and public health statistics, policy decisions and procedures used to manage and procure SALW. 
The extent to which Kosovo’s new Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs will gain the capacity they need to 
perform their intended functions will be a key determinant of the level and quality of control over SALW in Kosovo 
in the coming years. Meanwhile, the transfer of competencies to PISG security and justice sector institutions has 
now begun, although this has so far been a slow and sometimes faltering process. For example, the Assembly 
of Kosovo is still not permitted to legislate on, or oversee, security issues. At the time of writing, one of the 
Assembly’s few attempts to act in this area, the passage of new legislation on hunting in 2005 has yet to receive 
approval from UNMIK. Further, Kosovo lacks the supporting framework necessary for effective parliamentary 
oversight on these issues such as an established practice of governmental reporting to parliament or a freedom 
of information law. 
Outside the remit of national institutions, civil society practices and capacities also remain limited and effective 
channels of communication between this sector and governmental institutions have yet to develop. For example, 
interviews for this research revealed a gap in the understanding of current regulations on hunting between the 
hunter’s association and UNMIK legal office on hunting seasons. NGOs, citizens’ groups, residents associations, 
academics and the media have no formal role either in the formulation of Kosovo’s security policy, or in its 
application or review. Training events for NGOs and journalists on SALW issues may have been delivered in the 
past (usually linked to short-run SALW Collection initiatives),0 but they have not served as an effective spur 
to the development of the sector over the medium-term. If the situation is to improve, governance and policy 
formation on security issues in Kosovo will first need to become more open and accountable. Statutory provisions 
for dialogue between civil society, officialdom and legislators are likely to be necessary before effective bridges 
can be built between these actors.  
.	 Coordination	and	policy	formulation
Effective mechanisms for inter-agency coordination and the development of SALW Control policy are by-and-large 
absent in Kosovo. This has meant that policies and laws suited to meet the territory’s particular SALW problems 
have not typically been formulated to date. PISG institutions, having only recently acquired any competencies 
in this area, have understandably taken a back seat, and it has fallen to international actors to initiate SALW 
0  Correspondence, Adrian Wilkinson, 24 April 2006; Interview, Michael Page, UNDP Kosovo, 22-24 May 2006.
0  Examples would include one-off trainings for NGOs and journalists run by organisations such as Saferworld and SEESAC in 2003 and 
2004. See, for example, http://www.seesac.org/acrContent.php?page=acr&section=3 &content=&report=25.
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Control work and provide accompanying coordination. Yet as previously noted, exchanges of information at the 
national level between agencies such as KPS, KFOR and other criminal justice institutions are often fraught with 
difficulty. The example of Kosovo’s SALW Collection programme in 2003 provides a case in point: a working group 
assembled to coordinate the initiative that included UNDP, KFOR and KPS among its members largely failed to 
produce the clear and consistent policy and leadership needed to ensure the initiative’s success. 
Research for this Survey demonstrates the significant problems faced by government institutions in collecting and 
collating SALW-related information across a range of areas, which is compounded by the attendant problem of 
analysing impacts to inform public policy responses. A culture of isolated working practice among key government 
departments further complicates the picture. A national SALW coordination body (as required by the UN PoA) 
is an essential structure for providing a forum for inter-departmental coordination of effective policy responses 
to safety and security problems. In May 2006, UNDP Kosovo convened a governmental working group on SALW 
Control, which, provided it is supplemented by training for key civil servants across government, and develops 
the appropriate mandate and working procedures, may provide a basis for the development of an over-arching 
SALW Control strategy for Kosovo.04 
	 Conclusion
This Survey highlights a number of areas in which SALW Control in Kosovo requires improvement. For example, 
the possession of illicit arms within the territory, although an accepted fact of life for many, is clearly widespread 
and problematic. The misuse of SALW has been highlighted as a problem, particularly, but not exclusively, in 
association with armed crime and at times of high tension. Within governmental institutions, problems with 
information management, the storage and registration of SALW, transparency and policy coordination have also 
been identified. Crucially, a number of gaps or ambiguities exist in the legal and regulatory framework and the 
responsiveness of the criminal justice sector in this area is unsatisfactory.
There can be no doubt that SALW Control poses a fundamental challenge to the stability of Kosovo, and that 
this is only likely to come into sharper focus as a decision on final status moves closer. Over recent months 
there have been a number of encouraging signals that international and Kosovan power-holders are committed 
to addressing the issue of SALW proliferation and misuse. This will not always be easy: many of the problems 
identified in this report compete for priority and some are complex, particularly when considered in light of 
existing processes and plans for the territory. Further, as is the case in most other transitional post-conflict 
societies, the control of SALW is not an end in itself and cannot be achieved successfully unless it is seen as a 
component of much broader processes of reform and change. 
SALW Control in contemporary Kosovo should therefore be integrated into existing initiatives such as the final 
status negotiations and ISSR, as well as into rule of law programmes. It is critical that leadership is provided to 
ensure that SALW becomes and remains a key element of broader reforms of the security sector. To this end, 
coordination at a senior governmental level is needed to translate the findings and recommendations from 
this and other research into effective and relevant public policy that can be implemented at all levels across 
Kosovo. To enable this, international administrators should continue to encourage the engagement of PISG at 
the organisational as well as individual levels with SALW issues in order to ensure that the future transfer of 
power promotes rather than damages the rights of Kosovans to safety and security.
04  Correspondence, Helena Vazquez, 31 May 2006.
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Annex A – SALW Survey error margins
The margin of error expresses the amount of the random variation underlying a survey’s results. This can be thought of as a 
measure of the variation one would see in reported percentages if the same poll were taken multiple times. The larger the 
margin of error, the less confidence one has that the poll’s reported percentages are close to the “true” percentages, that is 
the percentages in the whole population.
A margin of error can be calculated for each figure produced from a sample survey. For results expressed as percentages, it is 
often possible to calculate a maximum margin of error that applies to all results from the survey (or at least all results based 
on the full sample). The maximum margin of error can sometimes be calculated directly from the sample size (the number 
of poll respondents).
A margin of error is usually prepared for one of three different levels of confidence; 99%, 95% and 90%. The 99% level is the 
most conservative, while the 90% level is the least conservative. The 95% level is the most commonly used. If the level of 
confidence is 95%, the ‘true’ percentage for the entire population would be within the margin of error around a poll’s reported 
percentage 95% of the time. Equivalently, the margin of error is the radius of the 95% confidence interval.
In order to calculate margin error one should find what is standard error. The standard error is the standard deviation of the 
sampling distribution of the sample statistic (such as sample mean, sample proportion or sample correlation).
Where p is proportion we would like to test, and n is number of respondents in a sample.
The standard error can be used to create a confidence interval within which the ’true’ percentage should be to a certain level 
of confidence.
Plus or minus 1 standard error is a 68% confidence interval, plus or minus 2 standard errors is approximately a 95% confidence 
interval, and a 99% confidence interval is 2.58 standard errors on either side of the estimate.
The margin of error is the radius (half) of the 99% confidence interval, or 1.96 standard errors, when p = 50%. As such, it can 
be calculated directly from the number of poll respondents.
The SALW Survey of Kosovo (2006) sampled 1,258 respondents. At the 95% confidence interval this means a standard error 
of 2.8% on the total sample (6.6% and 3.1% for the Kosovo-Serb and non- Kosovo-Serb portions of the sample respectively).
Margin of error (95%) = 0.028 = 2.8% (meaning that one may be sure that the real proportion in the population lies between 
47.2% and 52.8%.
To conclude, the margin of error is the 95 % confidence interval for a reported percentage of 50%. If p moves away from 50%, 
the confidence interval around p will be smaller. Thus, the margin of error represents an upper bound to the uncertainty; 
one is at least 95% certain that the ‘true’ percentage is within a margin of error of a reported percentage for any reported 
percentage.
Sources:
The ESOMAR Handbook of Market Research, Group of Authors, 2005, ESOMAR.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margin_of_error
Margin of error (95%) = 1.96 ×
Standard error =
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